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Abstract 
Although the study of nationalism has expanded over the last decade as 
nationalist movements have increasingly resulted in violent conflict, constructions of 
gender have not been widely recognised as integral elements of these nationalist 
projects. Through an examination of nationalist movements in two case studies, this 
thesis found that gender constructions are vital to the legitimation of nationalist 
movements. 
The need to integrate gender (meaning the constructions of both men and 
women) into studies of nationalist movements stems from the fact that nationalism is 
a social phenomenon reliant on certain social norms and guidelines for its legitimacy. 
Nationalism and gender were examined through two thematic lenses, the politics of 
tradition and the politics of reproduction. The politics of tradition incorporates 
symbolic aspects of gender, in which the manipulation of tradition and history playa 
major part. The politics of reproduction are comprised of gender constructions based 
on the "natural" roles for men and women, such as father and mother. This section 
examines manifestations of gender constructions such as pronatalism and rape. These 
lenses were then used to examine two countries in which there were leadership 
legitimation crises, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. As socialist legitimacy was 
eroded in the 1980s, potential leaders in both countries sought to legitimate 
themselves through nationalist ideology. These nationalist movements, which 
occurred during both the late socialist and post-socialist periods, were highly 
gendered in their rhetoric and discourse. 
Gender constructions were found to be vital in the demarcation of difference 
between national groups, and in the mobilisation of communities to achieve national 
projects. The symbolic and emotive elements of these gender constructions were used 
to create the perception of internal and external threats. Additionally, gender 
constructions were found to have long-term effects on ethnic relations, and, in the 
case of the former Yugoslavia, on the nature of violent conflict and prospects for 
peace. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Gender is a useful tool for political analysis. l Many modem political 
phenomena, such as nationalist movements, are heavily reliant upon and imbued with 
gender constructions, particularly as part of attempts to legitimate leadership. Seeing 
gender as problematic, not axiomatic, allows a deeper understanding of such social 
structures and of political power. 2 This thesis demonstrates the need for incorporating 
gender into the study of nationalism, and illuminates the utility of gender as an 
analytical device. 
This thesis examines how certain nationalist movements legitimate themselves 
in part through this gendered nationalist discourse. By looking at a problematic 
definition of gender in nationalist movements, we can see how identities that are often 
perceived as natural and immutable are actually constructed, and how they are utilised 
to create and maintain power structures. 
Eastern Europe is useful for illuminating the intersection of gender and 
nationalism. The roles of women and men within these societies, the nationalist 
movements that have developed in the area, and the conflicts that have arisen since 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union all provide compelling examples of why this is an 
important area to research. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a time of upheaval 
for many communities in Eastern Europe.3 The end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 exacerbated and resulted in crises of legitimacy for communist 
leadership in the Eastern European countries. The subsequent "revolutions" were 
I Scott, 1988, p 28 
2 Ibid, P 49 
3 By Eastern Europe I am referring to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria, the regions of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. While these 
official boundaries have shifted recently, the general areas remain the same. 
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varied in both fonn and content: some erupted into violence, some have not changed 
their power infrastructure in any significant way, and others are perceived to be well 
on the road to capitalist democracy. One characteristic many of these states have had 
in common has been the use of nationalist concepts and ideology to legitimate 
political power. These nationalist discourses were (and are) highly gendered in both 
rhetoric and policy. 
Many of the borders of Eastern Europe were imposed after WWI, and are 
partially along "ethnic" lines and partially in accordance with the politics of the 
Allies. The various groupings of people, and how they identified themselves, were 
generally either quashed or manipulated by the Soviet-influenced leadership. With the 
collapse of the USSR's influence in the region in the late 1980s, these ethnic, 
religious, and historical identifications became rallying points for nationalist conflicts. 
The gender aspect of these identifications is complex, and is interwoven with the 
professedly traditional and historically "pure" roles of the various nationalist 
groupings. With these issues in mind, this thesis will be looking at Romania and the 
fonner Yugoslavia. In both countries, nationalist sentiment was manipulated by 
various groups throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, incorporating both socialist 
and post-socialist time periods. These case studies clarify the utility of studying 
gender in relation to the legitimation and maintenance of power by demonstrating 
how, in crisis, nationalist movements overtly draw on gendered conceptions to assume 
legitimacy. 
Socialist nations had their own dynamics of legitimation and maintenance of 
power, one of the main methods being the inculcation of certain societal nonns.4 In 
some countries, this was combined with the exploitation of ethnic nationalist 
sentiments for political ends. Rather than adhering to the traditional interpretation of 
Marxist theory, which maintained that communism would transcend national 
boundaries and eliminate the need for nationalist goals,5 nationalist sentiments were 
often manipulated to maintain the power of the leadership. As the political and 
military support structures around them disintegrated and economic (and social) crisis 
4 Verdery, 1991b, p 418-19 
5 Ramet, 1992, p 42 
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loomed, the contenders for power increasingly turned to ethnic nationalist ideology 
for legitimation. 
Legitimation in such instances was sought through the claim to authenticity for 
the nation, specifically through the "naturalness" of the nation. This involves drawing 
on what are purportedly natural roles and identities, such as family structures, when 
justifying a patriarchal leadership, to form the basis for wider societal organisation. 
This legitimacy was gained in part through the co-option of gender roles and 
relationships. Romania and Yugoslavia, the countries analysed in this thesis, 
demonstrate the power to be gained not just by the manipulation of these roles, but in 
the inculcation of the norms that they prescribe. These norms not only define who 
does and does not meet the criteria for membership in the nation, and who is defined 
as the enemy, but they also imbue a sense of validity for the national project. These 
norms are based on what are professed to be absolutes that have innate validity 
because they are eternal and natural: just as the nation is. 
This thesis examines two countries in which there were leadership legitimation 
crises. In the 1980s, under socialist leadership, it was through the aegis of socialist 
ideology that the regimes were legitimated. However, as this legitimacy was eroded, 
potential leaders in both countries sought to legitimate themselves via a nationalist 
discourse. After the collapse of socialism, as former social certainties were thrown 
into confusion, the nationalist rhetoric intensified as various leaders sought to gain 
leadership legitimacy through nationalist concepts. By looking at these legitimation 
crises, we can see how the utilisation of gender as an identifier and as a symbol in 
nationalist movements becomes overt. The use of nationalist dialogue to legitimise a 
particular group or ideology opens a window on the gendered nature of power 
structures. The movements discussed in this thesis rely on gendered constructs to 
demonstrate their right to govern. The claim they make for in leadership is dependent 
upon gender constructions and, in conflict, gendered warfare. 
The case studies are examined through two thematic lenses: the politics of 
tradition and the politics of reproduction. The politics of tradition incorporates the 
more symbolic aspects of gender, in which the manipulation of tradition and history 
playa major part. In this section, the instances of retraditionalisation in the case study 
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countries is investigated, which involves policies aimed at moving women out of the 
work force and into the horne. To justify this, nationalist leaders called on the 
mythology of the nation to strengthen their power bases and demonise the "other": 
those who represented either an external or internal threat to the nation. The politics of 
reproduction deals with gender constructions that are based on "natural" roles for men 
and women, such as father and mother. This section examines how nationalist 
movements attempt to control these constructions, and deals with themes such as rape 
as a nationalist tool of war, and pronatalism. 
Studies of nationalism have generally taken one of two approaches when 
confronted with the role of gender. One approach has ignored gender as irrelevant, as 
it is often perceived to be synonymous with women, and therefore pertains only to the 
private sphere of society. Because nationalist movements and the key figures in them 
are in the public arena, there is no need to incorporate a gender dimension. Scott's 
summation of this reasoning, that an understanding of an issue "is not changed by 
knowing that women participated in it", is made regarding history, but is true of much 
social science literature.6 On an intemationallevel, studies have tended to focus on the 
strictly official, public realm (which usually involves heads of state and negotiators) 
and neglects aspects of gender. The second approach to gender analysis also equates 
gender with the study of women. These studies focus solely on activities at the local 
level, rather than in the wider context of the larger community. This approach 
examines the private realm of women, rather than examining the larger implications 
of gender for the whole community. 
The need to incorporate gender (meaning the constructions of both men and 
women) into studies of nationalist movements sterns from the fact that nationalism is 
a social phenomenon which relies on certain social norms and guidelines for its 
effectiveness. Gender is "one of the most basic organising principles in human 
societies, past and present".7 To understand the power of nationalist movements as 
motivating forces, then, we require an understanding of how these social organisations 
interact on symbolic, community, and individual levels. As is evident in the literature 
review in chapter two, gender is noticeably absent in the discussions on nationalist 
6 Scott, 1988, P 30-1 
7 Verdery & Borocz, 1994, p 223 
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movements and constructions. While some theorists do address social issues such as 
class8, it is only recently that there has been an incorporation on any level of the role 
gender plays. 
The study of gender in nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has 
only been incorporated into this literature for little over a decade. As discussed above, 
gender is a basic unit of social construction.9 Gender as a basic building block of 
society is important in the study of nationalism. In the last decade, there has been a 
growing acceptance that gender plays an integral role in how people perceive 
themselves and are perceived within a group. 
Nationalism's place as an "important" field of study is evident not just in the 
massive body of literature that is already present on the subject, but also in the 
number of current struggles, both violent and peaceful, between groups that identify 
themselves as nationalistic. The study of this type of group identification is important 
for the analysis of how people situate themselves within a community. Both gender 
and nation are significant ways people identify themselves within a community. 
Within most nationalist movements, gender roles are defined in fairly specific ways. 
As will be demonstrated through the examples of crisis, and particularly in conflict, 
gender constructions are not only transformed and entrenched by conflict, but also 
help to determine certain characteristics of the conflict itself. 
It is important to note that there are limitations on a project of this nature. The 
primary qualification is the difference in emphasis on various aspects of the case 
studies. Both Romania and Yugoslavia provide ample evidence of the incorporation 
into and manipulation of gender in the nationalist project. However, the particular 
manifestations of these constructions vary, and it is important to recognise that these 
idiosyncratic experiences result in a variation of emphasis in the case study section. 
There are also certain factors, such as language and distance, that limit the 
amount of primary information available from the case studies. In areas of conflict, 
such as the former Yugoslavia, there is often information available that is skewed 
towards one "side" or the other. Because this thesis is in English (the native language 
8 Hobsbawm, 1983a, for example. 
9 Verdery & Borocz, 1994, p 223 
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of the author) there is a danger that English language infonnation has a particular bias. 
Therefore, this primary material has principally been examined in the context of 
exploring propaganda and rhetoric. 
The issue of language and geographical distance also presents the problem of 
access to primary infonnation. While this has been alleviated by access to infonnation 
over the internet, I have been reliant on many secondary sources for infonnation. This 
has influenced the nature of the case studies, as much of the infonnation and analysis 
is based on other investigations and studies. 
The nature of the topic of this thesis and the geographical difficulties in 
primary research require that this thesis be theory-based, and that it draw on 
secondary sources for the case studies. Because this is a theoretical, qualitative 
approach rather than a quantitative approach, the analysis will consist of a large 
amount of "theory knitting". This will include a synthesis of theories and discussions 
from a wide range of disciplines including political science, history, anthropology and 
sociology. These writings and theories include relevant works on nationalism, 
particularly "seminal" writings on nationalism, those that address gender Issues, 
feminist writings, and conflict theory, an10ng others. 
This thesis first explores the role of gender in nationalism, and then examines 
how nationalist movements ,incorporate and utilise conceptions of gender. This 
demonstrates how gender is imbedded in our understanding of politics in a way that 
often seems so natural that it is deemed irrelevant. This thesis looks at gender in 
nationalist legitimation crises. The relationship between nationalism and gender is 
then illustrated and explored in Romania and Yugoslavia. 
The second chapter reviews the theoretical issue this thesis addresses, namely 
nationalism. This includes a general discussion of the major themes in the discipline. 
This section begins with an overview of the various arguments in the literature, 
attempting to identify the general theories of how nationalism becomes important in a 
community and how it is legitimised. The chapter discusses the modernist paradigm 
and its main critiques. Additionally, there is a brief examination of theories of 
nationalism in Eastern Europe, particularly how they are unique, or different from 
nationalisms in the West. 
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The third chapter discusses gender constructions in nationalist movements, 
and examines the exclusion of this area from nationalist literature. This chapter 
includes an overview of the models of both gender and nationalism and women and 
nationalism that have been proposed by various authors. This chapter also covers 
how gender is located as important in nationalist theory, how gender roles are 
conceptualised in these movements, and includes an analysis of why this is so 
important to nationalist movements. Not all nationalist groups perceive gender in the 
same way or as playing the same role in nationalist movements. Rather, this chapter 
shows that there are trends and similarities that are useful in this examination. 
The fourth chapter provides the framework for the analysis ofthe case studies, 
by presenting the "lenses" through which these countries are examined: the politics of 
tradition and the politics of reproduction. This chapter includes a detailed examination 
of how gender constructions are manifested in the national project, including the 
rhetoric and policies of nationalist leaders, and in the policies and actions of 
nationalist movements. 
The fifth and sixth chapters are the case studies of Romania and the former 
Yugoslavia. The structure of this thesis seeks to utilise these Eastern Europe examples 
as a means of explaining, illustrating and clarifYing the various theories discussed. 
These sections examine the gendered nature of nationalist rhetoric and discourse in 
the media, history, and popular culture. These chapters discuss various nationalist 
strategies such as pronatalism, and will canvass partiCUlar nationalist aspects of rape. 
By examining the particular way that gender is incorporated into the 
nationalist discourse, this thesis reveals the gendered symbolic representations and 
manifestations of nationalist rhetoric. These in tum show the reliance of nationalist 
movements on male and female ideals. These ideals are used to construct national 
identities that are different from those of other nations. These identities are used in the 
presentation of threat to the safety and integrity of the nation, and can be manipulated 
to achieve nationalist goals such as popUlation growth. They can be used as a tool of 
war, such as rape. The utility of understanding the problematic nature of gender in 
these identities is that it helps in understanding what is driving nationalist movements, 
and how they engender such powerful responses in today's world. 
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Chapter Two 
Nationalism 
Chapter two reviews the major themes of nationalism, with a particular focus 
on nationalism and legitimation. The emphasis is on the modem manifestations of 
nationalist movements, how they command such deep allegiance, and the source of 
their legitimacy. The first two sections, modernism and the critiques of modernism, do 
not present a definition of nationalism; rather, they provide an overview of the general 
debates on the topic as they relate to this thesis. The third section discusses theories 
on what are purported to be Eastern European types of nationalism. 
Seymour, Couture and Nielsen trace a split in nationalist theories along the 
division between Ernest Renan and Johann Gottfried Herder, two of the earliest and 
more influential theorists on nationalism.IO The contention is that the differentiation 
between Renan's civic and Herder's ethnic nationalisms led to the current groupings 
of modernist and pre-modem typologies. The assertion of Renan, that the "nation is a 
voluntary association of individuals", contrasts sharply with that of Herder, who 
theorised the nation as "a collective body which transcends each individual", and in 
which ancestry counts more than an individual's choice or desire to belong. I I 
While it is acknowledged that this is a simplified version of complex 
arguments, the division nonetheless becomes the basis for the subsequent separation 
between modem and premodern theorists. The rationale for this is that despite 
attempts to reconceptualise nationalism, it is the dichotomy between civic and ethnic 
that reappears in one form or another. 12 In a stance that is repeated by Smith 
(discussed below), the ultimate reason for maintaining this particular opposition is the 
10 Seymour, Couture and Nielsen, 1998 
II Ibid., P 2-3 
12 Ibid., P 6 
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general acceptance of civic nationalism by academics and theorists, while ethnic 
nationalism is held up by nationalist movements as the rationale and legitimation for 
their struggles. 13 Both the modernist and premodernist approaches follow on from the 
civic/ethnic debate, and are therefore concerned primarily with the origin of the 
nation. 14 Seymour, Couture and Nielsen's critique of their own work is that by 
operating within this paradigm, these definitions and explanations are self-limiting 
and therefore leave "no conceptual space for nonnative arguments or nonnative 
issues.,,15 Premodern theory is not utilised as a theoretical tool to the extent that 
modernist theory is. Because there is not the same degree of rigorous critical analysis 
of premodern theory, the door is closed on other critiques of modern nationalist 
theory, which makes Seymour, Couture and Nielsen's framework inappropriate for 
the purposes of this thesis. By utilising this categorisation, which the authors 
themselves refer to as limiting, other critiques have been excluded from consideration. 
Another way of categorising nationalist theory is to make the division along 
functionalist lines, arguing that since modernist theorists offer the prevailing 
paradigm, they are the important ones to study.16 For example, Smith draws on the 
major critiques of the prevailing paradigm, rather than limiting himself to the 
ethnidcivic debate.17 This approach outlines the major themes in modernist writings 
on nationalism, and then offers critiques of these models and conceptions. Although 
relegating critiques to the end of his work, Smith still presents a useful model for the 
grouping of theories. 
Smith summarises the basic tenets of modernism in five main points. First, 
modernism asserts the modernity of nations, in their location in time, in their 
institutions, and in their concepts. Second, nations could only arise through "modern 
conditions and modernising policies".18 Third, because nations only arose through 
certain conditions, once those conditions no longer existed, neither would nations. 
Fourth, this held for nationalism as well, in that nationalism would disappear with the 
disappearance of these conditions. Finally, nationalisms were socially constructed 
Ibid., P 9 
14 Smith, 1998, p 10 
15 Seymour, Couture and Nielsen, 1998, p 10 
16 Smith, 1998 
17 Ibid., 
18 Ibid., P 22 
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identities, "designed for an age of revolutions and mass mobilisation, and central to 
the attempts to control these processes of rapid social change.,,19 Smith's 
characterisation of what is part of the modernist paradigm may be somewhat 
simplistic, especially in regards to the degree of agreement over numbers three and 
four above, as he makes assumptions regarding the maintenance of the nation that can 
be disputed. His argument on these points assumes that what is made can be unmade, 
rather than recognising how difficult it is to redefine nationalist identities once they 
have been formed. Nevertheless, he presents a useful framework for the authors 
included here. 
Smith's categorisation permits an examination of how the dominant paradigm 
addresses the relevant issues, while allowing for critique and input from other 
theorists. This modernist section below will first examine Gellner, Hobsbawm, 
Breuilly, and Anderson as examples of various theorists in the modernist paradigm. 
The two main critiques are represented by Hutchinson and Smith. 
Modernism 
One of the mainstays of the modernist argument is Gellner's hypothesis that 
nations are modem constructs reliant on a certain type of societal organisation?O 
Nationalism the principle of homogenous cultural units as the 
foundations of political life, and of the obligatory cultural unity of 
rulers and ruled is indeed inscribed neither in the nature of things, nor 
in the hearts of men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life in general, 
and the contention that it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist 
doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self-evident. But nationalism as 
a phenomenon, not as a doctrine presented by nationalists, is inherent in 
a certain set of social conditions."Z! 
It is the current organisation of society that encourages the pairing of central 
culture and central state. The transformation from agrarian to industrial societies 
propelled high cultures - those that are comprised of a literate, homogeneously 
19 Ibid., P 22 
20 Gellner, 1983 
21 Ibid., P 125 
14 
educated population to the fore. This transfonnation required the development of a 
"shared culture, and a literate sophisticated high culture at that."22 
This high culture is imposed through education, communication, the media 
and other means on low cultures. In other words, what were fonnerly small local folk 
groups are now bonded together in a large, unifonn culture. Nationalism is usually 
evoked by representing a culture as under threat from a foreign, high culture that . 
seeks to eradicate it or subsume it. Gellner has presented this as a progression that 
often leads to conflict: a movement looking for "national liberation". 23 
Nations and nationalism transform/create/obliterate pre-existing cultures. 
Nationalism uses history to create something which looks natural, but which has often 
transfonned history quite radically, and not accidentally. Indeed, "the cultures it 
claims to defend and revive are often its own invention, or are modified out of all 
recognition.,,24 This, says Gellner, is the paradox of nationalism. It professes to be 
something natural and inevitable. We are then unable to conceive of a world where 
nations are not the natural structure of global systems, and a state without a nation 
(and vice versa) is a "tragedy" and is "incomplete".25 Gellner has emphasised that 
nationalism is a phenomenon of the modern age in which certain preconditions have 
been met.26 
Hobsbawm has also discussed the paradox between the invented nature of a 
nation's history and the claim that this history is "rooted in the remotest antiquity, and 
the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 'natural' as to require no 
definition other than self assertion.,,27 He developed the concept of the "invented 
tradition", defined as "a set of practices ... of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks 
to inculcate certain values and nonns of behaviour by repetition, which automatically 
implies continuity with the past.,,28 He described a process wherein such traditions are 
22 Ibid., p 141 
23 Ibid" p 57-8 
24 Ibid" p 55-6 
25 Ibid" p 6 
26 Gellner (1983) puts forth arguments that are useful in conceptualising several pertinent issues. One is 
the relationship of nation and the desire for a state. Another is the example that Gellner gives of the 
"Ruritanians". This coincides with the example of Romania, in which "traditional" songs were sung 
and peasant dress worn by people of high social standing in times of nationalist fervour. 
27 Hobsbawm, Eric, 1983a, p 13-14 
28 Ibid., P 1 
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made to appear to have basis and therefore legitimacy in a connection with the past. 29 
The three motivations Hobsbawm described are to create unity in a group, the 
"legitimisation ... of authority", and the "inculcation of ... value systems.,,30 These all 
lead to the defining of group membership and identification with a particular group. 
Co-option, manipulation and invention of cultural signifiers are particularly relevant 
when examined in the context of gender, which Hobsbawm and the other theorists 
discussed in this chapter have not done. 
As a means of illustrating the mechanisms of these invented traditions, 
Hobsbawrn draws on the examples of the Third Republic in France, and the Second 
German Empire. He distils three common devices. The first is what he calls the 
"secular equivalent of the church", or the institutionalisation of concepts and ideas of 
the nation through such means as education.31 The second is that of public 
ceremonies: in the French case, for example, Bastille Day. These memorialise the 
formation of the nation and give citizens cause to celebrate. Finally, the third device 
is the creation of public monuments on a wide scale. These include not just the large, 
imposing statues, but the mass production of smaller scale figures. 32 
Hobsbawrn described the blurring of the line between civil and state society as 
the state standardises cultural and traditional symbols.33 This dynamic has particular 
relevance to the situation in Eastem Europe, where this ''blurring'' took place under 
state socialism as welL Finally, and perhaps of greatest consequence, Hobsbawm has 
made explicit the use and manufacture of actual traditions in relation to defining and 
legitimising the nation, pointing to this as an integral way in which the nation creates 
itself This has obvious implications for the role of gender in the later stages of this 
chapter, both in the symbols that are utilised, and the creation of tradition for 
nationalist ends. 
Smith has claimed that "Hobsbawm provides no clue as to why nationalism 
has been so successfuL,,34 While this is overstating the case, there is a lack of a solid 
29 Ibid., P 4-9 
30 Ibid., P 9 
31 Hobsbawm, 1983b, p 271 
32 Ibid., P 271-2 
33 Smith, 1998, p 77 
34 Ibid., P 129 
16 
link between drawing on the past for legitimacy and the emotive nature of the bond 
between individual and nation. This is addressed in Breuilly's examination of how 
nationalist ideology arose.35 He has contended that, 
Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern 
problem of the relationship between state and society ... .it was turned 
into an ideology by means of notions such as authenticity ... [and was] 
combined in a powerful but illogical way with purely democratic and 
political values. The net result was to transform certain important ways 
of understanding human affairs into political ideology which was 
beyond critical examination.36 
It is apparent that Breuilly believed firmly in the modernity of nationalism, in 
that it is a political manifestation that relies on modern institutions and dynamics. 
Breuilly traced the development of nationalist ideology from the desire to reconcile 
these social and state spheres. 
Breuilly examined the problematic nature ofthe relationship between state and 
society, not least of which is the artificial separation of the twO.37 In a discussion of 
how attempts have been made to overcome this separation, he described how 
historicism can be a useful theoretical framework when attempting to understand 
nationalist ideology.38 Breuilly argued that "it should be impossible for historicism to 
give rise to political value judgements", but that, with certain assumptions about 
nature and uniqueness, these judgements are made and provide the basis for particular 
nationalist ideologies.39 He demonstrated this progression through a discussion of the 
theories of Herder and Palacky. 
Herder's first factor in nationalist ideology is that of authenticity, which is 
derived from what are referred to as nature and the natural state. This authenticity is 
in turn derived from the natural societal organisation of families. Herder maintained 
that society started with families, and when these families joined into larger groups, 
there was a need for leadership.4o From this he concluded that the natural and 
therefore the legitimate state of human society is along ethnic lines, because it is an 
35 Breuilly, 1993 
36 Ibid." P 70 
37 Ibid., P 55 
3& Ibid., P 56 
39 Ibid., P 59 
40 Ibid., P 59 
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extended family. Herder's conclusion is that the national identity is natural and 
positive, while any incursion by foreigners is unnatural and negative.41 
The next phase of the discussion deals with the assertion of validity of every 
community on its own merit. This contention reinforces the notion that each nation, 
being distinct and original, has a way of demarcating and identifying itself. Here 
Breuilly questioned how historicism reconciles this with all the unnatural societies 
that exist, and with the fact that the people writing about these natural states often a) 
could not themselves be anything but products of "unnatural" societies, and b) their 
portrayal of the societies are often arbitrary in what they record and report as natural: 
"These arbitrary judgements, justified by the contrast of natural with unnatural, are an 
essential ingredient of nationalist ideology.,,42 
The final element of nationalist ideology is the reconciling of the historic 
community with political needs. This follows on from the above point, as the 
"logical" political end to the uniqueness of the community is the desire for self-
autonomy. Breuilly contended that not only is this relationship in fact irreconcilable, 
but that it is the appearance of the settling of this issue that gives nationalism its 
appeaL 43 Nationalist sentiment only seems to eradicate differences between culture 
and politics, namely the public and private spheres. While this may seem a simplistic 
connection, it is not necessarily an invalid one. This results in the attractive 
combination of human affairs, history, and symbols. All of these are self-referential, 
giving legitimacy to seeking self-determination, and justifying the society's 
uniqueness.44 
In his conclusion, Breui11y stated that the nationalist solution to the 
relationship between state and society is simple. Since nations are unique, and foreign 
rule can only harm the nation, each nation should have its own government and state. 
Following from this, "history can be understood only in the terms of the achievements 
and frustrations of the nation.,,45 
41 Ibid., P 61 
42 Ibid., P 61 
43 Ibid., P 62 
44 Ibid., P 69 
45 Ibid., P 69 
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Anderson's theory of "imagined communities" redefined the way many 
theorists conceptualised the nation and its formation.46 Anderson's main contention is 
that nations are, in fact, not "natural" groupings that have existed since humans first 
started to congregate. Rather, this particular type of community emerged through a 
combination of certain historical factors. Anderson stated that his purpose is to 
demonstrate that "nationality and nation-ness are cultural artefacts", thus contending 
that nationalism is a constructed phenomenon.47 Anderson argued that by the 18th 
century, the collapse of three previously axiomatic concepts laid the foundations for 
the beginning of modem nationalism. These were: 
1. a particular language offers access to truth. The language and the truth were 
the same, so to have access to the language was to know this truth. 
2. society is organised around high centres and individuals who were different 
from others (divine right). This created/enforced the hierarchical nature of 
society's organisation and "loyalties". 
3. the conception of time in which "cosmology" (concept ofreligion and the 
divine) and history are "indistinguishable", as are the "origins of the world 
and of men".48 
The collapse of these concepts brought a void in identity that sought a new 
relationship between "fraternity, power and time".49 The collapse of these certainties 
meant people needed to seek identity through a different means. National 
identification provided a sense of belonging and an overarching authority. The nation 
was also an entity that located people in history, reaching back in time and existing 
into the future. 
The question then is how these communities identified themselves and their 
members. Anderson answers this by defining nationalism as an "imagined political 
community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".5o This 
community IS imagined as the "image of ... communion". 51 Nationalism then is 
created through language and a sense of belonging in that community, reinforced by 
the narrative of that community's history. Anderson's model is one that portrays the 
powerful sense of belonging lid entity, and the equally important notion that this is not 
a natural or inevitable state for society. 
46 Anderson, 1991 
47 Ibid., P 4 
48 Ibid., P 36 
49 Ibid., P 36 
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A key element that Anderson identifies is the appeal that nationalism has on an 
emotive level. The concept of belonging to a nation can be seen as tantamount to a 
spiritual belief, or a belief in something that not only transcends the individual, but the 
lifetime of all individual. Other conceptions of society, such as Marxism or liberalism, 
did not present that kind of connectedness, or "man in the cosmos" that people 
sought.52 This kind of inclusion and alliance to an overarching community partially 
explains the loyalty that people show to nationalist identities over other identities (i.e. 
class, gender, etc.) It also goes far in explaining the power that nationalism wields in 
uniting and mobilising large numbers of people. 
Mythology, as referred to by Gellner and Hobsbawm among many others, 
plays an integral role not only in the in the maintenance of the nation, but in the 
supposition that the nation is something natural and therefore legitimate. Kertzer 
(1988) discussed how symbols, rituals and myths also teach the "valued norms of 
conduct and what are the criteria of success. ,,53 These norms and values relay to the 
members of the nation what their role in the nation is. Kertzer has discussed the 
specific needs that symbolism and mythology address. Symbolism, he argued, allows 
people to make sense of the information that assaults them in their everyday lives by 
imposing order upon the maelstrom: it is the "primary means by which we give 
meaning to the world around US.".54 Using Geertz's definition of a symbol, that it is 
"any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a 
conception",55 Kertzer described how Anderson's imagined community is actually 
conceived through symbols: that "far from being window dressing on the reality that 
is the nation, symbolism is the stuff of which nations are made.,,56 
The modernist paradigm presents a framework of constructed identity in 
nationalist movements. It is the relationship between the constructed nature of this 
identity and the perception of the identity being natural that is explored above. When 
we then look into a particular nationalist movement's rhetoric, the dialogue around the 
50 Ibid" p 6 
51 Ibid., P 6 
52 Ibid., P 9-12 
53 Kertzer, 1988, p 13 
54 Ibid., P 4 
55 Geertz, 1966, p 5 as cited in Kertzer, 1988, p 185 
56 Kertzer, 1988, p 6 
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manipulation of history and the invention of tradition becomes clear. The efforts to 
anchor the nation in antiquity are part of legitimation-seeking. The "natural", family-
centric, hierarchical foundations of such a national movement created a security of 
identity that struck a chord which was, as we shall see, particularly resonant in 
Eastern Europe. 
Critiques of Modernism 
The theorists above describe nationalism as a modem occurrence. While the 
modernist paradigm allows (to different degrees) that there may have been ethnic and 
historical ties between groups of people in the distant past, the argument is that these 
ties cannot be construed as nationalism. Rather, nationalism is a constructed political 
phenomenon; it is based on invented traditions, and is an imagined community reliant 
on cultural artefacts. These modernist arguments, while representative of the 
dominant theories, are challenged on some structural levels by theorists such as 
Hutchinson and Smith. 
Hutchinson has disagreed with the notion that nationalism is a political 
construct. 57 Hutchinson's primary argument is that there is a distinction between 
political and cultural nationalism, and that the political is not the relevant construct. 
Political nationalism is the mobilisation of like-minded people who seek to create a 
community of "educated citizens united by common laws and mores like the polis of 
classical antiquity.,,58 Sometimes using "ethnic-historical identities" to engender mass 
support, the goal of political nationalism is to obtain a state for this nationalist 
community. 59 
On the other hand, cultural nationalism is not a constructed entity but is 
"accidental" and is unique.60 Hutchinson maintained that cultural nationalism relies on 
new concepts for vitality, unlike political nationalism's reliance on retraditionalisation 
for legitimacy. 61 Countering one modernist argument that cultural nationalism is a 
57 Hutchinson, 1987 
58 Ibid., P 12 
59 Ibid., P 13 
60 Ibid., P 13 
61 Ibid., P 13 
21 
"regressive force", he claimed that "cultural nationalists act as moral innovators" and 
are in fact forward thinking. 62 The politicisation of cultural nationalism is reconciled 
through the cultural nationalist's efforts to ensure the nation's non-assimilation by 
other cultures: a state is sought to preserve the uniqueness of the nation. This nation is 
a "progressive culture in active contact with other societies." 63 
Nationalist historians are described as tellers of the "national destiny"; with 
Hutchinson reframing the modernist idea of a constructed mythology as that of the 
historian's combination of scientific research with "romantic" ideals to help the 
members of the nation "rediscover their authentic purpose.,,64 Indeed, these scholars 
constantly encourage individuals not to imitate the heroes of whom they write, but 
rather to see them as embodiments of an ideal. They are to be inspirations, so that 
"every true member of the nation, then, is an artist-creator".65 
My critique draws attention to who decides the criteria for a "true member". 
This can be a very political decision. Although Hutchinson referred to the political 
necessity of the nation seeking its own state (which can also be questioned), the 
dynamics he described among cultural nationalists point to a very subjective and 
arbitrary conception of the nation. In the reality of human and social interaction, 
Hutchinson's portrayal of cultural nationalism seems to lead to an affirmation of the 
modernist paradigm. 
Smith has written of his own journey from being a modernist student of 
Gellner's to believing that the modernist emphasis on elites was inadequate in several 
ways: it did not explain the passion that nationalism evokes, it did not include the 
popular involvement in nationalism, and it did not fully explain the relationship 
between historical cultures and the form nationalism takes today.66 Hence, Smith 
arrived at the conception of ethnies, "named human populations with shared ancestry 
myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a 
sense of solidarity" as the basis of the nation.67 
62 Ibid., P 34 
63 Ibid., P 35-6 
64 Ibid., P 14 
65 Ibid., P 15 
66 Smith, 1998, p 190 
67 Ibid., P 191 
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Smith located the beginning of the concept of "nationalism" in the 18th 
century, but feels it is insufficient to explain the connection with "national structures, 
sentiments and symbolism". For this, scholars of nationalism must go much farther 
back in history, necessitating an examination of how roots and connections of modern 
nationalism can be traced back in time: farther than modernists are willing to admit.68 
Careful to distinguish between his theories and those of primordialist ideology, Smith 
referred to the mechanisms of "community, shared memory and collective destiny, i.e. 
by lines of cultural affinity embodied in myths, memories, symbols and values 
retained by a given cultural unit of population.,,69 These all point to a community that 
is rooted in the past, based on a "myth of descent", not the actual tracing of a lineage. 
We are then presented with three ways that the modem nation forms out of 
these historical groupings and identifications. Firstly, "bureaucratic incorporation" 
stems from the competition of monarchs for resources and wealth. This resulted in the 
middle classes being incorporated into "an increasingly accented, territorialised and 
politicised 'national' culture"'. 70 Smith associated this with "civic" nationalism, in 
that it gradually became not just the middle class, but the general populace. The 
second, "vernacular mobilisation", involves the "quest for authenticity" in the past, 
and is often referred to regarding nationalist mobilisation. This results from a 
movement of intellectuals looking to the past to create an identity that seems genuine. 
Unsurprisingly, the nationalism this forms is "founded on 'ethnic' conceptions".71 
Finally, in a very brief section on nationalisms formed out of immigrant cultures, such 
as the USA and Canada, Smith discussed "providentialist frontier nationalism", which 
is based on the nation's plurality of cultures.72 It is not clear whether the historical ties 
here are those that the migrant cultures bring with them, or if such nations merely 
have short histories. 
The modern nation, which stems from antiquity, means that "the nation ... as 
concept and ideal formation, is historically firmly embedded".73 Here, Smith does not 
differentiate between uses of history in theoretical conceptions of the nation and 
68 Ibid., P 190 
69 Ibid., P 192 
70 Ibid., P 193 
71 Ibid., P 194 
72 Ibid., P 194 
73 Ibid., P 195 
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nationalist rhetoric. Smith's theories on the historical roots of the nation include an 
aspect of legitimate historical connection that the others have not, but I am not 
convinced that it is a complete examination of nation formation and analysis. I 
contend that he takes the connection too far, as is demonstrated in his abrupt analysis 
of "providentialist frontier nationalisms". While his concept of ethnie may be 
convincing in some areas, its failure to explain the dynamics in other situations means 
it is unsatisfactory as a general theory of nationalism. 
Eastern European Nationalism 
This section exammes the argument that there is a particular kind of 
nationalism unique to Eastern Europe. Explicit in many of these theories is the 
contention that this unique type of nationalism makes the region more susceptible to 
entrenched conflicts. Implicit is the contention that Western nationalisms are rational 
and logical, and therefore somehow more legitimate than Eastern nationalisms. The 
theorists discussed below posit various theories on why nationalism in Eastern Europe 
has developed the way it has. Sardamov, for example, has presented several 
perspectives on Yugoslavian nationalisms and why they disintegrated into armed 
conflict with each other. 74 Kohn's contention was that Eastern nationalism developed 
through resentment of the West, whereas Sugar has engaged in a somewhat 
contradictory effort to describe Eastern European nationalisms in Western terms. 75 
While contending that Eastern European nationalisms are distinct from those in the 
West, Sugar attempted to utilise models based on the Western paradigm. 
Sardamov initially categorised the theories of nationalism that have been 
applied to Yugoslavia: constructivist, instrumentalist, structuralist, culturalist, and 
essentialist or primordialist. 76 The constructivist approach sees nationalism as a 
modem phenomenon, based on models such as Anderson's conception of imagined 
communities. This view holds that nations, far from being strictly and permanently 
defined, are a "fluid, highly malleable and pragmatic affiliation". 77 The 
instrumentalist view draws from this, but maintains that nationalist movements are 
74 Sardamov, 1997 
75 Kohn, 1945; Sugar, 1994 
76 Sardamov, 1997, p 461-2 
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elite-created and manipulated for political purposes. These are Western models that 
derive from the Western conceptions of the rational individual. Sardamov next 
referred to structuralist and culturalist theories of nationalism, specifically in regard to 
Eastern Europe. Structuralism lays the blame for ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe at 
the door of institutional collapse, which leaves society in disarray; whereas the 
culturalist explanation examines cultural and religious differences in these societies. 78 
The final grouping, essentialist (or primordialist), states that "each people in the 
region represents an organic community of common ethnic descent".79 This is usually 
reiterated and reinforced by a sharing of "glorious and painful historical 
. " 80 expenences . 
Sardamov settled on the essentialist approach to describe events in the former 
Yugoslavia. In this model, the Croat and Serb forms of nationalism are based on a 
long history of victimisation and perceived wrongs done by the other. He concludes 
that this constant demonisation of the other has resulted in the two groups being 
unable to view each other as anything other than inherently an enemy. His conclusion 
is that it is this construction of the other that has resulted in the intractability of the 
conflict: neither is capable of seeing the other as anything other than a threat, and that 
this conflict would have occurred regardless of the attempts at manipulation by the 
nationalist leaders.8l What he does not explain, however, is how after many years of 
peaceful coexistence there was a Yugoslav identity, to the extent that radical means 
had to be taken to differentiate between ethnic groupS.82 Sardamov's analysis of 
Yugoslav nationalist identities is very useful, but his conclusions ignore the way that 
identity is manipulated. 
In another approach, and working from the view that "nationalism is a state of 
mind", Kohn has contended that a state is one of the requirements of a nationalist 
movement. 83 This requirement was drawn from the theory that the state is the highest 
demonstration of legitimacy and is a kind of "consummation". Although Kohn traced 
77 Ibid., P 461 
78 Ibid., P 462 
79 Ibid., P 462 
80 Ibid." P 462-3 
81 Ibid., 
82 See Meznaric (1994) for a discussion of how rape was used to make this differentiation in Kosovo (p 
82). This is also discussed at length in the chapter four of this thesis. 
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a similar search for legitimacy and sovereignty back to the Greeks, he maintained that 
not until the French Revolution was a true form of nationalism born (this places Kohn 
in the modernist paradigm with Gellner and Anderson).84 The transformation of the 
populace from being "no longer in the nation, but of the nation" meant that a 
reframing of the masses' perceptions of themselves and their affiliation took place.85 
Kohn then traced the differences between Western and Eastern nationalisms to 
the political cultures in which they arose. In the Western world, according to Kohn, 
not only was nationalism a "predominantly political occurrence", it also took place 
(with the exception of the USA, where it was simultaneous) after the "formation of 
the future nation state." The difference in the Eastern world was that nationalist 
struggles clashed with existing boundaries and political systems. Kohn then went on 
to describe the relationship between East and West, in which the West, as a leader and 
teacher in nationalist movements, "wounded the pride" of the Eastern elites' 
nationalisms.86 
Kohn contended that Eastern nationalisms grew in a tradition of trying to fmd 
their own style of nationalism, always defining themselves in opposition to the West. 
Eastern nationalists reached back to mythologised pasts that were based on dreams of 
a homeland that was destined to be reclaimed. Here we have the crux of Kohn's 
argument: that in attempting to find its "own" nationalism, the East defined its 
identity along historic and ancient relationships which contrasted completely with the 
Western conceptions of liberalism, individualism and rationality. Kohn also asserted 
that this growth in opposition to the West resulted in an "inferiority complex" , in 
which nations were likely to "over-assert" themselves.87 Kohn plotted the widening 
divergence between East and West as crucially affected by the different nationalist 
movements. As the West became rational and looked forward while casting off the 
vestiges of medievalism, the East reached back in time to concepts of the past, and 
relegated itself to a secondary role yet again.88 
83 Kohn 1945 
84 Ibid., P 18 
85 Ibid., P 20 
86 Ibid., P 330 
87 Ibid., P 330 
88 Ibid., P 331 
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Kohn's interpretation of an Eastern "inferiority complex" can also be 
interpreted as one of the reactions of nationalist movements to perceived threats from 
external forces: defining the unique Eastern nations against the Western nations could 
be seen as creating a threatening "other" that would create support for Eastern 
movements. What is useful about Kohn's analysis is his outline of some ofthe sources 
of Eastern nationalist legitimacy, and the reliance on a glorified past as a method of 
rationalising a particular nationalist future. However, Kohn's argument, that Eastern 
nationalisms are based on inferiority complexes, does not seem to satisfactorily 
account for the emotional attraction of the movements. Rather than Kohn's reflexive 
perception of Eastern nationalisms, a more convincing perspective may be rooted in 
the seeking of a distinctive national past. In other words, it is more a case of each 
movement asserting its own uniqueness against all others, rather than only the West. 
Another perspective on Eastern European nationalism is that of Peter Sugar, 
who maintained that there are four kinds of nationalism in Eastern Europe, which 
loosely correlate to Western types. 89 These were bourgeois nationalism, (most like 
the West) such as the Czechs; aristocratic nationalism, such as Poland and Hungary; 
popular nationalism, such as Serbia and Bulgaria; and bureaucratic nationalism, which 
Sugar identified with Turkey, Greece and Romania.9o Sugar then presented the 
rationale for these categorisations, country by country, looking at their original 
nationalist movements. 
Sugar contended that Czech nationalism developed in a mostly Western 
manner - through the bourgeoisie because this class strata had developed enough to 
take a leadership role. This was due to the Czech nobility being foreign, which not 
only created a gap between commoners and nobility that the bourgeoisie could fill, 
but also meant that there had been foreign influence on the intellectual movements of 
the Czechs, bringing Czech nationalism closer to the Western variant, 9 I However, 
Sugar contended, the lack of a Czech state forced Czech nationalists to increasingly 
include traditionally Eastern European styles of nationalist components; what Sugar 
89 Sugar, 1994 
90 Ibid., P 46 
91 Ibid., P 47-48 
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calls "less realistic and more historical-traditional than the bourgeois nationalism of 
western Europe.,,92 
Sugar's explanation for the same phenomenon not occurring in Poland and 
Hungary, despite similar contact with the West, relies on the lack of any cohesive 
middle class. His contention is that this middle class was more closely aligned with 
the nobility in Czech society. Sugar sees the adoption of nationalist principles by the 
Hungarian and Polish nobles as what Sardamov would call instrumentalist: the 
nobility utilised anything that ensured their hold on power.93 
The examples of popular nationalism, Serbia and Bulgaria, are so categorised 
because the development of their nationalist movements is found in the "lower 
clergy" and peasants. Sugar's contention is that because the landowners in these 
regions were foreign (Turkish), nationalist movements developed among the 
peasantry, and were "basically democratic and directed mainly against landlordism".94 
The bureaucratic nationalism that arose in Romania, by contrast, was caused by the 
inability of a liberal nationalist movement to gamer enough support. With the other 
divisive movements that were tearing up the country, the only concept that bonded the 
country was an irredentist one. Sugar maintained that the bureaucracy utilised this 
irredentism to ''justifIy] its slogans and omissions and its condemnation of all 
opposition as unpatriotic.,,95 
Sugar's discussion of how Eastern European nationalism appears is somewhat 
one-dimensional. His argument is undermined by two important flaws. One, as 
referred to earlier, is the inappropriateness of the Western models he applies to the 
countries involved. Despite his own contention that the two areas are different, Sugar 
fails to expand his hypothesis to include this. The second flaw is the method used to 
prove that these categories are valid. Rather than presenting case studies that seek to 
demonstrate a well developed theory, Sugar presents a primarily historical progression 
with little analysis to prove his contentions. 
92 Ibid., P 47 
93 Ibid., P 48-50 
94 Ibid., P 52 
95 Ibid., P 51 
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The theorists above present various arguments in an attempt to isolate the 
uniqueness of Eastern European nationalisms. Ironically, this is what most Eastern 
European nationalist movements base themselves on: uniqueness. Sardamov's 
contention that nationalism in Yugoslavia is based in essential aspects of Serb and 
Croat identities. While the logic of this assertion may not withstand scrutiny, the 
perception of Serb or Croatian national difference is part of the entrenched conflict 
between the two groups. Kohn's representation of the inferiority complex of Eastern 
Europe is also indicative of this uniqueness. The legitimacy of these national projects 
lies in their ability to indicate their difference from other groups. The background 
these analyses present is also useful as this thesis moves towards an examination of 
gender in the region; namely that the nationalisms in the region are contested and 
often co-opted by the power elites, despite claims of representing the popular will. 
Conclusion 
There are several key elements of the discussions above. First, the nation is a 
modern construct, imagined through language, a shared culture, and a common 
identity rooted in history. Anderson's conception of membership in a community 
being reinforced by the community's history is particularly salient, for it conveys the 
importance of history to the existence and reinforcing of the national identity. This 
history is often manipulated to achieve modem goals, such as presenting the nation as 
a natural and self-evident entity. 
One of the main methods of legitimation for nationalist movements is the 
presentation of identity constructs as "natural". This naturalness, as Breuilly argues, 
comes from a perception of the nation as an extended family, which as the next 
chapter will demonstrate, helps to determine gender roles. The utilisation of a family 
hierarchy to delineate national identities is drawn on heavily in nationalist rhetoric. 
The combination of a "natural" national identity and the importance of a shared 
history is then made more potent if the history is presented as one of victimisation, as 
Sardamov detailed in his discussion of Serb and Croat nationalisms. 
Throughout these theories are variations on a theme: the imagining of the 
nation through invented traditions and manipulated histories. The question becomes 
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how these social structures are imagined and manipulated. Although some of the 
theorists above deal with social issues, such as class, the modernist paradigm and the 
critiques above generally neglect the part played by a certain social construct: 
specifically, gender. Gender is one of the most potent ways to manipulate nationalist 
sentiment, as gender constructions can be highly emotive. The conceptions above 
operate on a construction of the nation and the state as structured entities that have 
within them groups such as elites and masses. While discussing the foundation of 
ethnic nationalism in the family, the impact of this construction has upon nationalism 
and the national identity is not explored. As many of the theorists in the next chapter 
argue, the familial structure has many ramifications for the nation, both symbolically 
and physically. 
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Chapter Three 
Gender and 
Nationalism 
This chapter covers the main relevant critique of the modernist theorists and 
the paradigm within which they are writing: the neglect of gender in nationalist 
literature. This is demonstrated through an examination of the major lines of theory 
regarding gender and nationalism. The rationale for including gender in the study of 
nationalism is based on the need to include a comprehensive examination of gender in 
this discipline. The discussion of models of gender in nationalist movements begins 
with theoretical models of how women participate in the development and 
perpetuation national projects, including feminist interpretations of gender. This is 
followed by models of gender in these movements, and discussions of various 
thoughts on how to reconceptualise gender in nationalism. 
Definition of Gender 
Before continuing with a discussion of gender, it is necessary to clarify exactly 
what is meant by the term. In much of the literature there is a tendency towards, as 
Nagel phrased it, the "conflation of the terms 'gender' and 'women,.,,96 Scott 
contended that one reason the terms are used almost interchangeably was the 
"political acceptability in the field", in that "gender" was a less controversial and 
more academically acceptable term of analysis in the 1980s.97 Nagel argued that the 
efforts to incorporate gender into the study of nationalism focus on women, rather 
than the examination of gender, i.e. feminine and masculine roles. Because much of 
96 Nagel, 1998, P 243 
97 Scott, 1988, P 31-2 
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the literature on gender and nationalism is written to redress the lack of information 
on women in nationalist projects, Nagel maintained that this means the literature is 
still bereft of a real examination of "what is uniquely masculine in a structural, 
cultural or social sense, about such clearly gendered activities as ... nationalism.,,98 
Current literature surrounding gender and nationalism focuses on women, 
especially (and understandably) feminist literature. However, as this thesis attempts to 
analyse the relationship of gender with nationalism, it is key to identify the 
relationships of men and women with this dynamic. Because of the lack of 
information available in the literature on the relationship between masculinity and 
nationalism, by necessity there will be more primary information on women. 
Consequently much of the analysis of men's roles will be extrapolated from the roles 
identified for women. 
Jones, in an approach that has caused a degree of controversy, argued that 
although they have produced important analyses of women in nationalism and 
conflict, feminist analyses of gender are restricted by their own mandate: to analyse 
women, rather than men and women.99 He therefore "argues for a more balanced and 
inclusive understanding of the role gender plays in conditioning the actions and 
experiences of men and women alike, in the Balkans war and other confiictS."lOO 
Jones has argued that wartime gender crimes are not perpetrated solely against 
women, and that men are also targeted for specific actions because of their gender. 
Therefore, "a more nuanced and inclusive approach to the gender variable is 
warranted." 101 
As discussed previously, one of the main contentions' of this thesis is that 
gender is one of the fundamental elements of societal structure. 102 This argument has 
maintained that although the use of devices like gender symbolism are prevalent and 
obvious in nationalist movements, gender has been all but ignored in nationalist 
theory and analysis. Adding to this definition is Scott's discussion of gender as both 
"a constitutive element of social relationships" and a "primary way of signifying 
98 Nagel, 1998, p 243-4 
99 Jones, 1994 
100 Ibid., P 115 
101 Ibid., P 115-16 
102 Verdery and Borocz, 1994 
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relationships ofpower.,,103 This includes the transmission of symbols and culture, as 
well as the maintenance and legitimation of power. 104 
Absence of Gender in Nationalism Literature 
Yuval-Davis has maintained that nationalism literature in general has 
neglected the importance that gender (and women) plays in both the formation and 
maintenance of the state and nation. los The majority of nationalism theory has 
separated public and private spheres, with women in the private, which in tum renders 
them irrelevant. Yuval-Davis and others (pateman, 1988) have contended that this is 
an invalid separation, as "the public realm cannot be fully understood in the absence 
of the private sphere ... [i.e.] without both, mutually dependent halves of the 
sphere.,,106 Grant asserted that this stems from the omission of women from such 
foundational theories as those of Hobbes and Rousseau, who understood men's 
essentially aggressive nature to be at the root of the transition to society.l07 Yuval-
Davis advocated the inclusion of more anthropological theory, which recognises the 
"links between gender relations and social cohesion". 108 
Peterson contended that "sameness within is purchased at the pnce of 
institutionalising difference." 109 In its efforts to demarcate and identify the boundaries 
of a nation, the state must set cultural and social boundaries in policy. This is an 
important aspect to keep in mind as this thesis looks at gender roles: these are roles 
that are often determined out of a desire to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the 
nation. Peterson has argued that by ensuring that certain gender roles are perceived as 
natural, they are removed from the public sphere, and therefore remove women from 
political power. I 10 In other words, "natural ising" women's roles de-politicises them, 
and thus dis-empowers them. 
103 Scott, 1988, P 42 
104 Ibid., P 43-44 
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Rationale 
In a general sense in the social sciences, gender informs our understanding of 
social and power structures. As Scott maintained, "gender is a primary field within 
which or by means of which power is articulated" while remembering that "concepts 
of power, though they may build on gender, are not always literally about gender 
itself." 1 1 I In other words, there is not always a sign reading, "this power structure is 
gendered". It is often in the absence of women in official power, or in the organisation 
of a society through male and female spheres, that we see this gendered structure. 
The taking for granted of certain gender identities leads to a neglect of gender as an 
analytic aid. By treating issues of gender as problematic, not axiomatic, we can 
examine "what is at stake in proclamations or debates that invoke gender to explain or 
justify their positions.,,112 
It is useful at this point to look at the rise both of nations and conceptions of 
gender respectability. Mosse has shown how the two became intertwined by 
contending that sexuality and the physical body, which had been integrated into 
society, became "privatised" in the 1800S.113 In other words, in the West, the human 
body became something to hide if one was to be considered respectable. The morality 
of the Victorian Age dictated strict codes of conduct reliant on one's gender. This is 
not to say that there had not been such codes in the past; merely that such things as 
bodily functions and the male and (especially) the female bodies were now subject to 
rigorous norms in order to maintain respectability.114 
One of the most interesting aspects of Mosse' s work is the way he connected 
gender with nationalism. The rise of the nation and nationalist movements came at 
approximately the same time as a general shift towards sexual "decency".1l5 This 
raises the conjunction of acceptability and respectability, upon which the nation and 
sexual decency are reliant. Nationalism as a movement includes only those who are 
acceptable; who meet certain norms. Acceptable sexuality and gender roles rely on the 
III Scott, 1988, P 45 
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same: adherence to a set of norms. Within a nation the norms that are required for 
acceptance are based on gender norms of acceptability. I 16 Continuing membership in 
the nation is dependent upon continuing adherence to one's appropriate gender role. 
According to Peterson, gender "illuminates the processes of identity 
formation". I I? When inequality is "natural" and "presumed", it becomes a very 
difficult concept to battle. On a larger, more inclusive scale, gender inequality sets the 
stage for other institutionalised inequalities. The gendered nature of nationalism 
results in a "naturalisation of domination ("us" at the expense of "them") [that] 
depends upon the prior presumption of men/maSCUlinity over women/femininity.,,118 
Peterson warns that outdated dichotomies simplify and obscure the real issues of 
gender and nationalism and their complexityY9 By continuing to take this tradition of 
dominance for granted, and by not challenging it, our capacity to challenge these 
inequities is diminished.12o This goes back to Scott's discussion of gender and power 
structures: the relationship is not necessarily a literal or explicit one, but one that 
nonetheless needs examination. 
Combined with this socialising of gender, in order to control it, there is a vital 
connection between nationalism and nature. 121 The socialisation of bodies and their 
genders, and their connection to "organisations of power and inequality" lead to the 
gendering of the nation. This is where gender enters the arena of nationalism, and is 
where understanding gender roles and symbols becomes important. 122 
The concept of "nation" connects the individual to the state. The connection 
between an individual and the state is conceptualised as personal, rather than as 
distant, with state leadership far removed from the individual's day-to-day existence. 
Nationalism in this scenario bonds the natural with the civilised, and the individual 
with the state.123 This makes the relationship between state and individual reliant on 
certain qualifications and conditions of memberships: it implies a relationship of 
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belonging and other. This relationship renders "physical space socio-politicar~; in 
other words, with the body as a political unit~ and with the aforementioned 
relationship between gender and state, gender then becomes an important aspect of 
nationalism. 124 
Models of Gender and Nationalist Movenlents 
Before exploring the literature on gender and nationalism, this section first 
explores the inclusion of women into nationalist literature. One of the most widely 
accepted models of how women are incorporated into the nationalist "project" is that 
of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, who have presented five ways in which the relationship 
between woman and state can be conceived. 125 These concentrate on the relationship 
women have within the processes of nationalism, rather than on the roles imposed 
upon women. 126 
The first relationship IS women as "biological reproducers of members of 
ethnic collectivities" with an emphasis on the biological part ofthat role. 127 Second is 
women "as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups", in reference to 
policies that forbid women to have sex/children with men outside their group, and to 
cultural restrictions on marriages and rights that are along religious/ethnic lines. 
Third, women "participat[ e] centrally in the ideological reproduction of the 
collectivity and as transmitters of its culture", as women are the main caretakers of 
young. Fourth, women are "signifiers of ethnic/national differences as a focus and 
symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and 
transformation of ethnic/national categories". The formative state calls upon its 
members to "fight for the sake of our women and children". The notions of a nation as 
a "motherland" and the image of "raping the land" are images with very strong 
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emotive power. Finally, women can be seen "as participants in national, economic, 
political and military struggles".128 
Two aspects of this final category are key. Firstly, the authors discussed the 
role that women play in these struggles, such as women as actual fighters and the fact 
that they still seem to playa "supportive and nurturing" role. Secondly, the authors 
briefly discussed the very different ways that nationalist struggles perceive and 
portray women's "liberation" movements. 129 The authors emphasise that women are 
not merely actors being acted upon: "Women actively participate in the process of 
reproducing and modifying their roles as well as being actively involved in 
controlling other women.,,130 
Yuval-Davis has revisited the roles of women in nationalism discussed above 
with a slightly different focus. 131 The categories are citizenship, culture, and origin, 
with emphasis on "the specific boundaries of inclusions and exclusions that [the roles] 
construct.,,132 Yuval-Davis first looked at citizenship, and how it differs for women 
and men. The concept of citizenship, based on such formative theories as the "Rights 
of Man" involved particularly the rights of man. This was not accidental, but 
intentional: men were the "representatives" of the family. This is a relationship that is 
continued today through custom and through policies of the state. Therefore, when 
the discussion turns to Eastern Europe, the irony of using terms like "civil society" 
and the "state" is that women are often omitted from these spheres, since the state is 
often dominant in civil society. 133 
There is an argument that citizenship reqUIres full participation in a 
community, and this, Yuval-Davis has argued, is where one of the great debates in 
Western feminism occurs.134 This complete equality can be seen as requiring full 
participation, which "has led some feminists to think that the only way women could 
gain full equality would be if they were to share equally all citizenship responsibilities 
12& Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, p 7 
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and duties.,,135 In other words, women had to have equal representation in all aspects 
of society, such as holding official and public positions of power. This is opposed to 
arguments that women are capable of holding separate but equal power, as is argued 
in many non-western societies. 
Secondly, Yuval-Davis wrote on "gender relations and cultural constructions 
of collectivities", which was based upon two elements. First, women as symbols in 
nationalist conceptions, for example, motherland, mother tongue, etc. In these 
symbols women represent the collectivity of the nation. The second is the 
transmission of culture through women: both because of their role in raising the 
children of the national community, and through the appropriateness of their 
behaviour. In other words, they are signals, especially in multi-cultural societies, of 
what is acceptable within the boundaries of their culture. Any dissension from the 
norm threatens the homogeneity of the group, which feels it must present a united 
front to "others", The behaviour most often referred to is women's sexual behaviour, 
which is related to the third element in Yuval-Davis' framework. 136 
The third section is "gender relations and the biological reproduction of 'the 
nation"'. This portion of the discussion concerns nationalisms that are not voluntary 
but "race" based. Here, the "purity" of a community is dependent upon preventing any 
outsiders from parenting children of the nation. This, in terms of policy, means no 
marriage between members of different nations/ethnicities. This also leads, as 
discussed in the Yuval-Davis/Anthias article, to population control methods such as 
sterilisation and access to birth contro1.137 
In a review of the work of Yuval-Davis, layawardena and their discussions of 
the participation of women, Sylvia Walby (1992) has proposed "emphasising the 
question of women's differential involvement.,,138 This is where Walby branched 
away from the framework of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, especially their claim that 
women participate in the national project as much as men, but in different ways. 
Walby contended that women participate when the national interests coincide with 
135 Ibid., P 626 
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their own interests as women. 139 This appears to be a limited analysis, as it assumes a) 
that women make their decisions based on their identification as women first and 
foremost, and b) that membership and participation in the national project is presented 
as a choice, not a fact. Walby assumed that women perceive a choice about their 
identification with the nation and believed they often can and do make a decision to 
identifY themselves in another way. Part of the reason Walby made this assertion is 
the belief that women are more peace-oriented than men. 140 She did not address the 
fact that women are usually excluded from the militarisation process, such as military 
conscription. Walby then went on to ask whether "women's greater non-violence 
[has] an effect upon their view of the 'national' project, in that they are less prepared 
to pursue nationalist goals by force than men".141 Walby answered this through 
Western examples of women involved in pacifist projects that can be seen as opposed 
to the nationalist project. Later in the argument, Walby concluded that "women are 
simultaneously both less militaristic and less nationalistic because militarism is often 
seen as an integral facet of a national project.,,142 
Walby's assertions ignored evidence from around the world of women's 
involvement in nationalist movements both militarily and in support of military 
action. Her argument also oversimplified the relationship between gender and 
nationalism. As will be demonstrated later in the case studies, there are many cases of 
feminist movements falling victim to nationalist movements as women choose their 
national identity over one of "global womanhood". While this may be unpalatable, it 
is nonetheless one of the realities of conflict, and ignoring it does not strengthen 
Walby's contentions. 
Peterson has also presented a feminist critique of nationalism and gender that 
includes relevant issues. However, her argument revealed some general problems in 
the literature that are important to address. One of Peterson's main concerns, which 
provides a basis for some of the other points raised, is somewhat controversial. This is 
that men cannot bond with others by giving birth (mother-child bond), and therefore 
need to bond through the physical manifestation of an abstract concept. Peterson 
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maintained that nationalism satisfies men's need for group identity, which, 
presumably, women get through being able to have children. 143 
There are a number of problems in Peterson's analysis. One is the implication 
that women are a generic, monolithic group who identify themselves as bearers of 
children alone, and that men are also a generic group, whose need to create a nation is 
based on competition with women's ability to create life. These assumptions and 
generalisations undermine the validity of her argument, as they are based on single 
(and possibly erroneous) aspects of gender that ignore the complexity of such 
constructions. However, the real contradiction arises when Peterson later argued that 
women and people have a series of ways of identifYing themselves, such as class, 
race, etc, and not just according to gender. Peterson also implied that women's roles 
are purely acted upon them, rather than also assumed by them. 144 
Peterson also argued that "reproduction [is] the most political... of all 
activities." Following the above point, the struggle of men to control the biological 
boundaries of the nation entails control over reproductive policy. This restricts 
women's autonomy of decision-making over their own bodies.145 Peterson discussed 
this through the framework of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, with some alternative 
perspectives, as follows. 
Peterson left untouched the first element of the Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
framework, which is that of biological reproducers of the state. 146 The second, that 
women are social reproducers of the state, Peterson referred to as the "battle of the 
nursery". In this situation, the state can utilise control over citizenship, marriage, and 
other means to regulate the continuation of the culture and people. Thus citizenship 
becomes increasingly important as the state requires it for basic rights. 147 
The third element is that women are "signifiers of group differences". This is 
the section that discussed the gendering of symbols. Here Peterson called on the claim 
I disagreed with above, arguing that men use symbols, images, myths, etc to 
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reproduce the nation and have something to fight and die for. The reproduction of the 
nation through symbols, images and languages that are gendered produce "social 
groups that are based on abstract bonds between men, who are distanced from 
reproductive activities.,,148 The objectification of women through such symbols and 
images makes them into possessions of men. It also helps to explain why women's 
appearance and adherence to cultural rules are so important. These are essential to the 
continuation and reproduction of the nation. 149 
A further intersection of gender and nation is through women's participation in 
"political identity struggles". Here Peterson disagreed with the picture of women as 
always peaceful and peacemakers. 150 For example, women can take up arms, nurse, 
gather information and, because they can often move more freely than men, are 
capable of taking messages back and forth. The misperceptions of women's roles in 
war and the lack oJ analysis of their roles is explained by the removal of women from 
the public sphere. War and high politics are therefore seen as the realm of men, thus 
excluding exploration of women's roles. 151 
The fifth and final element that Peterson covered is that of women as general 
members of society. In other words, women have other alignments aside from those 
with other women. These "social hierarchies" include "racism, classism, ageism, 
heterosexism, ablism," etc. These categories are interactive. This then led to a 
discussion of different contexts and different allegiances, and how people associate 
themselves with different categories on different issues. lS2 Peterson's piece is useful 
in its further treatment of the five points of Yuval-Davis and Anthias. However, 
Peterson's rationale for men creating a national struggle is problematic, and, as 
pointed out above, large sections of her argument are unconvincing. 
Nagel has taken a different approach by focusing on the masculinity of the 
state and its related institutions. One of the issues she discussed is that of essentialism. 
Essentialist definitions of inclusion, she argued, play an integral role in certain 
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nationalist movements, and rely heavily on gender definitions and norms. Nagel 
defined essentialism as a classification that relies on one central characteristic. 153 In 
other words, essentialism defines people by one aspect that then not only defines them 
and all others in that group in one way, but disregards any other affiliations an 
individual may have. Indeed, "the weakness of the essentialist approach is its 
arbitrariness and easy faisifiability.,,154 Essentialism is an issue that is relevant to 
other theorists (Walby:1992, Calhoun:1997) who made assumptions about the roles 
women play in nationalist struggles. These assumptions usually portray women as 
more peaceful than men, and therefore not as involved in the nation and nationalism. 
This is an essentialist view of gender roles that ignores evidence to the contrary at its 
peril. By not examining the roles that men and women play, we will never have a true 
understanding of the intricacies of gender and nation. 
In comparing the roles that men and women play in nationalist struggles, 
Nagel has relied heavily on the model set forth by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, above. 
One of the key elements of Nagel's discussion is her treatment of essentialism. In 
opposition to Walby's argument, which maintained that women are somehow innately 
more peaceful than men, Nagel demonstrated the flawed logic of such an argument. 
The complexity of identity and gender cannot be reduced to one characteristic to 
which the majority of a group will adhere. Women often choose their national identity 
over their identity as a woman. Nagel has outlined some of the ways in which women 
do participate in nationalist movements and conflicts, showing that their participation 
is different, rather than non-existent. Outlining some of the restrictions that women 
face in participating in nationalist conflicts, she then detailed the methods in which 
women utilise the conceptions others have of them to fight for their national project, 
including moving information, recruiting supporters, and forming their own military 
units. 155 These are roles that women often assume in times of conflict, as the conflict 
transforms the structure of the society in which the roles are constructed. Women 
assume many different roles in nationalist struggles, as roles are transformed and 
redefined in times of danger. 
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Nagel addressed two important issues that are often left out of the literature. 
The first is that essentialism as a theory of gender is not a valid method' to analyse 
what actually occurs in the construction and perpetuation of gender roles. However, it 
is utilised in nationalist ideology as a way of maintaining boundaries within and 
around a nation. The second is how the present literature defines in practice what 
studying gender entails. The need to include women in nationalist literature too often 
excludes discussion of the relationship between men and women in its analysis of 
feminine roles alone, while professing to analyse gender. 
Turning to these essentialist constructions that are utilised in many nationalist 
movements, it is important to note that one of the most common conceptualisations of 
gender in Eastern Europe nationalisms is that of the nation as family. This establishes 
a gender hierarchy in which gender roles are then adopted according to one's position 
in this "family".156 In other words, women become mothers, daughters, and wives, 
with the attendant roles, while men become fathers, sons and husbands. Family based 
societies also have an element of "naturalness" to them. Again, this construction 
draws on the inherent legitimacy of the natural argument. Socialist regimes attempted 
to eliminate gender-based differences in some spheres (i.e. making the private 
public)157, while maintaining these same gender roles when drawing on a history that 
gave legitimacy to the nationalist leadership. 
McClintock sees the family model as offering nationalist commurtities an 
"indispensable figure for sanctioning social hierarchy within a putative organic unity 
of interests." 158 The construction, of the supposedly natural structure of the family lent 
legitimacy to similar hierarchies in the public arena. In other words, the family of 
nationalism was natural and thus impervious to criticism. When the "subordination of 
woman, and child to adult was deemed a natural fact", 159 there was subsequent 
legitimation for gendered, family-based hierarchies. 
State socialist societies often drew on these conceptions of family structures in 
their relationships between individual and state. The contradictory approaches to 
156 Stychin, 1998, p 9; Verdery, 1994, p 229-30 
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gender taken under state socialism provide examples of just how problematic these 
constructions can be. Official state socialist rhetoric emphasised the equality of men 
and women, but in reality socialist policies relied heavily on maintaining the 
inequities of the past. Verdery's model of the relationship between nation and gender 
under socialism has three components. First is citizenship, in which women and men 
have unequal standing as citizens in regards to maintaining and enjoying the rights of 
that citizenship. Second are the symbols of gender utilised in nationalist dialogue and 
mobilisation. Third is the effort made by socialist regimes to "eradicate male-female 
differences to an unprecedented degree, casting onto the state certain tasks associated 
with household gender roles.,,160 By making the connection between socialist regime 
and the re-assignation of gender and family roles, the integral role that gender has 
played in the creation and perpetuation of the socialist Eastern European state 
becomes apparent. 
These conceptions of gender meant that a complex relationship between the 
state and the individual arose; one that was sexual, patriarchal, and familiaL Verdery 
has explored the image of "nation as loverlbeloved", which is an extremely emotive 
issue in national politics. This created a personal relationship between the individual 
and the nation, rather than a remote and distant one. This creates a bond that allows 
members of a nation "come to feel themselves nationaL,,161 This process is enabled 
through the "cathexis" of sexualising of the nation state. In other words, the bond 
between the individual and the nation is manifested in an emotional, often romantic 
relationship. The nation becomes both female sexual object and the mother with her 
sons. 162 The importance of Breuilly's discussion, in chapter two is highlighted by this 
overcoming of the separation between society and state. The sexualising and 
personalising of the state makes it more accessible. 
Conclusion 
The acceptance of gender roles in various cultures/nations/communities as 
"natural" is as fraught with conceptual danger as is accepting a nationalist mythology 
160 Verdery, 1994, p 227-29 
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as accurate and objective. While there has been a general acceptance that histories 
and traditions are at least manipulated if not invented, there has not been the same 
realisation that gender role creation is just as important to the development and 
perpetuation of the nationalist project. It is essential that gender be incorporated into 
the study of this field, and not tacked on as an interesting aside that mayor may not 
have relevance. 
The examination of the way gender influences the construction of societies 
and communities, and in particular ones that base inclusion on nationalist definitions, 
is vital to understanding the nation in crisis. If the argument that women are central 
"in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture,,163 
has validity, then the gendering of that role must have significance. If, for example, it 
was unimportant who perpetuated the cultural traditions and represented the societal 
boundaries, then this would be the domain of both men and women. 
In chapter two, Anderson's discussion of the new relationship between time, 
power and fraternity was discussed, as was Breuilly's discussion of the family and the 
conception of a "natural" community. These are combined when we examine the 
gendering of individuals through family roles. Men and women are constructed in the 
nation through these professedly natural roles, which ties them to the family of the 
nation, which in tum is a natural entity. All of these connections with an organic and 
therefore positive and authoritative construction of identity are powerful and 
reassuring. The constructed nature of gender identities have allowed connections 
between nature and society, and between the individual and the state. Gendering the 
perception of the nation, such as identifying it as a mother or a father, makes the 
relationship of individual and nation not only closer but personal. The bond is an 
personal one that engenders loyalty on an emotional level. 
The framework within which this thesis will examine gender and nationalism 
uses the lenses of the politics of reproduction and the politics of tradition. The models 
illustrated above reveal that these are the two avenues through which gender roles 
both influence and are influenced by nationalist movements. The symbolic 
representation of these archetypes in the traditions of the nation, along with the 
163 Anthias and Yuval-Davis, p 313-15 
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legitimating power of these traditions is a consistent theme in the literature. Consistent 
too is the reproductive theme of women as mothers and men as fathers, with women 
as the biological reproducers ofthe nation and men as the protectors. 
The issue now becomes how to utilise t~s analysis. This chapter has presented 
strong theoretical arguments not only for including gender in an analysis of 
nationalism, but for concluding that gender plays an integral role in the creation and 
continuation of nationalist movements. The next phase of this thesis will present a 
framework of analysis to demonstrate how gender is used in nationalist discourse; 
particularly when that discourse seeks to legitimate a leadership in crisis. 
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Chapter Four 
Politics of 
Tradition and 
Reproduction 
This chapter discusses the context and the framework for the two case study 
chapters. The main body of the chapter is a discussion of the lenses through which 
gender and nationalism are examined: the politics of tradition and the politics of 
reproduction. 164 The next section canvasses several areas in which deviations from 
the nationalist "norm" occur, and how these contradictions are either assimilated or 
rejected within the nationalist paradigm. Finally, in order to understand the context in 
which these nationalist struggles for legitimacy were occurring and the relevance of 
the case study countries, it is important to understand the dynamic between state 
socialism and gender. This is followed by a discussion of the post-socialist status of 
gender, which includes a brief examination of the relationship between nationalism 
and socialism. 
Politics of Reproduction and Tradition 
Gellner contends that "nationalism is a theory of politicallegitimacy,,165. This 
raises the question of how nationalist movements assert legitimacy. To begin with, we 
draw on the concept of a "natural" nation, one in which legitimacy is derived from the 
supposed uniqueness of the nation in which there are certain seemingly immutable 
norms for behaviour and identity. Because inclusion in this nation is initially based on 
164 Thanks to Joanna Goven for the concept of these lenses. 
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biological criteria (Le., one must be born into the nation), women are categorised 
primarily as mothers. More specifically, they are mothers of the physical population 
of the nation. In this paradigm, men are classed as fathers, which has its own 
ramifications. The traditional nature of these roles is then apparent on both a physical 
and symbolic level. Women are mothers who are encouraged to bear children for the 
nation, to take care of the horne, and to raise the children. Men are expected to work 
and earn the income for the family, and to protect the family. 
These roles are then translated into the language and culture of the larger 
community. Women are not meant to work, at least not as a career, as their role is to 
have children and to care for them. Men are pressured to maintain their roles as 
providers, and also to assume the leadership roles in the community, as the 
community takes on the hierarchical structure of a "traditional" family. The nation is 
often presented as a family,166 which means the nation itself takes on gender 
characteristics, such as the "motherland" or the "fatherland". This is then translated 
into a variety of symbols that define and delineate the nation, which also draw it 
closer to the members of the nation. In other words, the individual is actually a part of 
the national family: there is not the sense of distance and separation between the 
individual and the state apparatus. The tendency for people to imagine the nation as a 
family in part sterns from a need to make the nation more personal and available. The 
symbolism of the nation as a body (usually with a significant gender) enables easier 
access to the nation for its members. 167 This tendency to "reify" abstract notions 
results in the images of the nation as a mother or father, with all the attendant 
implications. The personification of the nation is not a value-free characterisation, but 
is itself instructive and meaningful. Indeed, "these symbols provide a way to 
understand such abstract political entities as the nation and a means (indeed the 
compulsion) ofidentifying with them."168 
The politics of tradition incorporates the more symbolic aspects of gender and 
nationalist legitimacy. As discussed above, the "natural" roles of the nation are 
usually along what are considered traditional lines. The symbolic reproduction of the 
166 See McClintock, 1993, p 64; Verdery, 1994, p 227-229; Scott, 1988, P 47 
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nation is, as Yuval-Davis and others have argued, a gendered process. 169 The 
reinforcing of hierarchical and patriarchal systems through gendered traditions and 
national legends results in the maintenance of highly gendered nationalist movements. 
These movements draw on conceptions of the professedly essential roles of men and 
women to both metaphorically and tangibly represent the nation. Therefore, the 
politics of tradition, which operate on a more symbolic level, are intertwined with the 
politics of reproduction, in which the intangible is enacted on and through the actual 
bodies of the members of the nation. 
The politics of reproduction is not solely an examination of the biology of the 
nation: it concerns the manipulation of reproduction, and the effects of perceiving 
gender roles as biologically determined. Earlier discussions of women and the nation 
have focused on the role of women as both the biological and the symbolic mother of 
the nation. By opening this discussion up to include men and women, and by 
examining the effects of this, we see this intersection of politics and reproduction. By 
viewing nationalist movements through this framework we see a number of areas 
where the politics of reproduction are used for political legitimacy. 
Politics of Tradition 
Under the rubric of the politics of tradition, this section will examine several 
concepts. These include a discussion of history as a conduit for nationalist 
legitimation; tradition as a way of reaffirming and reinforcing legitimacy; symbols of 
the nation and how these are gendered; and, finally, the influence of myths in the 
modem nationalist movement. It is my contention that the constant, modem-day 
reaffirmation of the nation through traditions results in a society in which the 
identifications of gender and nation are reliant upon one another. Intertwined with 
these traditions are symbols of various kinds, from those of Orthodox religion to the 
potent symbol ofKosovo in Serbian legend,17o 
169 Yuval-Davis, 1993 
170 Eastern European nations maintain a great deal of their traditional cultures in a variety of ways such 
as dance, marriage ceremonies, and legends. See, for example, "The Legend of the Arges Monastery" 
in Miroiu (1997) and the importance of traditional wedding customs in Olsen (1990). 
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Gellner examines the way nationalist movements often manipulate history, 
transforming and creating mythology to make their nationalist movement appear 
natural. 171 This often occurs through certain presentations of the past by sympathetic 
historians. This is not to make the presumption that there is, in reality, an objective 
historian anywhere. Rather, it is to make the point that in many nationalist movements 
there is often state-sanctioned (if the nation also holds power in the state) and 
supervised manipulation of history.172 There is a need to locate the nation in a 
common historical past in order to lend authority and unity to a nation. As Hobsbawm 
so aptly put it, "Historians are to nationalism as poppy growers in Pakistan are to 
heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market."l73 
The invention of tradition as a means of legitimating power has been widely 
studied. As discussed in the first chapter, Hobsbawm makes a convincing argument 
that the historical anchoring of the nation through tradition is one of the main ways 
nationalist movements instil norms in the community. This is achieved through 
invented traditions that establish "certain values and norms ofbehaviour".l74 It is this 
particular facet of Hobsbawm's model that is important as we examine the 
relationship between the ways particular roles are adopted, enforced and encouraged 
within a nation, particularly when that nation is in crisis. The adoption of these 
traditions in part defines the nation and determines what is appropriate within the 
nation. 
Part of what these traditions emphasise are symbols of the nation, which 
function as identifiers of what is important and desirable in the nation. In chapter two, 
I discussed Kerzter's definition of symbols, in which symbols are conveyers of 
meaning in the nation. Kertzer argues that, "the symbols at the heart of ritual 
observances are part of the tissue of myth that helps structure an understanding of the 
political world ... ,,175 Through symbols, members of a nation "learn both what are the 
171 Gellner, 1983, p 55-6 
172 An example of this is the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, which contains a variety of 
historical perspectives on Serbia and its mythology; http;llwww.barw.org.yu/ 
173 Hobsbawm, 1992, p 3 
174 Hobsbawm, 1983a, p 13-14 
175 Kertzer, 1988, p 13 
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valued nonns of conduct and what are the criteria of success.,,176 These teach 
acceptable behaviour and nonns in a society. 
I would like to expand that conception to one that sees symbols, as presented 
in myths of the nation, traditions, and in the media, as instructive for the nation. I 
draw on Kligman's analysis of symbols and rituals, in which a ritual is a "dramatic 
form that articulates the relationship between a symbolically constructed order of 
meanings ... and a system ofinterpersonal and institutional relationships.,,177 Here I am 
using ritual in the context of traditions and myths as means of "mobiliz[ing] 
perceptions and values that are often not consciously recognized.,,178 In this paradigm, 
the symbols that Kerzer refers to (which allow people to make sense of the 
community in which they live) are conveyed through these vehicles. For example, 
myths of the nation combine stories of history, be they of victimisation or heroism, 
with the presentation of symbols that are then used as touchstones for a nationalist 
movement. 
Myths usually relate how the founders ofthe nation (allegedly) acted, which is 
then prescriptive for the present day members of the nation. 179 They often present an 
archetype of the idealised member ofthe nation. Benton, in her discussion of founding 
myths of the nation, refers to the importance of war and conflict in many of these 
myths. ISO The combination of the birth of the nation through conflict with the 
messages of self-sacrifice and valour that are imbedded in these myths are not merely 
to bond the population of the nation, they are instructive. 
National myths convey a sense of community, identity, and history. They can 
be seen as lessons in appropriate patterns of behaviour and how interpersonal 
relationships, particularly gender relationships, should be enacted. Many relate to the 
foundation of the nation itself, rooting the nation's origins in a history that stretches 
back in time, thus legitimising the nation. 181 This concept of the "birth" of the nation 
176 Ibid" p 13 
177 Kligman, 1984, p 169 
178 Ibid" P 169 
179 Benton, 1998, p 28 
180 Ibid" P 27 
181 Ibid" P 28 
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is significant for its personification of the nation, which conveys both the organic and 
natural (and bloodline-dependent) nature of the nation. 
There is an effort in these myths to present the nation as cohesive, particularly 
in times of national crisis populated with men and women who do their duty to the 
nation by fighting (and dying) bravely, by sacrificing children and loved ones, and by 
reproducing the nation. These images, generated through myth, media and other 
cultural transmitters, seek to portray a nation that stretches through time, both into the 
past and into the future, that is constant and unchanging. However, this appearance of 
immutability is not the reality. The definitions change according to what is necessary 
for the preservation of the nation in the present day. 182 
One of the key ways to disseminate information of any kind is through the 
media. As was discussed previously, Anderson showed how the nation was and is 
imagined through the print media. The shape of the community, both externally and 
internally, is imagined and defined at least partially through various media. It can be 
drawn from his argument, and from Kertzer's, that the constant imagining and re-
imagining of the nation carries with it an identification of symbols and roles that are 
appropriate for the imagined community. The nation is delineated as much by these 
internal indicators as by its external ones: ie, the defining of difference from "others" 
who do not belong. I contend that this (Anderson and Kertzer's) explanation of the 
relationship between media and the nation can be extended to include gender, 
particularly gendered traditions and roles. 
The manifestation of the traditions discussed above takes a variety of shapes. 
There is considerable emphasis on tradition in the communities discussed here, and 
there is a correlating emphasis on the methods of transmitting popular culture. 
Therefore, there is a great deal of epic poetry, folklore and folksong that is heavily 
referential to mythology of the nation. There are also many festivals and celebrations 
that promote the traditions of an idealised folk culture. These will be covered in depth 
in the case study chapters. 
182 For example, see Gellner's (1983) argument regarding the paradox of nationalism in chapter two of 
this thesis. Also see Haddock and Caraiani's (1999) discussion of the flexibility of nationalism in 
regards to communism. (p 261) 
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How does this symbolising of the nation actually manifest itself? Verdery 
refers to the way language is gendered, and the way gender is drawn on to mobilise 
the nation,183 primarily through gender-specific language, such as the "fatherland", or 
the "mother-tongue". The utilisation of this type of gendered language is one of the 
most widely recognised ways that gender is incorporated into the nationalist project. 
Imagery such. as the "rape of the motherland" or "going to war for the fatherland" 
evoke the nation as a body.184 This coincides with the contention that women are "a 
focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and 
transformation of ethnic/national categories.,,185 
An examination of language reveals that gender is used in the construction and 
reproduction of the nation through imagery such as the birth of a nation. The 
relationship between the national family and the actual family is one that is reciprocal: 
as Scott contends, there is often a perception that "the well-ordered family [is] the 
foundation of the well-ordered state.,,186 The concept of a nation as a mother or sister, 
daughter or lover gives a personal motivation to a male soldier going off to war, as 
well as supporting the notion that the female relative needs to be protected. 187 
Additionally, women are symbols of the nation, used to maintain the 
differences between the national "self' and the enemy "other".188 Indeed, "defining 
and controlling women is central to demarcating ethnic and national boundaries.,,189 
The importance of women as the symbol of purity of the nation is evident in the 
multitude of cautionary legends and myths that convey this theme. If a woman is 
raped, it means the men who have responsibility for her in the nation have failed in 
their task, and that they are emasculated. With this emasculation comes a loss of 
legitimacy: "rape in legend frequently symbolises the destruction of male authority, 
which has lost its essential quality of rule, the will and power to protect the weak.,,190 
183 Verdery, 1994 p 227-29 
184 Ule & Rener, 1997, p 228 
185 Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, p 7; Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627-28 
186 Scott, 1988, P 47 
187 Ibid., P 48 
188 Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627 
189 Charles and Hinljens, p 2 
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Because of the female construction of the nation, "violence committed against women 
is directed against the physical and personal integrity of a group.,,191 
The converse of this is the need to then paint the enemy as impure and 
unworthy of such defence and respect. In order to differentiate between "us and 
them", enemy men and women must be portrayed as embodying the antithesis of 
acceptable characteristics. The need for women to remain sexually pure, for example, 
is cautioned against by portraying enemy women as promiscuous. Enemy men are 
rapists who threaten women (and therefore the nation), and yet are also portrayed as 
effeminate and not "real men". Salecl has discussed the delicate balancing act 
between portraying the threat of the enemy as a rapist and the need to portray the men 
of one's own nation as strong and virile.192 
There are two assumptions on which these traditions rest: essentialist 
conceptions of the nation and, following on from that, the correctness of traditional 
society. These are described below. 
Essentialism 
Essentialist conceptions of identity, as discussed in the first chapter, focus on 
defmitions based on one or two "fundamental" characteristics. When membership 
within a certain group is based on a particular criterion that is itself legitimised by its 
adherence to a "natural" order, it can appear to be logical to assign gender roles along 
these same lines: "What racism, nationalism, and sexism seem to have in common is 
that they are all categories which ... divide the universality of the human species into 
exclusive transhistorical groups which are supposed to be separated by essential 
differences, or to become self-conscious and act as if they were separated by essential 
differences.,,193 In many nationalist movements, gender roles and national roles are 
interdependent. The nation, as outlined in chapter two, is dependent upon adherence 
to social norms: if men attempted to assume women's roles in the care of children, 
for instance, the rationale for protecting women as the caretakers and conveyers of 
191 Seifert, 1996, p 39 
192 Satecl, 1992, 54-5 
193 Balibar, 1994, 192 (original emphasis) 
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traditional culture would be weakened. The use of biological and therefore seemingly 
indisputable (and "correct") roles for men and women is thus made clear. 
Retraditionalisation 
The theme of the role of the mother is constantly revisited in the literature on 
gender and nationalism. The imagining of women as mothers plays a crucial part in 
imagining the nation itself This symbolic conception of the woman as mother, 
combined with the physical reality of motherhood, has a number of consequences. 
One is the removal of women from the private sphere, or the retraditionalisation of 
gender roles. 
Retraditionalisation often emerges as a trend in nations that are attempting to 
assert their legitimacy, as many were after the collapse of socialism. Part of socialist 
ideology was to eradicate identifiers such as nationalism and religion, and the 
traditions that went along with them. 194 However, the relationship between socialism 
and nationalism was not this simple, for as will be discussed in the case study section, 
state socialism often resorted back to nationalist identities to assert its "flagging 
legitimacy".195 Regardless, the perception of nationalism was that it represented a 
return to the natural roles that had been denied under socialism. By presenting 
themselves as "genuinely" Serbian, Romanian, Croatian, etc, nationalist leaders 
established the authenticity of their nation, and defined themselves in opposition to 
the previous regime of socialism. 
Retraditionalisation is a way of defining difference between groups, and 
gender roles constitute integral parts of that difference. 196 Part of this traditional 
society is its basis on the naturalness of gender roles in the Serbian, Romanian, or 
Croatian nation, and therefore the naturalness of the nation itself. 197 Drawing on the 
model of women as cultural signifiers, Ule and Rener argue that through 
retraditionalisation, "only women who have dedicated themselves exclusively to their 
families are capable of preserving traditional values and the national consciousness of 
194 Gilberg, 1998, p 64 
195 Ibid., P 64. Thanks to Jim Dckey for highlighting this point. 
196 Dng, 1995, p 46 
197 Dng makes this argument regarding Malaysia, 1995, p 46 
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new generations.,,]98 In other words, the process of returning women to the home 
ensures that women will be there to properly educate the nationalists of tomorrow, as 
well as safeguarding the hierarchical roles that are nonna1ised in the nation. 
The politics of tradition as an analytical lens is a particularly apt one for 
Eastern Europe. The next section, the politics of reproduction, will further illuminate 
how gender and nationalism interact, and how gender constructions are manifested in 
the nationalist project. 
Politics of Reproduction 
This section examines the control of the concept of natural roles for men and 
women, discussing reproductive control, such as birth control and abortion, as the 
nation moves towards a perceived crisis. This includes pronata1ist policies, which 
encourage and legislate attempts to increase the population of the nation. 199 This 
section also includes a discussion of rape as a tool of nationalist conflict, both in the 
presentation of a threat to the nation and as a means of warfare. 
The conception of women as mothers and men as fathers entails the adoption 
of a variety of gender roles for both men and women, all of which are reinforced by 
mythical ideals and symbolic representations. The motherhood conception also results 
in attempts to regulate and control the sexuality of the members of the nation. "Not 
incidentally, those who are preoccupied with the 'purity' of the race would also be 
preoccupied with the sexual relationships between members of different 
collectivities. ,,200 
The need to control the sexuality of women becomes important when national 
membership is patrilineal: it is biological fact that the father of a child is harder to 
detennine than the mother. This results in attempting to protect the nation through 
policies designed to maintain the purity of the nation (pronata1ism) and cultural 
restrictions (no sex before marriage; no sex with members of another nation) that are 
reinforced by cultural taboos. All of these are direct descendants of the conception of 
198 Ule & Rener, 1997, p 225 
199 Yuval-Davis, 1989 
200 Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 628 
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women as mothers: of women serving a biological role in the nation.201 Yuval-Davis 
and Anthias outlined the need of nations to control the reproduction of social 
boundaries through women, focussing on the "proper" way to maintain a group's 
identity. 202 
This need for maintenance of identity is heightened if there is a threat to the 
integrity of the nation. For example, Moghadam argues that a nation in crisis 
"constructs an ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism, and the 
religious order. It assigns women the role of wife and mother, and associates women 
not only with family but with tradition, culture, and religion.,,203 Just as these 
patriarchal values and religious symbols are the underpinnings of nationalism and 
define gender roles, so are these gender roles necessary for the continuing legitimation 
of the nationalist identity. By framing certain "guidelines" of appropriate behaviour in 
nationalist rhetoric, the validity of the nationalist identity and therefore the coherence 
of the nationalist community is augmented. The control over the "mother" of the 
nation becomes integral to the purported survival of the nation. 
Pronatalism 
When there is a crisis for the nation (which is how a crisis of leadership 
legitimacy is often portrayed), one of the top priorities becomes the physical 
preservation of the nation. This often leads to armed conflict in some form to 
militarily "protect" the nation, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Another form of 
protecting the nation and preserving its strength is increasing the population, in which 
gender constructions obviously play a major role. Anthias and Yuval-Davis' 
framework of gender and nation, as previously discussed, outlines the particular 
perception of women as biological reproducers of the nation.204 These boundaries 
become particularly important when the nation is in crisis, as women become both the 
cause to fight for (the symbolic motherland) and the symbol of the boundaries of the 
nation. Pronatalist policies and rhetoric are frequently presented in times of crisis, 
both to present the image of an imminent threat, and to combat that threat. These 
201 Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, p 8 
202 Ibid., P 9 
203 Moghadam, 1995, p 336 
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policies often seek to increase populations that are risk of diminishing due to 
battlefield casualties, or is in danger of being outnumbered by its enemy's population 
(as in the case of Serbs in KosOVO).205 
Pronatalist policies, which seek to increase the population, range from 
restricting access to abortions and birth control, to media campaigns encouraging 
women to have more children, to the extreme of punishing women and families who 
have fewer than a specific number of children. The utility of women in the 
reproduction of the nation partially lies in pre-existing conceptions within the nation 
of gender roles. With the intertwining motivations of duty to the nation and the 
defining of oneself along essentialist definitions of gender, the call for women to 
surrender rights to abortion and birth control and to have as many children as possible 
is powerful. If a definition of self is reliant upon essentialist and biological elements, 
then the obligation to have many children (and therefore replenish the nation) 
becomes a high priority. Nationalist goals and natural duties provide potent 
motivation to have more children. 
A perceived threat does not necessarily need to be military to prompt 
pronatalist feelings. National movements that perceive an ethnic minority within its 
borders to be a threat often encourage population growth to combat that threat. There 
are also economic factors: such as when a large population is perceived as an 
indicator of strength in international terms. In this scenario the leaders of a national 
movement may believe that a large population base will give international status and 
economic growth.206 This threat to the nation is more nebulous than a direct military 
one, but is still motivating. When nations are competing in a region or within a state 
for legitimacy which may stern from resources, or even international recognition, 
there is a perception that a larger population helps to attain these. 
In the context of the issues raised above regarding pronatalism, abortion 
policies can be seen in certain circumstances as indicators of nationalist movements in 
crisis. This is not proposing that abortion policy itself is an indicator of the level of 
nationalism in a country. Rather, there are specific cases where abortion has been 
204 Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627-28 
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targeted as "killing the nation" (i.e., killing the unborn population of the nation). 
Abortion, a right everywhere in Eastern Europe in the latter socialist years other than 
Romania,207 has been decried by leaders who speak of the need to regenerate the 
nation. The calls to restrict or remove access to abortion have been in many cases 
intertwined with efforts to increase the nation's population. 
The framing of abortion in nationalist rhetoric may have something to do with 
the validity such rhetoric lends. As Ule and Rener argued, "It is characteristic of many 
post-socialist countries that the opponents of abortion cite the 'threat to the nation' 
being posed by the decreasing birthrate.,,208 Here the dynamic of nationalism and 
gender becomes even more complex, as gendered nationalist rhetoric is utilised to 
achieve other goals, such as garnering support for anti-abortion campaigns. 
Although little is written on it specifically, men were affected by socialist 
pronatalist policies as well. They too were encouraged to have as many children as 
possible, although they were not held responsible for the care of the children. 
Kligman, in her discussion on socialism and pronatalism, makes the point that men's 
masculinity was, in a strange twist, assaulted by the policies. In these traditional 
societies, "the banning of abortion challenged men's patrilineal "rights" to the sexual 
and reproductive lives of their wives, which the paternalist state expropriated by 
fiat.,,209 
The overarching conception of pronatalism is the subsumation of the 
individual body to the goals of the nation, in which the personal motivations of men 
and women become secondary to the nationalist project of producing more children 
for the nation. As the case studies will show, in Romania in particular this policy was 
carried to an extreme. 
207 Moghadam, 1995, p 344 
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Rape 
Rape during conflict is a difficult issue: complex, emotive and rife with 
different motivations.210 For the purpose of this thesis, there are particular aspects of 
the motivations and effects of rape in war that are related to nationalist conflicts and 
crises. The damage to the symbolic purity of the nation (i.e. the woman is seen as the 
symbol of the nation which has thus been corrupted by the rape) has been discussed in 
the tradition section, but there are functions that rape serves closer to the individual 
level that are vital to discuss. These include the physical violation of the woman on an 
individual level, the ramifications due to of her traditional culture (Le. she is made 
unclean), and the possibility of "polluting" the actual purity of the nation: (i.e. having 
the child of the enemy). 
Wartime rapes are used to achieve much more than basic sexual 
gratification.211 The sheer number of rapes in times of conflict, the ways in which they 
are committed, and the way they are orchestrated demonstrate that the rapes serve a 
particular political purpose. What is it about rape in particular that is perceived to be 
such a brutally effective tool of war, particularly when the battle lines are drawn on 
nationalist lines? One reason is that it is one of the most effective ways of injuring a 
human, with all the attendant psychological and physiological scars it inflicts, and is 
thus an effective tool in any war. 
Rape also creates a distinction between national groups and their 
characteristics. As Meznaric has argued, rape is used in creating difference between 
the men and women of one group in opposition to the other.212 The threat of rape is 
used to portray threat, in that the men from the enemy group are rapists, and the purity 
of the women in one's own group needs to be protected. However, rape is also used to 
define the masculinity of soldiers. Through rape comes an assertion of power over the 
raped, which proves the rapist's dominance.213 This ability to dominate is part of the 
construction of masculinity that we see in the gender constructions in nationalist 
movements: being male is to hod power. 
210 For an excellent in-depth analysis of the complexities of this issue, please refer to Henry's (2000) 
"Why Soldiers Rape: An Integrative Perspective" 
211 Seifert, 1996, p 36 
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Another reason for raping multitudes of women during nationalist conflicts 
has been to impregnate them with the children of the enemy, then prevent them from 
obtaining abortions, so they are forced to "pollute" the nation's bloodline. As Brown 
argues "In cases of ethnic and racial conflict, women's sexual purity and their 
childbearing become not taken-for-granted realities, but instead, means of conflict ... 
motherhood can become the battlefield.,,214 
To quote Ruth Seifert, "One of the pnmary goals in war... IS the 
destruction/deconstruction of culture and not necessarily the defeat of the enemy 
army. The deconstruction of culture, however, is achieved through injuring and 
destroying human beings because this is the most efficient (most forceful) way in 
which a decision can ultimately be brought about.',2l5 Rape as an attack on the culture 
of a particular group is particularly potent because of the symbolic position women 
hold in many societies. In the tradition section I discussed the roles women play in 
maintaining culture and embodying symbols of the nation. 216 When women are 
raped: "The destruction of women and/or their integrity affects overall cultural 
cohesion. Because societies derive their specific form, their self-image and their 
definition of reality from cultural cohesion, its destruction is of outstanding 
importance.,,217 This cohesion is damaged when ethnic rape is used to divide a 
community, especially in the fear of the "other" it creates, and in the breakdown in 
communication it can cause.218 
Rape becomes an attack on men, too, as it is used to prove that they are not 
masculine enough to protect their women. In some cases, rapes are used to project a 
feeling of threat from an enemy, and if this can threaten the legitimacy of the men in 
the nation to protect the women, then it is only more effective. As discussed in the 
previous section, the rape is an attack on the ability of men to protect women, and on 
a symbolic level, their ability to protect, or even lead, their nation. 
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The way a nation identifies itself in times of perceived threat is significant in 
relation to gender: roles and identities are transformed and exaggerated. The link with 
gender is particularly potent because of its high emotive value. When an emotive 
issue like rape is involved, " ... images of women under threa:t or violated [sic] serve to 
homogenise the nation and to define its boundaries in relation to others. This reaches 
a paroxysm in war.,,219 The use of rape as a means to portray threat is also used: the 
threat of rape being one of the more horrific aspects of warfare, its spectre can be a 
motivator. As Nagel points out, "accounts of many wars and nationalist conflicts 
include portrayals of enemy men either as sexual demons bent on raping nationalist 
women, or as sexual eunuchs, incapable of manly virility. ,,220 Both of these portrayals 
of the enemy are presented in the next two chapters. As will be demonstrated in 
Yugoslavian case study, rape as a tool of warfare is a powerful weapon. 
Deviations from Nationalist N ornlS 
The variety of roles individual men and women assume in both peacetime and 
times of conflict often coincide with those already discussed: women as mothers and 
reproducers; men as warriors. However, some roles are less obvious and appear 
diametrically opposed to what are usually presented as normative roles for men and 
women. 
Women as Soldiers 
An interesting transformation that occurs in times of "national crisis" is the 
movement of women into military roles. This contradicts several long-held theories 
that women are more "peaceful" than men.221 As discussed in chapter three, there has 
been a perception that women are somehow inherently more peaceable than men, 
often because of a biological imperative to bear and protect children. For example, 
Walby concluded that because women do not "take up arms for the nationalist 
project" as often as men, they do not have such strong nationalist sentiment.222 This 
219 Morokvasic, 1998, p 75 
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disregards the social factors that prescribe military roles for men, not women, and 
assumes that women are more peaceful than men. However, there is an increasing 
perception that women engage in nationalist struggles and movements in different 
ways, but are not any less involved in the aims of these movements. 223. Ong cautions 
"feminists against the assumption that nationalisms usually represent only male 
interests, or that women hold a separate vision of the imagined nation-state,,,224 
because women are often just as involved in the national project as men are. 
The movement of women into combat roles and other non-traditional roles 
presents a crisis for the way the nation imagines itself. As is discussed in the 
symbolism chapter, women are often held up as vulnerable and in need of protection. 
What happens when they partake in combat, and are no longer in need of this 
protection? What then happens to the justification for the conflict if it is based on the 
protection of the weak from the threatening enemy? The acceptance of women in this 
role by the nationalist movement, associated as it is with the vilifying of women who 
partake in the same action within the enemy camp, necessitates some ideological 
gymnastics. Unsurprisingly, as Milic points out, there is no statistical information in 
the case of the former Yugoslavia on how many women went armed into battle. She 
posits: "the mass media were obviously loath to promote this category of women 
participating in the national conflict.,,225 The dilennna is that participation of women 
in the armed services and war "can erode one of the most powerful cultural 
constructions of national collectivities - that of 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990) as 
the reason men go to war.,,226 This vilifying of women can also serve as a means to 
justify going against a vital gender role: protecting women and children. If a woman 
on the side of the enemy can be portrayed as monstrous, then it is possible to 
rationalise killing her. By adopting an unnatural role, she has given up her right to be 
protected and has become just another enemy. 
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Feminist Movements 
As far as feminist movements are concerned, there are two general responses 
to increasing nationalist rhetoric and sentiment. One is to try to maintain the 
connection as women across nationalist barriers: in other words, to identify as a 
woman first. The other response is the division of the movements along nationalist 
lines, which is more often the case.227 This has been discussed by some theorists as 
the subversion of feminist goals to the nationalist project,228 The pressure on women 
to chose nationalism over any other type of identity increases as a nation moves 
towards violent conflict, as was shown dramatically in the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia.229 Feminists are often portrayed as whores, or not "real" women,230 and 
face this labelling from both men and women,231 especially in the context of 
nationalist conflict.232 There is the additional perception that feminism is both foreign 
and frighteningly familiar. Goldfarb details how Western feminist thought is 
threatening both because it represents the "other", and because it has drawn heavily 
on socialist theory, which is something East European women are wary of after years 
of negative experience with it.233 
One reaction to a "national" crisis is the re-evaluating of national priorities. 
The re-evaluation is manifested in the subsuming of smaller group goals and 
aspirations to the superior importance of the nationalist goals. This prioritisation is 
often discussed with regard to feminist movements, which are often put on hold until 
the nationalist struggle has been won. The sidelining of feminist movements in times 
of crisis, often voluntarily by the women themselves, (Mertus et al) is an interesting 
aspect of how gender roles are defined in a time of crisis. In times of national threat, 
"women's issues" (which would actually serve to redefine gender roles in society) are 
put on hold as the national interests are protected. The incidence of women putting 
women's issues on hold, as these issues are perceived as less urgent, is relatively 
common. 
227 Benderly, 1997, p 60 
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Women, when protesting against the national leadership or joining military 
service, are perceived as no longer vulnerable and in need of protection. This non-
conformance requires a re-working of norms. This is one of the most important 
transfonnations apparent in nationalist conflict: the adoption of roles that would 
conceivably be unacceptable are rationalised in a variety of ways. The adoption of 
military roles by women is often justified by either the shortage of men or through the 
image of the "fierce mother" who will fight to save her offspring (another biological 
reference). 234 
Homosexuality 
Because of its deviance from the prescribed sexual noons of the nation, 
homosexuality is often perceived as a threat in nationalist movements. Although this 
thesis deals with "traditional" gender roles (i.e. heterosexual male and female), it is 
important to note the importance of including other concepts of gender and sexuality 
into the study of nations and nationalism. Part of this sterns from the idealised 
conception of what a man or a woman is. To cross the boundary into the other's 
territory is to attack the foundations ofthe nation's order, and this weakens the nation 
itself. As Nagel says, one of the worst insults people in general can imagine is to have 
their sexuality questioned.235 
Another part of this discussion examines the practical utility of the assumption 
of particular roles for men and women. Yuval-Davis' discussion of the perceived need 
to control sexuality within the nation sterns in part from the attachment of national 
identity to the notion of national security and safety. In a time of crisis, it becomes 
increasingly important to maintain proper gender roles in order to maintain the 
integrity of the nation. The result of this is often the repression of what is perceived to 
be "abnormal" sexuality, ie homosexuality.236 There is also the threat of non-breeding 
men and women to the size of the nation. As Heitlinger has argued, homosexuality 
234 Zajovic, 1997, p 171 
235 Nagel, 1998 p 252 
236 Stychin, 1998, p 9-10. The subject of homosexuality and the nation is discussed in detail in 
Stychin's book, A Nation By Rights. 
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means these men and women will not be bearing children, and this presents a threat to 
pronatalist projects. 237 
In tenns of masculinity, the representation of a man as less than a real man is 
often framed by calling him a homosexual. This not only degrades him for not being a 
real man (and therefore not a member of the nation), but for being actively abnonnal. 
Indeed, Mosse contends that nationalist movements have perceived homosexuality to 
be as threatening as criminals and foreigners. 238 The masculinity of the soldier is 
threatened by this homosexual identity, which is perceived as feminine. As Hageu has 
argued, "homosexuality, in this reasoning, weakens military strength and the strength 
of the national anny.,,239 For women, charges of lesbianism are often hurled at 
feminists who contradict the national leadership in times of conflict. Again, these 
charges are intended to attack the nonnalcy of the women, and their right to belong to 
the nation. 
The deviations from the prescribed nonns of the nation discussed above point 
to the paradox of immutability that nationalist rhetoric is reliant upon. The 
constructions of gender that are prescribed for men and women are not consistent or 
set in stone, rather, they are subject to change depending upon the utility they have for 
the nationalist project. In the case studies, these deviations from the gender nonn will 
be demonstrated to be both a weapon in the struggle for legitimacy and a source of 
aggravation for the nationalist leadership. 
Case Studies 
The inclusion of Romania and the fonner Yugoslavia as case studies is based 
on several specific characteristics of the two countries. Both countries were had by 
leaders who legitimised themselves through a nationalist discourse in both the latter 
years of state socialism and in the early 1990s. The utilisation of gendered rhetoric in 
the nationalist movements of both countries provided support for the legitimation of 
these movements. The constructions of masculinity and femininity were integral 
elements in the war in Yugoslavia, and concepts of motherhood and fatherhood were 
237 Heidinger, 1979, p 22-23 
238 Mosse, 1985, p 25 
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the basis of Ceausescu's pronatalist campaign. Both the former Yugoslavia and 
Romania had poor relations with internal minorities which were manipulated to 
legitimate particular nationalist ideologies. This section will examine gender in the 
socialist and post-socialist periods, with a particular eye to how gender constructions 
and policies were useful to the nationalist movements in both case study countries. 
The former Yugoslavia is the war-tom area in the EastelTl European region, 
with nationalist hostilities breaking into violence over the last ten years. In 
Yugoslavia, the leadership legitimacy crisis began after the death of Tito in 1980 as 
the power-sharing relationship between the republics began to break down. Some 
republican political elites looked to ethnic identities to shore up their support, 
resulting in the continued movement of power away from the central institutions. The 
final nail in the non-nationalist policy coffin was Milosevic's speech in Kosovo in 
1987. This followed moves by Milosevic to restrict Kosovo's autonomy. This speech 
is seen by many as a break with the officially non-nationalist principles of Tito's 
regime, and as the beginning of overt Serbian nationalism. In the following years, in 
which power struggles resulted in bloody civil war, there is consistent evidence of the 
efforts to grasp and maintain power by claiming legitimation through the nationalist 
project. The rhetoric in these efforts is highly gendered, as is evident in the allegations 
of rape in the region as tensions between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians 
intensified. 
In Romania, it can be argued that a crisis of legitimation was occurring in the 
late 1980s as Ceausescu increasingly tightened his control over the country to 
maintain powe:(. The ever increasing portrayal of the threat from outsiders 
(particularly Hungarians) and the efforts to increase the Romanian population through 
pronatalist policies were strategies utilised to shore up popular compliance as social 
and economic conditions worsened. Political groups since Ceausescu's 4eath have 
used extreme nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to win mass support. Both Ceausescu 
and the post-1989 leadership have drawn heavily on highly gendered rhetoric and 
policies to claim a right to govern the country. Ceausescu's actions are some of the 
more blatant instances of utilising women as the reproducers of the nation's 
population. 
2J9 Hague, 1997, p 58 
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It is important to re-emphasise here one of the points raised in the introduction 
to this thesis. There are some areas in the case studies that will have different 
emphases, as the different gender constructions have manifested themselves to 
varying extents in the two countries. In Romania, for example, there was a strong 
pronatalist campaign in the socialist years, In Yugoslavia, rape was one of the most 
important expressions of the connection between gender and nationalism. It is 
important to note that while almost all of the constructions discussed above occur in 
both countries, each has particular areas on which more importance was placed by the 
nationalist leadership. 
Gender and State Socialism 
Before 1989, gender issues in Eastern Europe were dominated by the state 
socialist leadership in what has been called "the gender regime of socialism".24o This 
regime permeated both the public and private realms in these socialist communities. 
Havelkova claims that one goal of communism was to "remove the boundaries 
between public and private,,241, and others have discussed how this, combined with 
the gender equality policies of socialism, prevented people from identifying as a man 
or as a woman. For example, in Romania the pronatalist measures taken were so 
severe that women dreaded their own gender: to be a woman was to be constantly 
subject to state interference with their bodies.242 
It is useful here to discuss briefly the relationship between state and society in 
socialist countries. The power basis for socialist regimes was in their ability to 
maintain control over resource allocation.243 The state had three options: "relying on 
material incentives", which ultimately weakens the state's monopoly on production 
and therefore its hold on power; coercion, entailing the use of force to maintain 
power; and finally what Verdery describes as "symbolic-ideological" strategies, 
involving the normalising of state socialist rule through "moral imperatives, societal 
norms, or other ideological appeals",244 
240 Verdery, 1994, p 229 
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In the utilisation of the third method of control listed above (normalisation), 
the creation of these societal norms through cultural production (art, literature, the 
intellectuals) creates a similar paradigm to that of actual goods production. In order to 
ensure the legitimation of the state and its right to govern, there must be allocation 
control over cultural production. This ranged from control over the physical means of 
production, such as the registering of typewriters in Ceausescu's Romania, to the more 
intangible control of language, to the censoring and oversight of almost all written 
materiaL 245 
There are two key points to draw out of this discussion. One is the role of both 
coercion and normalisation in socialist societies as a way of maintaining and 
strengthening power bases. This provides an interesting introduction to the 
adaptability of socialist structures to nationalist ones, as will be. discussed below. The 
second point is the interlocking need of the socialist state to intrude in almost every 
facet of people's lives. As the state sought to establish its legitimacy through these 
norms, it appropriated all means to achieve this aim: media, popular culture, and other 
social avenues. 
Socialist regimes did not eradicate the different gender roles in the workplace, 
in politics, or in the home. There are those who maintained that women were better 
off under state socialism than previously, but even they conceded that there was much 
to be done before women achieved anything approaching equality.246 One study 
conducted in 1989-90 led Massey et al to conclude that, "socialist countries have 
persistently emphasised their commitment to equal treatment for women in all spheres 
of society. The record of many of these societies in living up to this commitment 
cannot be dismissed ... There were genuine structural transformations that improved 
women's lot... however, in socialist formations a highly visible gendered division of 
labour remained.,,247 Despite the constant claims by leaders that they were promoting 
gender equality, women continued to do the majority of the housework, were 
responsible for the majority of the childcare, and often worked full time. As Cole and 
Nyden found in their research in Romania, the pressure put on women to both partake 
in the labour intensive economy and produce (often under severe duress) and care for 
245 Ibid., P 420-22 
246 Olsen, 1990, p 433 
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large families not only exacerbated what they called "gender repression", it also was a 
source of "social antagonisms" between men and women. 248 
One of the characteristics of this strange relationship between "gender 
equality" espoused by socialist leadership and the actual gendering of the community 
was the so-called "double burden" assumed by women. Even as women were being 
exhorted to work (a large labour force being vital in the "labour-intensive and capital-
poor" societies249) there was no real reorganisation of gender and societal roles. 
Women were therefore still expected to work full-time, yet maintained the 
responsibility for housework and childcare. This resulted in women being defined "as 
both workers and mothers, while men in the labour market were considered only as 
workers.,,250 William Moskoff also writes of this double burden, describing how in 
Romania (in the 1970s) there were some institutional supports for women with 
children. 251 However, these were often overcrowded, and were not in tum supported 
by attempts to alter the society'S long history as a patriarchy, resulting in women 
remaining responsible for the home. 
A second "hidden" aspect of the socialist equality policies was the retention of 
gender-basedjobs.252 Women were still confined to certain types of industries, such as 
textile, clerical, and light industry, while men maintained their dominant presence in 
heavy industry, the army, and positions of political power.253 When women moved 
into positions that in the West are well-paid (and dominated by men), these 
occupations were devalued, becoming less well-paid and less prestigious.254 This is 
presumably a result both of the aforementioned neglect to change the underlying 
attitudes to gender in society, and of the power that was maintained by the concept of 
the socialist society as a family that Verdery has discussed. This societal dynamic was 
one that placed extreme pressure on men and women to become equal, and yet 
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maintained the inequities it claimed to discourage. In general, there was no real re-
alignment of gender roles under socialism.255 
Gender and Socialist Collapse 
As the perceived solidity of the state socialist structures became suddenly 
uncertain, the collapse of socialism also represented a tremendous change in the 
relationship of gender in the community. There is an argument to be made that the 
structures of state socialism operated on a construction of "otherness" that was 
particularly adaptable to the nationalist movements that then appeared in Eastern 
Europe. 256 This "otherness" involved the creation of societal structures that relied 
upon an us/them dichotomy. The state socialist leadership, through the coercion and 
normalisation methods described above, often attempted to shore up its legitimacy 
through the portrayal of an enemy, whether that be the imperialist aggressor or the 
internal traitor to the revolution.257 
The connection with this thesis is the blurring of the line between public and 
private in nationalist movements: there is an important contradiction for East 
European countries. There was so much intrusion into private life under socialism that 
most people were adamant about the return of the private sphere. This was one of the 
attractions of the nationalist movements in the region: the return to a presumably 
"natural" society without the state's involvement in one's private life. This is not 
necessarily the reality: nationalist movements also blur the line between public and 
private in their attempts to influence attitudes. As Hobsbawm has argued, the line 
between civil and state society is often obscured as nationalist movements try to 
create norms for the community that support the nationalist goals. The irony is that 
what seems to be the salvation from the evils of socialism perpetuates many of the 
same problems: "the very same nationalism that helped to bring about the shift away 
from socialism toward democracy perpetuates a public/private ideology.,,258 
255 Kligman, 1984, p 167, 183; 1998, p 26 
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The retraditionalisation of gender roles in nationalist movements gave identity 
after years of socialist "normalisation" and the uncertainty of private roles under 
socialism.259 On a utilitarian level, retraditionalisation fits with the economic reality of 
high unemployment of post-socialist Eastern Europe. Encouraging women to leave 
the realm of public, paid employment to return to the private sphere would have the 
beneficial result of easing the demand for jobs when unemployment was 
skyrocketing.26o The state could not afford to have women competing for jobs, and 
could not afford to help women work. The reality of the "transitions" of post-socialist 
countries has meant that "there is no longer any money for all those day-care centers 
and kindergartens, for lengthy maternity leaves and family allocations ... ,,261 As these 
transitions progress, it is possible to see Eastern Europe as an indicator of "how 
tightly interwoven are 'socialism' and 'capitalism' with specific - and variant -
organisations of gender; and these in tum are bound up with the national idea.,,262 
What did nationalist movements offer after socialism? For one, an apparent 
distinction between public life and private life. The degree of intrusion of the socialist 
state into private lives, especially in Romania, is hard to overestimate. The movement 
of women back into a clearly defined private sphere was a political movement in that 
while it adhered to a traditionally nationalist conception of male and female roles, it 
also helped to alleviate an economic reality of post-socialism; namely, skyrocketing 
unemployment. The nationalist ideology of retraditionalising gender roles 
simultaneously fit this economic situation and provided a comforting definitiveness 
about social roles. Rather than being trapped with the double burden of paid work and 
housework, women only felt obligated to work in the horne. DIe and Rener point out 
that while " ... women in the former Yugoslavia have an ambivalent attitude toward 
nationalism ... they have no trouble finding themselves in its social matrix, regardless 
of whether they reject nationalism or accept it.,,263 Perhaps this has been one of the 
fundamental appeals of nationalism movements in Eastern Europe. There is a possible 
connection between the maintenance of patriarchy in socialist regimes (despite claims 
259 Saled, 1993, cited in Benderly, 1997, p 62 
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of equality for women) and the swift return to traditional roles for men and women 
under nationalism.264 
After socialism, with its intrusion into private lives and dictation of private 
roles, nationalism gave security and stability with straightforward social roles, all 
while appearing to keep the private, private. Watson claims that women and men 
were not frustrated by the power imbalance under socialism, but the "extent to which 
the state has prevented some from being 'normal' women, and men from being 
'normal' men ... men tend to experience emasculation as a result of their inability to 
exercise real power and initiative in the public domain.,,265 So perhaps Benton is 
correct when she alleges that nationalist ideologies "offer women a distinct role as 
women. Not as citizens, but as the female part of the organic, homogeneous 
nation.,,266 
Although Benton does not address men's roles, we can extrapolate that men 
would then be re-adopting roles such as protector and provider. The masculine 
identity that relies on these roles would be reasserted with men's return to the position 
of sole breadwinner. In an examination of the history of citizenship and participation 
rights for men and women, Nira Yuval-Davis contends that the difference between the 
appropriate roles for men and women is integral to the gendered construction of 
society. " ... women were not simply latecomers to citizenship rights ... Their exclusion 
was part and parcel of the construction of the entitlement of men to democratic 
participation which 'conferred citizen status not upon individuals as such, but upon 
men in their capacity as members and representatives of a family (ie a group of non-
citizens' ,,267 
Therefore, we see that the characteristics of gender roles in socialist and post-
socialist societies are not as divergent as would first appear. As is discussed above, 
despite socialist rhetoric of creating equality for men and women, there was actually 
little substantive change for the better in women's status under those regimes. With 
the collapse of state socialism, and the increase in nationalist sentiment in the region, 
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the corresponding retraditionalisation of women was reinforced. Although the 
collapse of socialism was meant to allow men and women to regain control over their 
private lives, the reality was that there was increasing interference in the private realm 
as nationalist movements began to define who belonged and who did not. It these 
efforts to define the appropriate gender constructions that will be explored in the case 
study chapters. 
Conclusion 
The framework of the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction 
allows us to investigate the elusive but potent role that gender constructs play in 
nationalist movements. These lenses allow an examination of everything from the 
language of speeches to the actions of soldiers, in how they support and legitimate 
nationalist movements. 
The themes above will be covered in-depth in the case study chapters, and will 
draw on several particular areas for illustration. In the section on politics of tradition, I 
will look at history, the media and its manipulation, and popular culture and how 
these utilise gendered language and themes. In the politics of reproduction I will focus 
on policies and attitudes that can be classed as pronatalist (including abortion), and on 
rape. The case study chapters will also include some discussion about the occasions of 
"deviance" from the nationalist norms and ideals, such as feminism, homosexuality, 
and the assumption by women of military roles. 
In the first section of each case study, Hobsbawm's contention regarding 
legitimacy, which contends that nationalist movements rely to certain degrees on the 
invention of traditions, is demonstrated with alarming clarity. In both countries, 
tremendous effort was put towards presenting and manipulating the histories of the 
particular regions, and in promulgating particular histories and traditions that 
supported a particular leadership. Both the media and popular culture, such as songs 
and fiction, helped to incorporate national legends into modem life and demonstrate 
the conscious connection between the past and the present nation. Throughout, there 
was an underlying reliance on the essentialist nature of the nation. By rooting the 
nation in this conceptualisation, the "natural" order is justified and legitimated. 
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In the section on reproduction, some of the most potent evidence of the 
relationship between the construction of gender and the physical construction of the 
nation is presented. The leaders in both countries went to extraordinary lengths to 
manipUlate and control the "body" of the nation; the symbolic constructs of the nation 
are made manifest in policies and actions. The pronatalist tactics outlined above were 
not only utilised with savage effect, but are indicative of how reliant upon the control 
of gender roles these movements were. The use of rape to not only symbolically 
challenge a right to lead but to individually devastate is also discussed. As we will 
see, systematic policies of rape have been integral to the "cleansing" of regions: part 
of an assertion of dominance in nationalist conflict. 
Finally, the case studies deal with the incorporation or rejection of people who 
do not fit into the normative roles. In cases like these, there is a great deal of pressure, 
unsurprisingly, put on the "different" to conform, both by peers and through power 
structures. In the context of gender, the assumption of a "different" gender role is 
threatening to the cohesion of the national group. This threat was dealt with in various 
ways. In some cases there was co-option of a group, such as when feminist 
movements were subverted to the nationalist cause. In other instances, those who 
were different were imprisoned, as happened (and still does) to homosexuals in 
Romania. 
The framework outlined here provides us with clear evidence of the utility in 
using gender as an analytical tool. It illuminates the constructed nature of nationalist 
movements that attempt to legitimise themselves as natural and inevitable. 
Simultaneously, this gender-based schema exposes the professedly firm roles of men 
and women in society as both fluid and problematic as they are manipulated for 
particular goals. The roles are fluid in that they are not the permanent and timeless 
roles that nationalist rhetoric would portray them to be, and they are problematic as a 
result. To accept that these roles are not in need of analysis is to accept what Gellner 
calls a "fundamental paradox of nationalism": that which is constructed is something 
natural. 268 
268 Gellner, 1983, p 6 
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Chapter Five 
Romania 
This chapter examines the gender and nationalism theories and issues raised in 
the previous chapters in the context of Romania by examining the utilisation of gender 
constructions in the Romanian nationalist project.. Chronologically, it explores the 
early 1980s through the late 1990's, and involves discussion of both state socialist and 
post-socialist periods. This period includes the later years ofthe Ceausescu leadership, 
during which time Nicolae Ceausescu's leadership legitimacy was being questioned. 
The execution of the Ceausescu's in 1989 brought about another crisis of leadership, 
as increasingly varied groups vied for the right to rule in Romania. 
State Socialism and Revolution in Romania 
Before exploring the intersection of gender and nationalism in Romania, I will 
first outline the context of this intersection. Socialism in Romania was dominated by 
the rule of Nicolae Ceausescu. Although initially perceived by many as a reformer, 
especially in his defiance of Soviet hegemony, by the time of his execution in 
December 1989 Ceausescu had become a paranoid and ruthless tyrant. There was 
infiltration of the population by the state police (the Securitate) and informers at a rate 
as high as one in every fifteen people. The media was under the total control of the 
government, there were severe food and power restrictions, and extreme pronatalist 
policies meant that orphanages were overflowing and under-funded.269 By the late 
1980s, there were signs of growing discontent: increasing strikes and a riot in Brasov 
in 1987, as wages were often late and heat and food restrictions became unbearable.27o 
269 Tismaneanu, 1997, p 410-12; Kligman, 1992 and 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p 350-51 
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The Romanian "revolution" began in mid-December of 1989, and was 
effectively over by the 25th of that month with the execution of Nicolae and Elena 
Ceausescu. What had started as a popular uprising in Timisoara had, at least to some 
degree, been co-opted by members of the communist leadership.271 While there 
continues to be disagreement and speculation around conspiracies regarding the 
revolution, it is fairly clear that the overthrow of Ceausescu could not have happened 
without some complicity from both the Securitate and high ranking communist 
officials.272 The National Salvation Front (NSF), made up of former communist 
leaders, took control of the state apparatus and positioned itself as a caretaker 
government. Ion Iliescu, head of the NSF and the interim leader of the country, was 
elected President in both 1990 and 1992. Iliescu, a high-ranking communist in 
Ceausescu's government, attempted to gain legitimacy for his party by claiming 
responsibility for the elimination of Ceausescu. Rather than undertake a period of 
reform, the new leadership acted on the premise that with the end of Ceausescu came 
the end of the problems of the socialist years. 273 
In terms of any differences in political culture in the socialist and post-socialist 
periods, Romania did not change dramatically from one period to the next. Linz and 
Stepan have argued that the personalisation of leadership like Ceausescu's often tends 
to crush any perceived opposition, thus preventing any burgeoning of civil society.274 
This was certainly the case in Romania, where Ceausescu immediately quashed any 
potential leadership threats. There were some significant changes made in Romania 
following the end of the Ceausescu regime (the restrictions on abortion policies were 
repealed almost immediately, as were other extremely unpopular laws275) but there 
was no real examination or dismantling of the style of government that had allowed 
Ceausescu to maintain his hold on power.276 
This absence of "vital soul-searching" meant that there was no reform of the 
judicial, media or police systems, all of which would be necessary for any real 
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transfonnation from the former authoritarian regime.277 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the fall of the socialist system left power structures that were suitable for 
nationalist identification and rhetoric. This created a situation where the new semi-
authoritarian leaders perceived nationalism as one of the few immediate means 
available to assert their legitimacy.278 Nationalist rhetoric became a tool that no-one 
could neglect: "nationalism in the region's politics became a matter of degree rather 
than a distinct political option.,,279 In chapter four, I discussed some of the ways in 
which the structures of socialist legitimation lent themselves to nationalist 
movements. In Romania in particular, the socialist construction of a threatening 
"other", whether external or internal, fit with the continuation of a leadership 
legitimised through nationalist rhetoric.28o The threat from both neighbours and 
internal enemies created a constant atmosphere of uncertainty, and "became a 
convenient mechanism by which the population's vulnerability as well as national 
interest was aroused and maintained.,,281 Ceausescu, as the national leader, was then 
portrayed as the shield against these threats. 
It is important to clarify that unlike in Ceausescu's time, nationalists in post-
socialist Romania are not part of a monolithic movement, in that they are not the 
"only game in town", However, they still wield considerable power in the 
government, press, and security forces. 282 Nationalism has become a "card" that 
parties have been required to play to gain power283, and although there is dissension 
over whether this influence is currently waxing or waning, there is no doubt that 
nationalist rhetoric stills plays a fundamental part in Romanian political life.284 In 
recent elections in Transylvania, for example, extreme nationalist Gheorghe Funar 
alleged that if his moderate opponent won, Hungarian would become the official 
language of the region and Romanians in the region would be evicted from their 
homes. Funar won the election.285 
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Nationalism in Romania, both under state socialism and in the present, has 
focused mainly upon the difference between Romanians, supposedly of Dacian 
descent286, and those of German descent, Gypsies (as in most places in Eastern 
Europe), Jews (although the Jewish population is very small) and, most notably, 
Hungarians. The Hungarian population, particularly in Transylvania, has been 
presented as the main threat in part because of the tense relations with Hungary over 
the region of Transylvania. Nationalism under Ceausescu called for the 
homogenisation of the nation, which produced an interesting paradox. On the one 
hand there was the push to create a society with no internal difference, while on the 
other hand there was the impossibility of Hungarians being recognised as anything 
other than Hungarian.287 The first requirement for being a true Romanian was to be 
born a Romanian. So, even though Ceausescu called for unity, there were some who 
would never be allowed full membership. Under both state socialism and in the post-
socialist years, there has been tension between ethnic groups in Romania. 
It is important to make a distinction at this point about the level of 
participation of the general population in the maintenance of Ceausescu's regime. 
Although the infiltration of almost every level of society with propaganda was 
designed to inculcate particular norms (in the case of this thesis, gender norms), this 
does not mean that there was full scale acceptance of these norms. Rather, in 
Romania during the 1980s, it was more a case of, as Kligman puts it, "an effective and 
manipulative technology to engineer psychological and emotional compliance".288 
The distinction is that rather than an embracing ofCeausescu's ideology, there was an 
acceptance of it; while people did not believe, they did not rebel either. In a country 
where the shortages were so severe and the party rhetoric was so far removed from the 
reality of life, no amount of propaganda could convince the public that life was a 
socialist utopia. This is revealed in the jokes ofthe time, such as: 
Even though no one works, the plan is fulfilled beyond expectation 
Even though the plan is fulfilled beyond expectation, nothing is available 
286 This is the lineage that was traced back literally thousands of years and is one of the mainstays of 
Romanian national identity. According to Deletant (1991), this was "not merely a matter of historical 
contention; it became entwined with a defence of the Romanian nation" (p 81). There are a variety of 
sources that examine this further: Deletant, 1991; Verdery, ]991; Gallagher, 1995; Tismaneanu and 
Pavel, 1994, p 402-3 
287 Deletant, 1995, 198 
288 Kligman, 1998, p 117, and footnote to this discussion, #7 on page 297 
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Even though nothing is available, everyone eats 
Even though everyone eats, they are not satisfied (thankful) 
Even though they are not grateful, everyone claps their hands 
"(The last refers to people showing their adoration of Ceausescu by 
clapping on command even though they despised him.),,289 
The vulnerability of Ceausescu's regime did not go unnoticed. Writing III 
1989, Tismaneanu claimed that "Ceausescu's regime is probably the most vulnerable 
in East-Central Europe", and described the increasing failure of Ceausescu to actually 
instil the loyalty he demanded.29o This is by way of clarifying here that there was not a 
blanket acceptance of the messages being disseminated. However, it is also important 
to note that while Ceausescu's message was not ringing true, this does not mean the 
Romanian people did not subscribe to a nationalist Romanian identity under state 
socialism.291 
A large part of this propaganda was focussed on issues of gender, particularly 
in terms of encouraging women to take on particular roles. Gender was an issue for 
the socialist leadership in Romania just as it was in most other socialist countries.292 
There was official state rhetoric about gender equality, and about bringing women 
into the public workplace. Accompanying this was the "double burden" of women 
discussed earlier in the thesis, in which the work of women in the home was 
compounded by paid work outside the home.293 As in the other state socialist 
countries, there was also the lack of change at the local level in social structures. 294 
However, in Romania, there was the addition of what Kligman refers to as the triple 
burden: "when childbearing was declared a patriotic duty.,,295 In all the other socialist 
states, abortion was legalised as part of the effort, even if only superficial, to give 
289 Ibid., footnote #35, p 269 
290 Tismaneanu, 1989, p 189 
291 The argument can be made that many Romanians believed in such an identity, but that Ceausescu 
had betrayed it. The extension of this is that by 1989 Ceausescu was perceived as a traitor to the nation, 
and that this was the claim to legitimacy that post-socialist nationalists were making. The argument that 
Ceausescu's nationalism was "false" is made by far-right groups like the Movement For Romania. 
Gallagher, 1995, piSS 
292 Grapard, 1997, P 666 
293 Fischer and Harsanyi, 1994, p 203 
294 Kligman, 1984, p 184. In this examination of wedding rituals, Kligman made the argument that the 
wedding ritual was indicative of the reality of social interaction: that Romania was still a male 
dominated hierarchy that clashed with socialist gender prescriptions. This is because the "state ideology 
lack[ed] a transformative quality". See also Fischer (1985) on the lack of transformation of gender roles 
in the home (p 13 6) 
295 Kligman, 1998, p 25 
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women equality. In Romania, abortion was made illegal in 1966, the year after 
Ceausescu assumed control of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).296 
Politics of Tradition 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the politics of tradition centre on the 
twin issues of essentialism and retraditionalisation. The relationship between the 
leadership of Romania and the symbolism of the nation was complex, and took 
several guises. The nation was portrayed in a variety of ways, including as a family, 
as a lover, as a daughter, and as a mother, These conceptions were then combined 
with the particular state socialism of Ceausescu, which resulted in a complicated and 
personalised leadership. Romanian nationalism in this period was focused on micro 
and macro conceptions of human relationships, in which the interactions of 
individuals with the nation were interpreted through sexual and maternal/paternal 
filters, 
In Romania, the "traditional" family structure was a patriarchal one, one that 
fit well into the structure of large families and the woman's role as a mother that 
Ceausescu's nationalist goals would demand. This was then translated into 
legitimating the socialist "family", with Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu as father and 
mother to the nation.297 
The gender regime in Romania has been referred to as almost literally a 
"parent state", in which "the family must be replaced by the communist party.,,298 
Understanding this conception of the socialist system leads to an understanding of a 
society in which gender themes are operational at every level, as the state redefined 
itself as a family. In Romania, this led to the ultimate "family" state system, with 
Nicolae Ceausescu as the absolute father. Within a society organised along these lines 
come various roles, both explicit and implicit. As the community became defined as a 
family, men and women were defined as sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, 
husbands and wives. In another framing of the nation, as mentioned above, Ceausescu 
himself was representative of the nation, and became the ideal Romanian. By the end 
296 Ibid., P 24 
297 Ibid" P 30 
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of the 1980s, the identity of the nation was completely intertwined with Ceausescu as 
the leader to the extent that he was representative of the nation. This in tum meant that 
any attack on Ceausescu was in tum an attack on the nation, and vice versa.299 
It is helpful to address here the role of Elena Ceausescu and the attempts made 
to present her as the mother of the nation. In marked contrast to the professed 
"Romanian ideal", she and Nicolae did not have many children. However, she was 
held up as the ideal Romanian woman, as she was in charge of the women's groups in 
Romania and was the most public female figure in the country.300 However, she was 
mostly disliked if not despised in Romania.30) Other women held up as models of 
socialist Romanian women were also feared and disliked by the general populace.302 It 
is unclear whether this dislike was the result of jealousy for the "affection" of the 
father of the nation (Nicolae Ceausescu), a basic dislike for a tyrannical human being, 
or an aversion (despite socialist rhetoric) to women in positions of power. What is 
clear is that Elena never engendered the sort of positive emotion that Nicolae did. 
The understanding of the head of state as the ultimate father figure was carried 
over at least into the earlier days of the "revolution". Hausleitner discusses her own 
witnessing of "celebrations for the new' state father', Iliescu, [when] the people and 
especially the women - acted as they had under the enforced personality cult: 
simpleminded slogans of the leaders were chanted, and portraits of the new leader 
were kissed. ,,303 While the leadership of Iliescu did not go on to produce the same cult 
of personality seen under Ceausescu, this scene is indicative of the relationship many 
continued to feel with the head of state. That relationship was personal, and can be 
seen as partially a result of family structured socialism. This was translated into the 
nation as a family, the strength of which concept was discussed in regards to Breuilly 
in chapter two. 
In the framework established in chapter four, I argued that the relationship 
between gender and tradition was not only embedded in symbols of the nation and 
298 Verdery, 1994, p 230 
299 Deletant, 1991, p 80 
300 Lovatt, 1999b; Kligman, 1998, 130 
301 Harsanyi, 1993, p 48; Lovatt, 1999b 
302 Harsanyi, 1993, p 42 
303 Haus1eitner, 1993, p 53 
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national identity, but that the national identity was reliant upon gender constructions. 
In Romania we see that the position of power and dominance held by Ceausescu was 
dependent upon his gendered role as the father of the nation; he was a patriarchal 
leader with the right to rule. In the post-socialist years, this position of father of the 
nation was initially held by Iliescu as part of his efforts to assume the power that had 
been held by Ceausescu. 
These multiple portrayals of Ceausescu as the ideal Romanian, a father figure, 
and the ultimate husband (with ideal wife Elena) were supported in a variety of ways. 
The post-socialist nationalist leaders have not had the hegemony of Ceausescu, but 
have drawn on the same gendered nationalist constructions. I will first examine the 
way the history of the nation has become a means to justify and legitimate various 
policies and programs for both Ceausescu and the post-socialist leadership. 
Historical Manipulation 
Historiography in Romania has played an integral role in lending credence to 
the claims of an ancient and legitimate nation. Despite the actual malleability of 
history, the general perception that history consists of "facts" lends it authenticity, and 
has been utilised by many nationalist movements in attempts to give validity to 
nationalist claims. This malleability is evident in Romania, where nationalist goals 
and claims were often supported by historians.304 History was drawn on both to 
anchor the Romanian nation in antiquity, and to provide symbols of the great 
Romanian nation. For example, in the late 1970s the new philosophy of 
protochronism was being promoted. Meaning literally "first in time", Deletant 
describes protochronism as "a promotion of a nationalist view of the Romanian past 
and a denial of external influences in Romanian cuiture.,,305 This was not only to 
establish the Romanian heritage for claims to certain areas of land, but to establish the 
long and noble history ofthe Romanian nation. 
In 1980, the Romanians were asked to celebrate the 2050lh anniversary of the 
Dacian state, the predecessor of the Romanian nation. By 1986, Ceausescu was 
304 Deletant, 1991, p 65, 79-80,83; Gilberg, 1998, p 65-6 
305 Deletant, 1995, p 186; for more on this see the chapter on protochronism in Verdery, 1991 
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glorified as the embodiment of: Horea (18th C Transylvanian leader), Stephen the 
Great (Prince of Moldavia, 15th C), Nicolae Balcescu (1848 Wallachia revolution 
leader), and Prince Michael the Brave (briefly unified Wallachia, Moldavia and 
Transylvania, late 16th C), among others.30G These symbols from history were imbued 
with all that was noble in the Romanian nation, and that nobility was then transferred 
to Ceausescu. 
One of the contentions of this thesis is that specifically gendered nationalist 
rhetoric was used for reinforcing power. In Romania, policy and history intertwined to 
do just that. The pressure put on women in Romania to bear children in the late 
socialist years coincided with a concerted effort to portray the historical, traditional 
Romanian family as large. For instance, one article was published in the Communist 
Party newspaper with the headline 'The Home with Many Children, Sign of a Good 
Citizen's Sense of Responsibility for the Future of the Nation".307 The authors, two 
well-known academics, maintained that, "only with the founding of a family does a 
man acquire his true social identity" and that Romania's strength in the past came 
from its large families. 308 It is this combination of manipulated history and present 
day functionalism that renders the myth useful. In the Romanian case, it connected the 
attainment of true masculinity with a large family, and that same "traditional" large 
Romanian family with the goals of the modem nation. 
Part of this conjunction of these themes of gender, history and nationalist goals 
was the promotion of the Romanian peasant ideal. 309 As Harsanyi points out, this 
patriarchal ideal, which continues into the current day, means that "Men's domination 
and women's submissiveness are seen as rooted in a natural and religious order 
beyond human judgement.,,310 This was a "natural" ideal that combined the glorious 
history of the past with a family structure that promoted large families and patriarchal 
power systems. According to Kligman, after fieldwork in Romania in the late 1970s, 
"through the symbolic construction of a national ideology, the RCP legitimates 
itself. .. Part of the RCP's claim to legitimacy is seen to stem historically from the 
306 Gallagher, 1995, p 59 
307 Verdery, 1994, p 235-6 
308 Ibid., P 235-6 
309 Harsanyi, 1993, p 43; Verdery, 1991, p 227, 
310 Harsanyi, 1993, p 39 
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heroic tradition of the Romanian people themselves.,,3!! In this scenario, the ideal of 
the past provided identity for the present. 
Identity was intertwined with the usefulness in accomplishing the goals of the 
nation. True Romanians were useful people, therefore women, in order to be "real" 
women, had to bear and raise children and be socialists: Le., work. As referred to 
above, men found their true identity in fatherhood. Both men and women still had to 
be productive in society as workers. The true Romanian was "hardworking, 
productive, procreative and proper." Any deviation from this, as outlined in the 
section on homosexuality below, was seen as treason.312 As Harsanyi puts it, "the 
ideal woman was depicted as an improbable cross between an ideologically distorted 
peasant model and a stereotypical Stakhanovite worker 
combined with the traditional peasant one.,,3!3 
the Bolshevik ideal 
In post-socialist Romania, protochronism has continued in political parties like 
the "Movement for Romania".3!4 In historical revisionism in the 1990s, this has 
included the rehabilitation of a more recent, brutal past: the dusting off of reputations 
of the Iron Guard and Ceausescu himself and the presentation of these as noble and 
positive characters in history.3!5 The Iron Guard was a brutal, anti-Semitic inter-war 
group that drew on religious and nationalist sentiment, whose political arm was called 
"Everything for the Fatherland".316 In the post-socialist years, there have been several 
revisions of the group's history. One is that it was the original anti-communist 
movement, according to the political weekly Cuvintu1.317 The Iron Guard represents a 
harking back to a far-right ideal, in which a patriarchal national goal was sought 
through brute force. 
The rehabilitation of Ceausescu is also interesting: there seems to be a belief 
that at least under Ceausescu there was stability. This revision of Ceausescu's legacy 
began within two years of his overthrow and execution. Ion Coja (who was soon to 
311 Kligman, 1983, p 84 
312 Kligman, 1998, p 32-3 
313 Harsanyi, 1993, p 48 
314 Tismaneanu and Pavel, 1994, p 404 
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become vice-president) claimed that "history will evaluate Ceausescu much 
differently from how many do today... I think we are much too harsh in our 
judgement ofhim.,,318 Vadim Tudor, leader of the Romania Mare party and one of the 
most influential and extreme nationalists, is a Ceausescu apologist who has 
successfully utilised a revised version of the previous leader to bolster his own 
career.
319 The rehabilitation of the Iron Guard and of Nicolae Ceausescu are examples 
of the struggles for legitimation by various nationalist groups in Romania. One thing 
they all have in common is drawing on the same history of a patriarchal, victimised 
Romania. Indeed, Gallagher has argued that one of the reasons Iliescu won in 1992 
was his ability to present himself as a "symbol of security able to shield Romania 
from the chaos around its borders.,,32o 
The memory ofNicolae Ceausescu's wife, Elena, has not undergone the same 
kind of revision. Elena's legacy has been harder to come for the Romanian popUlation 
to come to terms with, and has been utilised in the post-socialist endeavours at 
retraditionalisation. One result of the retraditionalisation in Romania has been the 
reduction in numbers of women in public life, especially in politics32I , and the dislike 
of Elena has only made that easier.322 As was discussed earlier, Elena was not well-
liked in Romania, and her spectre is often all that is needed to either discourage 
women from entering politics or to disparage those who have.323 
Media 
The media plays an integral role in ensuring that particular "messages" get out 
to the populace.324 In socialist Romania, the propaganda machine was particularly 
intrusive and almost omnipresent. As Kligman argues, Ceausescu's propaganda 
"created a relationship between parents fulfilling their patriotic duties to reproduce 
318 Gallagher, 1995, p 196 
319 Gallagher, 1995, p 209-10; Kligman, 1998, p 310, note 47 
320 Gallagher, 1993 
321 The ratio of women in national politics has dropped from 34% in 1987 to 5% in 1997. Baban's 
argument is that women are currently perceived to be less "suited" to politics than men. Baban, 2000, p 
230. 
m Lovatt, 1999b 
323 Ibid. 
324 It is interesting to note that the Romanian language itself is highly gendered. As Verdery (1994) has 
discussed, the name of the country, Romania, is feminine, while the word for all Romanians is 
masculine. (p 244) 
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themselves and the labour force, and fulfilling the laws of nature to ensure the 
evolution of life. The laws of the latter were presented as being synonymous with the 
laws of the state. ,,325 In the post-socialist years, the media has not been as monolithic 
as under Ceausescu no particular group has had total control over the media. 
However, there has been governmental influence exerted to a considerable degree 
over the media in Romania, as is discussed below. 
Under Ceausescu, attempts at indoctrination were aimed at all ages: one youth 
newspaper bore the title, "Handsome and Healthy Children for the Vigor and Youth 
of the Fatherland".326 Education was aimed at indoctrination from very early in the 
school system, with pre-schoolers enrolled in "The Falcons of the Homeland", an 
organisation aimed at promUlgating the greatness of the Ceausescus.327 These efforts 
of indoctrination sought to produce a society that was both homogenous and that 
regenerated itself. Looking at the type of information being disseminated, it is 
apparent that this was used to create a society in which all strata of society believed in 
the cornmon national goal. 
Post-socialist media in Romania has for the most part remained under the 
control of the government and government-friendly organisations.328 There have been 
numerous cases of journalists being harassed and imprisoned for writing pieces that 
threaten the "status quO".329 Legislation has increased the punishment for defamation 
of public figures, with the most severe penalty reserved for defaming the president. 330 
Access to television and print media has also been restricted,331 and there has been a 
large degree of self-censorship where even opposition organisations do not mention 
certain "taboo" subjects.332 The media has also been indicted in a recent report by 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance for its racism and anti-
Semitism.333 In this post-1989 context come articles that encourage pronatalist 
policies and bemoan the decreasing birthrate of Romanians, condemning abortion as a 
J25 Kligman, 1998, p 136-37 
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"demographic catastrophe".334 The rhetoric of many of these articles, with their 
exhortations of "natural" roles for women, are reminiscent of Ceausescu-era 
propaganda.335 
Popular culture 
The role of popular culture has been discussed generally in chapter four. The 
following section explores the utilisation of popular culture in Romania to legitimate 
both nationalist leadership under socialism and by various nationalist groups seeking 
power in the post-socialist years. Popular culture in Romania, as is many Eastern 
European countries, has relied heavily on oral traditions of poetry, story-telling, and 
song. These are often highly gendered, with images of men and women sacrificing for 
Romania. 
The influence of legends in Romania with the theme of an idealised past are as 
popular (and influential) today as they were under socialism.336 The following well-
known legend from Romanian folklore portrays men and women in a typically 
"Romanian" situation. The main character did his duty and sacrificed his woman even 
though his comrades did not. The woman sacrificed for her man, fighting against the 
odds to do her duty. The Legend of the Arges Monastery is the story of Manole, a 
man commissioned to build the finest monastery possible for Negru Voda, the black 
king. However, as Manole and his men started to build, they realised that everything 
they have constructed is falling down each night. Manole dreams that these collapses 
will stop when the first woman to arrive at noon with food and drinks is bricked into 
the walls of the monastery. Manole was the only one of the builders not to warn his 
wife, Ana, to stay away. Sure enough, she dutifully arrived at noon to feed her 
husband. Manole prayed to stop his wife, but although terrible winds and rain tried to 
drive her away, she still struggled to the monastery. Resigned to his wife's fate, 
Manole tricked her into being bricked into one of the monastery walls, despite her 
telling him that she is pregnant with their child. The requirement of the dream now 
satisfied, the monastery was soon finished. However, when Negru Voda came to 
334 Baban, 2000, p 238 
335 This is discussed further in the Pronatalism section of this chapter. 
336 Miroiu, 1997, p 138-140 
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inspect the building, he was enraged when the builders admitted they could have built 
a more beautiful monastery. He chased the builders to the roof, where Manole tried to 
escape by flying with wooden wings. He failed, but a small spring appears where he 
fell to his death, next to the monastery he built. 337 
The Romanian mentality has been described as one of "victimisation", and this 
myth would seem to support that perspective.338 The theme of this particular story 
emphasises duty and sacrifice for what is perceived to be either a greater good or a 
higher power. Just as Ana performed her duty to a higher power (her husband), so did 
Manole perform his duty for his leader. Miroiu has argued that there is another 
meaning to this myth that calls for the participation in one's own walling-in. Under 
Ceausescu, a large degree of propaganda was directed at creating a self-sacrificing 
population, constructing people who would, " .. .ignore self; to ignore personal needs, 
desires, peculiarities; and to be devoted entirely to caring for the final goal, for nation 
and state ... ,,339 
This sacrifice for the nation that was called for in the above legend was 
mirrored in Ceausescu's urgings to sacrifice for the nation's continuity. Speeches and 
texts published in various venues (both state sanctioned and under state auspices) 
provide examples of these calls for sacrifice. Combined with portraying Ceausescu as 
the culmination of a long line of male Romanian heroes, these historical tracings 
detail the sacrifices made for the nation. All these heroes were men, while women 
were not referred to as heroic until pronatalist policies reached their peak in the 1980s. 
Thus, women's place in the national mythology was not promoted until they were 
useful in the national crisis.34o During this period Ceausescu gave the title of 
"Heroine Mother" to women who bore and raised 10 or more children.341 
The program of propaganda included public speeches from the Romanian 
leadership. There is a wealth of speeches and exhortations from Ceausescu that call 
337 Ibid., p 136-37 
338 Verdery, 1994, p 241-43 
339 Miroiu, 1997, P 139 
340 Verdery, 1994, p 239-42 
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upon the men and women of Romania to bear children for the nation, to be "good" 
Romanians themselves by being useful, and that draw upon the history of the nation 
for justification. As the 1980s were drawing to a close, it became clear that the efforts 
to pull these emotive strings were increasing, as the economic and social conditions 
deteriorated. For example, one speech claimed that "There cannot be anything more 
precious for a woman than to be a mother, to make certain that the laws of nature 
themselves are fulfilled in life, to procreate, to secure the continuous development of 
our people, of our nation.,,342 In this one sentence are many of the concepts discussed 
so far in the thesis: motherhood, propagation for the nation, and the natural role of 
women. This speech can be seen as an attempt to draw on as much emotive rhetoric as 
was at Ceausescu's disposal. 
As referred to earlier, Romania under socialism had a tradition of glorifying 
the Romanian peasant ideal. This involved holding up certain aspects of rural life as 
admirable and worthy of emulation, such as the large families that were meant to be 
part of the peasant tradition. Kligman outlines the very purposeful way that the RCP 
utilised populist methods of disseminating a particular and complex ideology.343 This 
was actually spelled out by the RCP, in its use of poetry: "to popularize ideology, to 
disseminate it in a form both attractive and accessible to the masses.,,344 In other 
words, the power of these forms of tradition was utilised by the leadership to 
legitimate itself in the way discussed in the framework: through a program of creating 
societal norms employing, in this case, nationalist rhetoric in popular culture. 
The rhetoric and policy goals of the current nationalists in Romania bear a 
striking resemblance to those under socialism. In 1998, the leaders of the nationalist 
parties, The Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party of Romanian National Unity 
(PUNR) signed a protocol that they called the "first step on the road to set up the 
Great Alliance for the Resurrection of the Fatherland".345 The familiar elements are 
there: the appeal to the historic homeland, with the patriarchal overtones of the 
protecting "fatherland". This utilisation of the construction of a male nation draws on 
to be born, but raised. Kligman, 1998, p 81. This concept of medals for women who bore many 
children was not peculiar to Romania, and was practised in Hungary and the USSR. 
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the history of a masculine Romania, in which the ideal is still a family-based social 
organisation. The ideal society is still a familial one with the concept of natural roles 
at the foundation. As discussed in the section on history in this chapter, the ties with a 
historical Romania are still at the root of nationalism in Romania. today, and the 
legends that were woven into Ceausescu's propaganda are the same ones that have 
emotive power in post-socialist Romania. 
Politics of Reproduction 
As has been discussed above, nationalist politics in Romania were heavily 
reliant on the mobilisation of women in particular roles. The perceived need for a 
large labour force meant that the nationalist movement proclaimed the necessity for 
women to become mothers. As discussed in chapter four, the politics of pronatalism, 
in which national goals are paramount, base gender constructions on conceptions of 
women as mothers and men as fathers. The very bodies of individuals are considered 
to be tools for the national project. In socialist Romania's pronatalist policies, the 
national goal was a large labour force, and Ceausescu went to extremes to achieve this 
goal. 
Pro natalis m 
Romania provides many examples of gender role symbolism and gender-based 
policy making, most particularly in regard to the pronatalist efforts undertaken by 
Ceausescu. Ceausescu's policies on reproduction eradicated the line between public 
and private spheres. 346 The maintenance and goals of the nation were locked into 
policies that promoted particular gender roles: "Ceausescu's socialist nation 
intersected with the ethno-nation precisely on the issue of women's 'nurturant 
nature. ,,,347 The achievement of national goals, such as a large labour force, was 
intertwined with the legitimation of the power structure. 
346 Verdery, 1994, p 228-235 
347 This is in reference to the connection with Romania's glorious past and the preferably large family 
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Romania offers the most extreme example of pronatalist policies in Eastern 
Europe. According to Kligman, "nowhere in the Soviet sphere was the 'marriage' 
between demographic concerns and nationalist interests more extreme than in 
Ceausescu's Romania.,,348 Ceausescu, in his bid to make Romania a powerhouse in 
the global arena, began a campaign of pronatalist policies that would ravage the 
country.349 The push to increase the Romanian birthrate became an obsessive program 
of intrusion into the private lives of Romanians, which was a true eradication of the 
line between public and private. 
The lengths to which Ceausescu went in order to ensure a population increase 
were extreme, and ultimately devastating for the psyche of the Romanian people and 
the children born under this regime. By the end of the 1980s, pronatalist policies 
meant that the lives of individuals, especially women, were dominated by state 
imposed efforts to increase the population. The measures taken included: 
" constant messages in the media for couples to have at least three children as their 
"patriotic duty" 
It mandatory gynaecological exams to ensure that women were not having abortions 
or using birth control 
.. incentives for couples to have children, and financial penalties for those who did 
not 
It constant "vigilante squads" in workplaces to threaten and cajole people to have 
children350 
These draconian measures resulted in women being subjected to psychological 
and physical trauma because of the physical nature of their female bodies. According 
to Baban, one woman said, "When I realized... that I was pregnant again, I often 
thought I would be better off going for a surgical operation, removing my uterus, 
ovaries, tubes, everything. ,,35 1 The severity of the policies, as they drew on the 
biological characteristics of women, drove women from expressing their femininity, 
and yet defined them primarily as Romanian mothers. There was no escape from the 
state interference with one's own body. 
348 Kligman, 1998 p 20 
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These measures stemmed from an increasingly worried leadership in Romania 
as the birthrate continued to falL In the 1980s, the measures became increasingly 
severe as what Ceausescu saw as the basis of Romanian strength, its large families, 
continued to shrink.352 In 1986, Ceausescu declared that the fetus was "the socialist' 
property of the whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty ... Those who refuse to 
have children are deserters, escaping the law of natural continuity.,,353 Ceausescu 
accused childless women of attacking the "continuity" of the nation. That is, they 
were assaulting one of the most important aspects of the nation: its longevity and 
presence in the past and future. The language Ceausescu used is militant: by referring 
to the uncooperative as deserters, he created the gendered image of the perfect 
member ofthe nation: women were to do their part by bearing children. According to 
Heng and Devan, this mobilisation through the rhetoric of patriotism is comparable to 
the mobilisation of men as soldiers. It constitutes a "sexualised, separate species of 
nationalism ... as patriotic duty for men grew out of the barrel of a gun ... so it would 
grow, for women, out of the recesses of the womb".354 
The de-criminalising of abortion immediately after the demise of Ceausescu 
came as no real surprise after the pain and suffering the policy had caused for so many 
years. Contrary to many other East European countries where abortion has been made 
illegal after many years of legality under socialism, Romania has kept abortion legaL 
However, there are moves afoot by the nationalist leaders in Romania to return to 
pronatalist policies. In 1998, of an anti-abortion bill was introduced in the Senate, and 
although it was subsequently rejected,355 it is part of a general trend of nationalist 
leaders expressing "concern about the low current fertility rates and how these low 
rates affect the 'vitality' ofthe nation.,,356 
Only a few years after abortion was made legal, Hausleitner talked about this 
disturbing trend, describing how a condemnation of "freer" sexual mores are 
combined with a "lament[ing] of the growing rate of abortions" in the context of the 
declining birthrate.357 According to Baban, various nationalist groups were supported 
352 Verdery, 1994, p 235-36 
353 Harsanyi, 1993, p 46 
354 Heng and Devan, 1992, p 348-9 
355 Monitoml, "Abortion Banning Bill Rejected", 3/13/1998 
356 Bacon and Pol, 1994, P 57 
357 Hausleitner, 1993, p 56 
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by calls in the media to stop using the poor economy as an excuse not to have 
children: "To remain passive and not react against the millions of annual abortions is 
to consent to your people's extinction".358 In addition, there has been a series of 
articles published in Romanian women's magazines that continue this lament, under 
titles such as, "A Family Without Children is Like a Tree Without Fruit", and "Birth 
Rate: The Future at Stake". 359 
These post-1989 calls for increasing birthrates, especially in relation to the 
threat posed by other nationalities with higher birthrates (such as Gypsies), are not 
only a disturbing link with the past, but provide further evidence of the link between 
nation and gender. The traumatic effects of the pronatalism of the socialist years are 
still being felt in Romania, and it is not surprising that the general population has been 
averse to restrictions on abortion. However, it is significant that even in this context 
there are moves to reintroduce some pronatalist policies, and that pronatalist 
nationalist rhetoric seems to be increasingly well-received. 
Rape 
The symbolism of rape has been used in Romania in regards mostly to 
territory that has been under contention. Thus, there are references to the "rape of 
Bessarabia" in regards to the Soviet annexation of the area.360 This reference is in the 
context of what has been called a sexualised Romanian nation, in which Romania is a 
female "container". "The container is feminine and the residents masculine, the space 
of 'Romania' is feminine and the temporally deep lineage of its inhabitants ... 
masculine, the body is feminine and the soul masculine.,,361 The nation can also be 
seen as a lover, or an object of love in a sexualised way, which evokes strong 
protective emotions. The poet Ion Lancranjan writes (in Verdery's translation), that 
" .. .love of country, love of your places of birth ... gives another meaning to 
everything ... making of yesterday's child a daring and clear-headed man, transforming 
the adolescent into a hero ... ,,362 
358 Baban, 2000, p 238 
359 Ibid., P 238 
360 Verdery, 1994, p 248 
361 Ibid., P 248 
362 Ibid., P 246 
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This image of the female vessel Romania connects with nationalist 
conceptions of women as vulnerable and with general issues of the nation feeling 
threatened by other nations. "In Romanian historiography, where national 
victimisation is a central theme, this victimisation often. has a spatial theme: the 
barbarian violates Romania's borders, rapes her, mutilates her.',363 This conception of 
women as the embodiment of the nation means that if women are sullied in any way, 
such as through sexual promiscuity or rape, the sanctity of the nation is tarnished. 
Rape as a symbol of victim is at ion has been utilised in Romania. 
Interestingly, however, rape does not seem to have been a tool widely used as 
a means of demonising the minority "other" in Romania. The point is not whether 
rapes occur in Romania (they do, and the numbers have risen since 1989364), or 
whether there is rape between "ethnicities" or for "ethnic reasons". The key here is 
that rape was not used as a tool of vilification in Romania during Ceausescu's time or 
afterwards to any significant degree. There may have been symbolic representation of 
the rape of the motherland, but not on the personal level. This is an interesting point 
that deserves further investigation, as there seems to be no significant discussion on 
rape in Romania in this context. I will outline two hypotheses on the absence of this as 
a nationalist tactic in Romania. 
It is important to point out here that the relevant threat is often not a "real" 
threat, but a perceived threat. The demonisation of the other, as discussed in this 
thesis, is the portrayal of an enemy on whom misfortunes can be blamed, either to 
distract national populations from national problems or in order to justify the 
acquisition of territory. In this case, however, Romanian nationalists did not seem to 
feel the need to portray the Romanian minorities in this particular way. 
The first hypothesis deals with the complex subject of nationalism III 
Romania, and the project of "homogenisation" pursued under Ceausescu, versus the 
use of the threat of the "other". The desire to assimilate and increase the population 
clashed with the need to demonise minorities, and to present them as a threat. 
363 Ibid., P 248 
364 Network of East West Women, from the Romanian feminist journal, Adevarul, via 
Beijing95Net, http://www.neww.org/countries/Romania/romania080398.htm; also the U.S. Department 
. of State- Romania Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998; also Baban, 2000, p 248 
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Combined with the pronatalist emphasis on women as mothers and the need for 
women to bear as many children as possible, this meant that rape was too dangerous a 
device to introduce. The possibility of women having the children of "non-
Romanians" was not something the leadership wanted to consider, as it wanted to 
ensure that as many children were born as possible. The rape and impregnation of a 
Romanian women by a Hungarian man would mean the issue of allowing abortion in 
some cases would have to be dealt with. In a traditional society like Romania, the 
stigma of rape may have been too great for this to come into the public arena. 
A second hypothesis is that the position of Hungarians, Germans and Gypsies 
in Romania was simply not threatening enough to warrant such accusations. There 
were not (and are not) many members of minorities in government or with enough 
power to pose an actual threat to the Romanian leadership. Because there was no real 
threat, for example, of a Gypsy take-over of the government, the accusation of rape 
was not used. This is in contrast, for example, with Kosovo, where the Kosovar 
Albanian population numbered 9 to 1 Serb, and where Serb accusations of Kosovar 
men raping Serb women were widespread. 365 
Thirdly, if rape is a means of "ethnically cleansing" an area, Romania was 
already doing this in a more economical manner. Romania was utilising programs of 
"selling" people back to their homelands, which occurred with people of German 
descent living in Romania. According to Gallagher, as of 1978 the Bonn government 
had agreed to pay 10,000 deutschmarks for each German allowed to leave Romania. 
The number of people leaving under this arrangement was estimated at 12,000 a 
year. 366 Perhaps programs such as this meant that there was not the need to portray the 
"other" in the country as rapists, because the threat was mitigated by the fact that the 
Germans would leave when conditions become uncomfortable enough.367 Apparently 
365 This is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
366 Gallagher, 1995, p 83 
367 The number of Hungarians fleeing the country and applying for refugee status in Hungary 
skyrocketed in conjunction with Ceausescu's homogenisation policy in Transylvania, which was 
discriminatory towards Hungarians. While this was embarrassing to Ceausescu and he went to the 
extent of reinforcing the border between Hungary and Transylvania, the border was not too tightly 
patrolled as the departure of Hungarian refugees reduced the number of Hungarians in Romania. 
Deletant, 1995, p 139 
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this option was also available to Jews (presumably with Israel "buying" them), but not 
to Hungarians, as the Hungarian monetary unit was not legal tender in Romania.368 
Deviations from Nationalist NornlS 
Under Ceausescu, the assertion of a primary identity on any basis other than 
Romanian (i.e. identities based on another ethnicity or on gender) was seen as a threat 
to the nation's leadership. Because of the inseparable nature of the Romanian national 
leadership and the nation, this threat was then to the legitimacy of the nation itself.369 
In the post socialist years, there has been an increase in the diversity of groups that are 
tolerated by the state. For example, women's groups have developed to an extent. 
However, the societal perception of what it means to be Romanian is still quite 
restrictive, and homosexuals are still persecuted. 
Feminist Movements 
In socialist Romania, the fear of difference, which had its roots in both the 
standard socialist perception of others as dangerous and in nationalist demonisation of 
the other, did not leave much room for women to identify as women first and 
Romanian second. The response of the Ceausescu leadership was to create 
nationalised woman's clubs, Femina, that would help to "transform the none-too-
conformist attitudes and practices of their 'sisters,.,,37o This is fairly clearly a co-
option of women's groups by the state in order to subvert the groups' potential for 
dissension. 
Post-Ceausescu, a number of feminist groups have arisen, such as ANA, the 
Romanian Society for Feminist Analysis. These have provided a degree of dialogue 
about women's issues and analysis, especially in the wake of the traumatic pronatalist 
policies. However, there is the impression that Romania is still primarily an anti-
feminist country, which is congruent with the retraditionalised attitudes of Romanian 
nationalism. The push for women to return to the home does not mesh with 
368 Kligman, 1998, p 229 
369 Ibid., P 33 
370 Ibid" P 114 
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movements that advocate equal rights and political participation for women. There is 
also the added negative association of Western-style feminism with Marxist theory, 
which is repellent to many Romanian women. 37 1 
Women As Soldiers 
There is not much literature on women assuming military roles in nationalist 
conflicts in Romania, as there was not the kind of nationalistic conflict there that there 
was in, for example, the former Yugoslavia. However, there are two perspectives I 
would like to briefly explore. 
One version of "women as soldiers" relates to the mobilisation of women for 
pronatalist goals. This was tantamount to a military movement, in which women were 
the soldiers (although, to continue the analogy, they were drafted and did not 
volunteer). As was discussed in the pronatalism section, this was similar to male 
mobilisation into the armed forces. However, it does not fall into the category of 
deviation addressed here. 
The other is that raised by Hausleitner, who has discussed the "women facing 
a hail of bullets in order to bring bread to the street fighters. One will also have seen 
the proud faces of young girls with MPls in their hands who sought to protect the 
people from attacks by the Securitate.,,372 The impression that Hausleitner gives is of 
courageous young freedom fighters, but as there was not conflict on the scale of war, 
the mobilisation of women as soldiers does not seem to be a paradox the Romanian 
leadership had to grapple with to any large degree. Indeed, in the re-framing of post-
Ceausescu nationalism, the first of these actions could be interpreted as those of 
valiant young women bringing food to the male fighters, and thus fulfilling a 
traditional female role. 
Hom 0 sexuality 
As discussed in the framework, the spectre of homosexuality is one that is 
often raised in nationalist rhetoric to emasculate men and to demonise women. To call 
371 Fischer and Harsanyi, 1994, p 217-220 
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a man a homosexual is to imply that he lacks the characteristics of a "real" man: he 
does not father children, does not have a wife, and is considered foreign and strange. 
A homosexual woman, does not fulfil her duties as a woman by bearing children for 
the nation. 
Homosexuality was declared illegal in article 200 of the Penal code under 
Ceausescu.373 The outlawing of homosexuality in socialist Romania fits the profile of 
homogeneity that Ceausescu and the RCP sought: along with the handicapped, those 
who did not work, and foreigners, homosexuals were the "other". They were different 
and therefore did not have a place in the Romanian nation?74 This added to the 
stigma already attached to homosexuality in Romania's traditional society and in the 
pronatalist policies. 375 
It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that the nationalist groups in 
Romania today often vilify gay men and women. Homosexuality is still an issue and 
has not yet been de-criminalised in Romania. Despite earlier rulings against the law 
by the constitutional court, Penal Code 200 was again discussed in Parliament in 
1996, and the punishment for homosexual behaviour was increased.376 One Deputy 
called homosexuality a "phenomenon placing in peril the birth rate of Romanians and 
the health of the Romanian people.,,377 In response to the calls from the European 
Parliament for Romania to decriminalise homosexuality in order to meet obligations 
as a member of the Council of Europe, another Deputy claimed that 35% of the 
European Parliament were homosexuaL378 It is quite clear that this was intended as an 
insult, and as an insult that attacked the normalcy (i.e. sexual normalcy) of the 
European Parliament members, who were, not coincidentally, foreigners and therefore 
"other". 
372 Hausleitner, 1993, p 53 
373 Kligman, 1998, p 143 
374 Creteanu and Coman, 1998 
375 Kligman, 1998, p 143 
376 Long, 1996, "The Romanian Chamber of Deputies Has Voted 'No' To Decriminalize Consensual 
Homosexual Acts Between Adults"; also ILGA Press Release, 12 September, 1996. For more 
information on the current status of homosexuals in Romania, see the Romania Action For Gay Men, 
Lesbians And Bisexuals website, http://www.raglb.org.uk/; Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 
377 ILGA Press Release, 12 September, 1996 
378 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter sought to demonstrate how gender was used in the legitimation of 
nationalist movements in Romania. Through an exploration of various elements of 
these nationalist movements, we have seen how these attempts at legitimation 
manifested themselves. What is evident in Romania is that the part played by women 
in the nationalist project matches with one ofYuval-Davis' key theoretical constructs: 
that of the woman as the reproducer of the nation. Under Ceausescu, the ramifications 
of this were the subsumation of men and women to one of the main goals of the state; 
namely, increasing the popUlation. 
The manipulation of history in Romania was one of the building blocks of 
Ceausescu's nationalist movement. As demonstrated in the section on history, the 
construction (and continuing re-construction) of the foundation of the Romanian 
nation was highly gendered, and was used to provide a rationale for both pronatalist 
policies and for the post-socialist retraditionalisation of Romanian society. The key 
conceptions, through such avenues as media, popular culture, and speeches, 
emphasised the integral characteristics of the idealised member of the nation, and the 
paramountcy of the nation over all other concerns. The media under Ceausescu was a 
forum for propaganda, which as Kligman has argued, was ubiquitous. The message 
delivered was one of mandatory conformity to a national Romanian ideal, which was 
bolstered by symbols and ideals portrayed in popular culture. This is particularly 
demonstrated in the explicit usage of folk traditions by the RCP, as discussed above. 
As explored in this chapter, the politics of reproduction provide ample 
evidence of the intersection of gender and national goals. The overt construction of 
gender roles that supported the state's goals is impossible to ignore. The use of all the 
methods above to gamer public support provide a case study that demonstrates how 
gender is integral to an understanding of nationalist rhetoric. The Romanian 
nationalist pronatalist project was dependent upon the manufacture and control of 
gender identity. 
Under socialist leadership, Romania relied on gender for its nationalist project, 
partiCUlarly as the 1980s brought about a more desperate time for Ceausescu's 
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legitimacy. In the post-socialist period, we have seen how the various political parties 
have utilised the familiar themes of gendered rhetoric to promote the legitimacy of 
their own claims to power. In part due to the power structures in place, and in part 
because of the leadership that sought and gained control, the manipulation and 
construction of gender identity continued post-socialism via the same rhetoric and 
nationalist discourse. As we shall see in the next chapter, many similar gender 
conceptions were utilised by various groups in the struggle for power in Yugoslavia. 
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Chapter Six 
Yugoslavia 
This chapter investigates the politics of tradition and reproduction in the 
region of the fonner Yugoslavia from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. The majority 
of the post-socialist section of this chapter focuses on Serb nationalism. This is 
primarily because of the limitations of space, as an examination of all the regions and 
their nationalist movements would unnecessarily extend this work. The decision to 
focus on Serb nationalism is due to the considerable body of literature in English that 
deals with the Serb nationalist movement and the role of gender in the rhetoric of this 
movement. Because this thesis is reliant on secondary sources, availability has 
partially dictated the choice of the case studies. 
Institutional Problems and Legitimacy Crises 
Under Josip Tito, regional nationalism (anything apart from Yugoslav 
nationalism) was actively discouraged. Indeed, it was quite ruthlessly repressed 
through purges of nationalist leaders. 379 However, the Yugoslav leadership, as Cohen 
put it, although uncomfortable with nationalism, nevertheless "found the notion of 
Yugoslavism a useful antidote for combating ethnic particularism and what they saw 
as a trend away from 'revolutionary unity. ",380 As Banac has argued, "the political 
legitimation of the Yugoslav Communists cannot be separated from their efforts at 
solving Yugoslavia's long-standing national question.,,381 The 1974 constitution 
reflected the pull between the constituent nations and the central government by 
379 Ramet, 1992, p 24-5; Denich, 1994, p 371 
380 Cohen, 1995, p 32 
381 Banac, 1990, p 150 
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giving each region the designation of a republic. This meant that the leaders of the 
different regions had to vie for power at the national leveL 
It can be reasonably argued that with the death of Josip Tito in 1980, there was 
a gradual crumbling of the federal structure of Yugos1avia.382 The federal structure 
was such that, without a strong leader at the centre, the (aspiring) leaders of the 
"ethnically" defined republics sought to shore up their power bases in their regions by 
emphasising nationalist goals for these regions. With this came a devolving of power 
from the central communist party, which culminated (at least symbolically) with 
Milosevic's 1987 speech in KoSOVO. 383 
In Kosovo, Serb nationalists began to realise their claims for more power and 
control in the region as Milosevic rose to power. Part of this struggle included 
attempts by Kosovo Serbs to take control of the police force in the Kosovo region, in 
which the population of 2 million was approximately 90% Kosovo Albanian. By 
1989, Kosovo's autonomy had been considerably reduced and Serbs in the region 
were being supported by the central government in Yugoslavia. Milosevic effectively 
reduced the independence of the Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina provinces to the 
extent that Serbia had control over their votes in the revolving presidency of 
Yugoslavia. According to Ramet, the result was that Milosevic could "produce 
deadlocks in the presidency at Will.,,384 By 1989, with the major changes that were to 
take place in Eastern Europe, the rising problems of central government had reached 
the point where nationalist movements were overtly secessionist. 385 The disintegration 
of Yugoslavia marked the end of the socialist period. 
It is useful here to briefly address the shape nationalism took in the former 
Yugoslavia. As described previously, Sardamov details primordialistlessentialist 
conceptions of nationalism as ones that have "a redemptive historical destiny", in 
which the movement to reclaim the national identity and right the often bloody 
wrongs of the past are the overarching goals of the members of the nation. Sardamov 
applies this conception to the Serbo-Croat conflict, contending that the identities in 
382 Cohen, 1995, p 45; Denich, 1994, p 370; Miller, 1997, p 150-1; Morokvasic, 1998, p 69 
383 Cohen, 1995, p 51-2 
384 Ramet, 1992, p 69 
385 The references in this thesis to the situation in Kosovo are primarily to do with this period of unrest 
in Yugoslavia, rather than the events surrounding the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999. 
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this region have remained relatively consistent over long periods of time, and that 
these are then drawn on and utilised in times of crisis by elites.386 
This was not pure instrumentalism; rather, the history and identity of the Serbs 
(in this case) is one of militant historicism: the very mythology of the Serb nation is 
one of conflict and "the prospect of messianic deliverance".387 As both Serbs and 
Croats share this essentialist view, it becomes difficult to come to mediated, 
negotiated peace settlements when each side believes that the other is inherently, for 
example, "marked by a common 'genocidal nature",388 
The impact on Serbo-Croat relations is wide. First, identities are based on the 
community, not the individual. This results in the perception of the irredemptive 
nature of the enemy on the one hand and the belief that the nation needs its own state 
to survive. Second, any members of an ethnic minority are immediately reduced in 
status, often with fewer rights of citizenship. Finally, this can lead to "deep mutual 
suspicions about the authenticity of the other side's ethnic self-identification, and [in 
this case] to a shared dismissal of Bosnian Muslim identity.,,389 
This is not to argue the position that nationalisms in the region are "natural" 
characteristics of the Serbs and Croats, and that these historical enmities have been in 
existence for so long that there is no hope in trying to change them. 39o Rather, 
Sardamov's argument above provides a perspective in which this demonisation of the 
"other" is key to one's own identity, and that this demonisation has been used to 
assert national dominance. Regardless of the veracity of the characteristics of a 
particular group (or the possibility of establishing such veracity), the perception is that 
these characteristics are natural and enduring. The power structures in Yugoslavia (as 
discussed above) meant that the seeking of legitimacy through nationalist rhetoric 
soon began to fit Gellner's portrayal of "nationalism [as] a theory of political 
legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political 
ones.,,391 This legitimacy was in tum justified by the history of misconception that 
386 Sardamov, 1997, p 463 
387 Ibid., P 464 
388 Ibid., P 465 
389 Ibid., P 465-6 
390 Ibid., P 463 
391 Gellner, 1983, p 1 
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Sardamov details: within the nationalist paradigm, the demonisation of the "other" in 
Yugoslavia made it impossible to conceive of a state which these nationalities could 
co-inhabit. 
As Yugoslavia disintegrated, nationalist rhetoric became more extreme. The 
leadership in Yugoslavia had, in general, been less intrusive into all facets of private 
lives than in Romania. However, in the 1980s, discussion in the media and other areas 
of public discussion included more nationalist rhetoric and more opinions on 
appropriate gender roles and participation. This resulted in increasing pressure for 
men and women to adhere to more traditional roles, and the nationalist leadership 
became more involved in the private realm.392 The manifestation of this pressure is 
discussed below in the politics of tradition. 
Politics of Tradition 
The politics of tradition in Yugoslavia follow the pattern outlined in chapter 
four. As the contest for the legitimacy to rule became more intense, so did the efforts 
to control and define the nation on a symbolic level. The manipulation of the image of 
the nation became important as nationalist leaders attempted to emphasise the 
difference between their group and the other, and to present the past in a manner that 
would draw attention to the need to see that other as a threat. 
In terms of gender, masculinity in Eastern Europe has historically been 
defined by legends of military prowess and conquest. In Yugoslavia, this conception 
was continued under socialism, in which "universal military training provided a 
shared background for all males and a rite of passage that identified manhood with the 
ability to fight.,,393 As a result, claims Denich, "Yugoslavia was a country in a 
constant state of military preparation.,,394 The definition of true masculinity was 
dependent upon this conception of the warrior male, which was reinforced by the 
tradition of male conscription. As discussed by Lukic, there was an "assumption that 
manhood is proved in battle, or at least in military service".395 Entry into the military 
392 Milic, 1993, P 112 
393 Denich, 1995, p 64 
394 Ibid., P 65 
395 Lukic, 2000, P 407 
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became a ritual for young males, celebrated by families as a symbolic rite of passage 
into adulthood. This ritual was commonly referred to as the "solemn oath". 396 
The double burden was a major problem for women in Yugoslavia. The issue 
of gender in socialist Yugoslavia was a complex one, in which gender equality, based 
partially on Marxist ideology, conflicted with traditional perceptions of gender 
roles.397 Therefore, there was an expansion of women's roles and rights, such as 
employment opportunities, but little accompanying change in the domestic arena. As 
in other socialist countries, the efforts to bring women into the workforce were not 
matched by substantive change in social structures of housework and childcare. The 
traditional nature of the society, as noted above, was not conducive to this type of 
restructuring. 398 According to Woodward, women "accepted the necessity of both 
work and family but ... deemphasized their participation in the public sphere.,,399 This 
conflict between work and family, common throughout socialist Eastern Europe, was 
conducive to the relief felt by many women at the initial retraditionalisation of 
nationalist movements, as discussed earlier in this thesis. 
There were considerable advances for women in Yugoslavia under socialism, 
as women were educated and moved into the workforce. This was accompanied by 
some changes in some social attitudes, and this combined with a relatively non-
oppressive socialist leadership meant that there was room for feminist groups, unlike 
the situation in Romania.4oo However, Yugoslavian traditional society was patriarchal, 
in which women generally organised the private sphere of the home, and men worked 
in the public realm. Under socialism, as discussed above, there was a push for women 
to enter the public work force, but (particularly in rural areas) this was not on the level 
of deep and pervasive societal change.401 This patriarchal nature of Yugoslavian 
society is noted with some cynicism in the following anecdote: 
An anthropologist doing fieldwork in Montenegro is walking along a mountain 
path when she encounters a local couple. The man strides ahead, happily sniffing 
the air, while the woman trudges six paces behind with a pack on her back. 
Business as usual, she says to herself. After leaving the area for a few years 
396 Ibid., P 407 
397 Woodward, 1985, p 252 
398 Massey et aI, 1995, p 376 
399 Woodward, 1985, p 256 
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because of a small regional war, the anthropologist comes back. On the same path, 
she catches up with the same couple. The woman's striding in front, the man is six 
paces behind her, leading a donkey with a pack on its back. Pleased, she greets 
them: I see your wife's in the lead now! what's happened? Lots, he responds--my 
house was shelled, my cousin was shot, but never mind, we're back to normal, 
except for the damn mines. 402 . 
This separation of male and female spheres is also illustrated by the images of 
public figures. A parallel can be drawn between the perceptions of Slobodan 
Milosevic and his wife Mirjana Markovic, and of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, 
particularly in the way they portray themselves as the family of a particular nation. As 
extensively discussed in the Romania chapter, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu presented 
themselves as the mother and father of the Romanian nation. This would seem the 
same in the case of the Slobodan Milosevic and his wife. Elena and Mirjana, both of 
whom were distrusted and feared as powerful women, were seen as wielding an 
inappropriate degree of power for a woman. 403 
As Serbian nationalism became the currency of power for Slobodan Milosevic, 
the general rhetoric around the movement became more separatist and inflammatory. 
The next section discusses the utilisation of gendered historical concepts and 
perspectives to support nationalist legitimacy. 
Historical Manipulation 
The framework in chapter four included a discussion of the importance of 
history in nationalist movements, and this has been born out by the evidence of 
historical manipulation in Romania. The use of historical symbols and traditions was 
not unfamiliar to socialist Yugoslavia. In Tito's use of Yugoslav nationalism, he also 
relied on pageantry and symbolism to reinforce his own status as patriarch of the 
nation.404 However, as nationalist rhetoric began to appear publicly in the 1980s in 
Yugoslavia, historical revisionism in partiCUlar became increasingly important.405 
Judah outlines the Serb history and its intersection with Kosovo, explaining how the 
importance ofthe 1389 battle was carried through Serb mythology and ultimately was 
402 Munk 1999 
403 Silber' 1999 
404 See f;r example Dubinskas, 1983 
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manipulated by Milosevic in his consolidation of power in the 1980s.406 With the 
disintegration of the socialist state and the parallel upsurge in nationalist rhetoric 
came a concurrent revising of national histories. In Kosovo, Serbian scholars started 
to write about Serbian history in a way that "reinterpreted the heroic tradition to 
emphasize loss and victimization.,,407 This was not merely an informal encouragement 
of such revisions, but policy from the leadership, as "textbooks were rewritten to 
include the nationalist view of history. Beginning in Fall 1991 textbooks for 
elementary and secondary school in the Republic of Serbia had to include a 'detailed 
account of wars, exterminations, tortures, destructions of [Serbian] people",.408 
According to Meznaric's research, the efforts of both Serbs and Albanians to 
assert the "right" to Kosovo resulted in the spending of "enormous amounts of money, 
energy and ideas on defining tradition and continuity.,,409 Meznaric argued that there 
was difficulty in defining the "other" in a region where distinctions between groups 
had been blurred over time, and that this is one of the reasons rape was used in 
construeting identities of the "other". At a now infamous speech on the 600th 
anniversary of the defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo in 1389, Milosevic framed the 
Serbian experienee throughout history as one of victimisation and of liberation, not 
one of oppression of others. In his claim that "the Serbs throughout their history never 
conquered or exploited anybody else", and he exacerbated the image of Serbs as 
vietims of Kosovo Albanians, and removed any responsibility Serbs might have for 
the oppression of other groupS.410 
As war broke out in the early 1990s, a new dimension was added to this 
manipulation of history: the exhumation of the dead in various contexts. Salecl asserts 
that this is part of a comparison of present day heroes with those of the past: "bones 
playa special role in this dramatie identification with the heroic past.,,411 There were 
subsequent allegations that enemy groups were mistreating the bones in other regions, 
405 Judah, 1997, p 24 
406 Ibid., P 24 
407 Denich, 1994, p 371 
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by perfonning medical experiments on them.412 There were also arguments over how 
many corpses there actually were, with each side wanting to increase its dead so as to 
claim a greater victim-hood.413 This physical resurrection of the past was not an 
uncommon phenomenon in the region, and has particUlar significance for this case 
study. One important aspect is the physical manifestation of just how important 
historical ties are to many groups in the region. The history of the bodies is one of 
struggle and oppression, so these are "historic revisions that reinterpreted the heroic 
tradition to emphasize loss and victimization".414 This history of victimisation is one 
of death and of other bodily wrongs, such as rape. Another aspect is that these bones 
draw our attention to the relation of the dead bodies with the body of the nation. As 
has been discussed previously, the connection of the physical body with the concept 
of the nation is important in the bond between individual and nation. The body of the 
nation is bonded with these dead bodies, just as the nation in the present is connected 
with the bodies ofthe living through men and women. 
These forays into the past provide evidence of the importance to Serb leaders 
of placing the validity of their nationalist project in the past. As discussed in the 
framework, the Serb history books were supplying the essential ingredients of the 
nationalist movement.415 What we see in these examples are historical versions of 
events that promote two particular gender constructions. One is very similar to that in 
Romania: that the traditional family structure of the Serb family (with the woman 
looking after the home and the man earning the wage) was the one that was true to the 
Serb nation and therefore preferential to any other. The second point, which is related 
to the first and was of particular importance to a nation that was about to go to war, 
was the message of the self-sacrificing woman bearing many male children and 
sending them off to war, where they went gladly in order to fight for their nation.416 
This conception of the sacrificing woman and the fighting man is one that was drawn 
on heavily in both the history and mythology of Serb nationalism. As is discussed in 
the next section, this message was reiterated in the media. 
412 Ibid., P 55-6 
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Media 
The part played by the media has been discussed in the framework section in 
regards to how internal cohesion is perceived and presented, In Anderson's argument, 
the media helps people to imagine who belongs and who does not. In the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia, the leaders of all sides recognised the importance of the media 
print, television and radio - in their continuing campaigns against their various 
enemies. These leaders only gained control of the various main media sources 
through either ownership or intimidation, and utilised these sources for everything 
from the promotion of negative images of opponents to the advocating ofmurder.417 
State television, for instance, has been called "Milosevic's most effective instrument 
of power".418 Additional evidence of the perception of the media's power was the 
assassination of Slavko Curuvija, the owner of the leading Yugoslavian alternative 
newspaper in April of 1999.419 
According to Miller, the media played a special role in Milosevic's 
demonisation of the Albanians in Kosovo in the late 1980s. The press in Yugoslavia 
had been relatively open, unlike Romania where the people were accustomed to not 
believing what they read.42o Therefore, when Milosevic began co-opting the media for 
the nationalist cause, "Serbs, accustomed to believe what they read and saw in the 
media, fell victim to this newly radicalized press.,,421 In this scenario, the influence of 
the press was particularly useful to nationalist leaders, as it was both under nationalist 
control and had a trusting audience. 
The argument has been made that a 'media war' is part and parcel of an 
'ethnic war', in which the media partakes in constructing the identities that are being 
fought over. Newspapers should not be seen as " ... merely journalistic reflections on 
or reports about events, and certainly not as innocent or incidental. .. Both wars [ethnic 
and media] define those who belong to the nation and those who do not, and they both 
411 "Special Report On the Media" from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1994. Also 
see Lukic (2000) for a discussion of the relationship between regimes and media as often being a 
reciprocal one, in which the media plays a self-interested role in maintaining a particular regime. In 
such a scenario, according to Lukic, the media has a vested interest in legitimating certain leaderships. 
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define the ways the fonner and the latter should be dealt with.,,422 As we will see 
below, the images and stereotypes presented in the Serb media at this time in Kosovo 
were constructs of the particular nationalist movements: the Serb men and women 
were positively portrayed while the Albanian men and women were often demonised 
or scorned. 
There are a variety of examples of the utilisation of archetypal male and 
female roles as presented in the mainstream Serbian media as anned conflict 
intensified. Lukic, in an examination of gender portrayal in the media, details several 
of these examples. As an example of the "heroic mother", there was a newspaper 
piece on a mother who, while asking for the Croatian and Slovenian annies to 
disband, is "proud of her sons in the Anny.,,423 Men were presented as heroic sons 
who, as referred to earlier, achieve true manhood through their military service. In 
regards to the "solemn oath" ritual, the newspaper article entitled, "They Saw Him 
For the Last Time at the Solemn Oath", speaks of the loss to a family of the young 
son, and romanticises his death for his nation.424 These two examples point to the use 
of historical images of men and women in which their purposes in life are to serve the 
nation: a nation that is constructed on images of heroic men and sacrificing women. 
This is not to imply that there is always consensus on what appropriate roles 
are. When mothers in Croatia marched against the co-option of their sons for armed 
service, the newspapers seemed tom between portraying the women as "fierce 
mothers" for whom even enemy soldiers stood aside, and "tearful" mothers, more in 
line with submissive and defenceless women.425 This once again points to the 
contested nature of the national image: there are multiple portrayals of the 
participation in the nationalist movement, and they are sometimes contradictory. 
However, regardless of the role played by individuals, there is almost always 
an emphasis on allegiance to the nation above all else. One newspaper article told of a 
young Serb woman saying, " 'she would not hesitate killing her ex-husband if it were 
necessary' ... The couple ... 'had a child and used to live happily' ... [however] 'he left 
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me because he could no longer be married to a Croat. If one day we run into each 
other, I will kill him, otherwise, I know he will kill me. ",426 As Morokvasic argues, "it 
is irrelevant whether the story is true or not", what is important is that the message in 
the paper was perceived as true.427 The emphasis is on the noble sacrifice this woman 
is making, even though it contradicts her normal, peacetime role of mother and wife; 
to save the nation she will put that aside. 
Popular Culture 
The tradition of poetry, song and stories is strong in the former Yugoslavia, as 
in many other Eastern European countries. As in Romania, where poetry was 
specifically co-opted by the socialist leadership, in Serb nationalism there has also 
been an acknowledgement that these are effective vehicles for conveying nationalist 
symbols and ideals.428 In chapter four there was discussion of how national cohesion 
and bravery are portrayed as the nation heads towards war. In the examples below, the 
ideals are of bravery, and the history is one that stretches back through the ages, and is 
filled with wrongs done to the Serbian nation. 
The following poem was posted on the Yugoslavian government web page at 
the time of the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. The poem is provided in both 
English and Serbian, and provides an interesting portrayal of Serbia. 
I 
divine daughter 
Serbia 
hereby freely state 
with shackles and through the wire 
before my witnesses 
Force, Suffering and Injustice 
that I am guilty and that I confess! ( ... ) 
Swarms of former men 
Thieves and paupers 
Packs of robots and other monsters yet 
will pounce on my orchards and fields 
and my little white houses along the roads 
426 Morokvasic, 1998, p 83 
427 Ibid., p 83 
428 See the nationalist Serbian Unity Congress website (http://suc.suc.org), which details the importance 
of "The Oral Tradition" in Serb history 
(http://suc.suc.org/cultureihistory/Hist_Serb _ Culture/chiiOral_ Tradition.htrnl ) 
112 
adomed by green goddesses 
cherry, apple and plum trees ( ... ) 
We are very important, 
I and my sisters 
Truth and Justice 
for such mighty forces have rallied against us 
and Wrong and Injustice are sneering at us. 
Why are Jihad warriors 
Crusaders or 
Yanks 
to quarter my sons and daughters ( ... )429 
There are several aspects of this piece that I would like to draw attention to. 
Perhaps the most obvious element is the identification of Serbia as female "daughter 
Serbia". This sets the tone for the rest of the piece, because with references to the 
sisters Truth and Justice, daughter Serbia becomes a noble female entity as well. 
Secondly, the images of Serbia as a victim are frequent, but I would like to focus on 
the stanza that portrays Serbia's enemies as, " Swarms of former men/Thieves and 
pauperslPacks of robots and other monsters yet". This not only conveys the image of 
disreputable men swarming over the body of this female Serbia, but portrays the male 
enemies as beingformer men: the poem seeks to emasculate the enemy. The enemy 
men are not actually men they are emasculated or they are automatons. Thirdly is 
the section that refers to "my sons and daughters ... ". This is a classic illustration of 
the nation as a mother, with the sons and daughters being persecuted, and is an 
interesting progression from the portrayal of Serbia as daughter earlier in the poem. 
What we see is a progression of Serbia as a daughter, who can be "swarmed" over by 
men. She then becomes the sister of Truth and Justice; an equal of etemal virtues. She 
then becomes the sacrificing mother of the victims, in which the message is that her 
brave sons and daughters have been persecuted by the enemy. One of the important 
implications is the biological inclusion in the nation in other words, being a son or 
daughter in the nation is reliant on being bom into that nation, and others cannot truly 
belong. It also implies the strong emotive ties that belong to family members, for 
whom one would presumably kill and die. 
There is often a blurring of the distinction between the mother of the nation 
and the nation as a mother. In the well-known legend of Mother Jugovic, it seems that 
this mother of the nation is also representative of the nation as a mother. The story is 
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of a Serb woman who sends all nine of her sons off to the 1389 battle of Kosovo, in 
which all nine are killed. The legend celebrates the sacrifice and bravery of the 
woman "offering her children up to death in defence of the fatherland".430 The story 
of Mother Jugovic is well-known and potent; it constructs the appropriate behaviour 
of a mother (sacrificing her sons and not breaking down) and portrays the Serb 
version of the battle for Kosovo. The importance of this story throughout the history 
of the Serbs is heightened by the bravery of the sons, and their victimisation in battle. 
A web-page organised by a group calling itself the "Belgrade Academic 
Association For Equal Rights In The World" presents an article by R W Seton 
Watson. This article includes a poem about Mother Jugovic and her sacrifice.431 This 
poem and the legend it refers to frame Mother Jugovic's actions as admirable in their 
stoicism and sacrifice. The inclusion of this piece on this website is important, too, as 
the writing makes several assertions about the character of the Serb that mark the 
distinctiveness of Serbs as a group. Drawing these threads together, we see that this 
legend of the nation conveys several familiar themes: the sacrificing nature of Serb 
women, the courageous nature of Serb men, the victim status of Serbs at a key 
moment in history, and the difference of Serbs from the "others" around them. 
The epic poetry and song that arose out of the battle of Kosovo are also 
connected with the present day. The symbolism of some ofthe most famous songs are 
referred to in the propaganda of current nationalist groups. One of the most famous 
poems is of the "Fair Maiden ofKosovo", about a Serb woman at the time ofthe 1389 
battle.432 During the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999, the Serbian Unity Congress 
placed a photograph entitled, "Maiden of Kosovo" on its website, in its "Destruction 
of Yugoslavia" section, in what seems to be an obvious reference the poem.433 The 
woman is at a peace rally, protesting the NATO bombing (see Figure 6.1, below). It is 
an interesting connection of history to the present day, in a way that specifically 
connects the brave, sacrificing woman of 1389 with the brave young woman 
protesting in the 1990s. This is an example of how tradition is drawn on as discussed 
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in the framework of the case studies. The modem woman is connected with the 
maiden of 600 years ago, which illustrates the concept of the nation stretching 
unchanged through time, in past, present and future. 
Figure 6.1: "Maiden of Kosovo" 
Another phenomenon of the upsurge in nationalism in the former Yugoslavia was the 
increase in "traditional" music. Both in Croatia and Serbia there was encouragement 
of popular music that relied on national legend during the war between the two 
nations. The official encouragement by the Serbian leadership of "newly composed 
folk music" parallels the encouragement in Croatia. In the 1980s, a resurgence in 
Serbia of this style of folk music, which was supported by Serbian media, was 
becoming increasingly dependent upon historical legends such as the Serbian defeat 
in Kosovo in 1389. Some song titles were, "Six Centuries Have Passed Since the 
Kosovo Battle", "Oh Serbia of Three Parts, You Shall Be One Whole Again", and 
"Montenegro and Serbia Are Two Eyes in One Head".434 
The increasing hostility in the region and the outbreak of open armed conflict saw 
increasing production of these "patriotic" songs, primarily in two categories: the new 
folk songs which "celebrate[d] and perpetuate[d] the conceptions about the brave 
[male] Serbian soldier", and those which utilised pre-existing songs, re-arranged in 
the modem folk style.435 According to Ceribasic, "these songs, using traditional 
434 Ceribasic, 1995, p 94 
435 Ibid., P 94 
115 
literary figures and vocabulary ... celebrate heroic intrepid fighters who remained 
undaunted even by almost certain death.,,436 In some instances the Serbian music 
portrays Croatia as a woman, in order to emphasise its weakness. This is not as a 
nomlal woman who should be protected: Croatia is depicted as a "whore". In one 
song, "Why Didn't Croatia Get Married", the songwriter portrays, "the image of the 
Croatian divorcee who 'bares her calves, and sashays through Europe, but nobody 
wants the bride' ... ,,437 The imagery is of a "wanton" woman, a woman who is not 
pure, a woman who is not the equal of the chaste idealised Serbian woman. This 
symbolic representation of Croatia implies the country is not only weaker than Serbia, 
but that the country is not equal to Serbia's moral fibre. The portrayal of this type of 
woman has interesting ramifications for rape, as she is not chaste and pure, and is 
therefore possibly deserving of the rape, or even "asking" for it. De-humanisation of 
the enemy is achieved by branding the enemy as inferior through gendered rhetoric. 
The Croatian popular music of the time is similarly instructive in its form. 
Although it addresses both men and women, there is a dichotomy presented of the two 
worlds (for that is how separate they are intended to appear): the men occupy the 
realm of "activity, power and fighting" while the women remain at home with, 
"passivity, indulgence, pleading for peace ... ,,438 There are differences in the 
representations of the two regions. Ceribasic argues that the Croatian songs focused 
on Croatia's victim status, while in the Serb songs "war .. .is perceived almost as a 
natural state.,,439 However, the general representations are very similar in their 
portrayal of what is natural and therefore proper for the nation state, and in their 
delineation of those natural roles along gender lines. Both groups extol the virtues of 
"their" women, especially in terms of their sacrifice and virtue, and both groups 
portray the women in the other group as promiscuous and wanton. As is examined in 
the section on deviations in this chapter, the actual parameters of what is acceptable 
for women is subject to change with the fluctuating needs of the nation. 
These "folksongs" were also used to present a partiCUlarly sexualised and 
apolitical version of women. In Lukic's account, one of the main images of women 
436 Ibid., p 94 
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that was available in popular culture was that the "young girl in very sexy, revealing 
clothes would sing about her wish to live for 'him' and for 'his mother', to serve 
him .... "44o These images became stronger and more prevalent in the early 1990s as 
instability increased and war broke out. 
A novel by Croatian woman Neda Miranda Blazevic illustrates several of the 
themes discussed thus far. The storyline of Dancing on Ashes (1993) introduces a 
young Croatian woman who discovers that she is actually an orphan: given up 
because she is the product of the rape camps for Serbian and Montenegrin men in 
World War II. As a result, "it turns out she is the offspring of organised, officially 
sanctioned rape. The central character therefore acquires symbolic value as the 
embodiment of the 'rape' of Croatia by Serbia and Montenegro in the monstrous 
distortion that, in the novelists' view, was the state ofYugoslavia.,,441 Not only is it a 
young woman symbolising the body and subsequent rape of the nation of Croatia, it is 
also an example of how women incorporate and appropriate nationalist discourses and 
identities. As Woollacott argues, "It should hardly surprise us that women have 
followed the same roads as men and embraced the same symbols in pursuing 
citizenship that men have.,,442 All of the areas discussed in this tradition section, such 
as myths of the nation, the revision of Serb history, and the rhetoric present in the 
media, are all relevant for both men and women. The identification of women with 
Mother Jugovic or the modem Maiden of Kosovo are all likely, as these are 
compelling images. As was discussed in the chapter on gender and nationalism in this 
thesis, women have more than one identification: they do not identify solely as a 
woman. The adoption of a national identity by the member of the nation is one of the 
goals of, for example, the manipUlation of history. The incorporation of the national 
identity into women's perceptions of themselves is part of the national project, and it 
is often successful. 
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Politics of Reproduction 
Part of the push in the late 1980s to define the various nationalist boundaries 
was through what has been defined in this thesis as the politics of reproduction. In this 
section I will be examining these themes in the specific context of the nationalist 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
Pronatalism 
The status of women under socialism, as has been discussed at length in this 
thesis, was a contradictory one. Official policies spoke of equality for men and 
women, while the reality of the societal traditions and the socialist need for large 
supplies of labour meant that women bore a double burden of work and responsibility 
for the domestic realm, and were expected to bear many children. This was 
demonstrated in the devastating effects of these policies in Romania. While the 
policies in Yugoslavia did not approach that degree of severity, there was still 
encouragement for women to bear children to build a large labour force. 443 However, 
there was not a concerted effort at increasing the population, and when the Serb 
nationalist movement began to publicly mobilise in the 1980s it noted with alarm the 
low Serb birth rate.444 
In the former Yugoslavia, the most overt pronatalist sentiment was in Kosovo, 
where the Albanian population drastically outnumbered the Serbian popUlation. 
Milosevic's movement to stir nationalist sentiment among Serbs in the region drew on 
many of the tactics discussed thus far in the thesis. By 1992, the new Yugoslavian 
constitution had eliminated Article 191, which had guaranteed women's reproductive 
rights. The cost of gaining an abortion was made prohibitive, and access to abortion 
. . 1 . d 445 was mcreasmg y restncte . 
Part of the support the Kosovo Serbs gained, both in Kosovo and from Serbs 
elsewhere in Yugoslavia, was through campaigns of propaganda in the province 
against Kosovo Albanians, portraying them as a threat to Serbs. Part of this threat 
443 Wolchik, 1985, p 191 
444 Milic, 1993, p 113 
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was the increasingly large Kosovo Albanian population and the small Kosovo Serb 
popUlation. In this section, I will examine some of the pronatalist policies and 
propaganda in both Kosovo and in Yugoslavia in general around this time. 
Pronatalist rhetoric was becoming prevalent by the late 1980s as nationalist 
sentiment heightened. Just as the decline in the working class birthrate was a concern 
under socialism, "as nationalism replaced class struggle as the basis of political 
discourse in Serbia, this obsession with reproduction was transferred to the nation.,,446 
The push for a strong labour force, common in the Eastern European socialist 
countries, changed to a nationalist drive to protect the nation by reproducing it. There 
were calls from Serbian politicians for" 'all Serbian women to give birth to one more 
son in order to carry out their national debt.' Following the war in Slovenia, another 
politician said, "For each soldier fallen in the war against Slovenia, Serbian women 
must give birth to 100 more sons".447 Mertus writes of charts in Serbian media with 
portrayals of Albanian and Serbian birth-rates: these "speak of the need to populate 
the 'Serbian nation, otherwise Serbs will be a minority in their own country",.448 This 
is a clear indication of the threat felt by many Serbs in the region of Kosovo, as 
relations between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians deteriorated. While relations 
had not been good for a long time, the push for restrictive abortion laws demonstrate 
that there was a fear regarding the strength of the nation in terms of sheer numbers.449 
An example from the Serbian media also demonstrates how Albanian women 
and Serbian women were portrayed as "mothers of the nation". The mothers of the 
Serbian nation were exhorted to bear more children as "Serbia's demographic slump 
[was] described as 'one of the greatest tragedies of the Serbian women",.450 Zajovic 
makes the point that this not only dictates to women what their role is, but also holds 
them accountable, and therefore open to blame when the demographic goals are not 
achieved. 
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In another example, a portrayal of the high birthrate of Kosovo Albanian 
women as a "democratic counterrevolution" was an obvious attempt to frame the 
issue as an actual attack on the Serbian nation. In such a statement, Serb leaders 
portrayed the high birthrate of Albanian women as a political act. Negative images in 
Serb media pre-1991 included those of Kosovo Albanian women as "illiterate village 
women in traditional Muslim dress, encircled by a dozen children and imprisoned by 
a brick wall.,,451 These Albanian women were portrayed as threats to the Kosovo Serb 
population because they had so many children: they were dangerous to Kosovo Serbs. 
Pronatalism can also include the provision of certain services to certain 
groups. It is clear that much of the motivation for certain pronatalist policies was 
functional, rather than coming from a moral objection to abortion, as examples of 
access to abortion in Kosovo demonstrate. Access to abortion was denied for some 
and allowed for others, depending upon which nationalist group the mother belonged. 
According to Mertus, the medical commission that approved abortions, "started 
denying abortions to more Serbian women when the grounds were 'social reasons' 
but. .. continued to pennit abortions for the same reasons for Gypsy and Albanian 
women.,,452 Abortions were therefore still pennitted for the undesirable minorities, 
whose high rate of reproduction presented a threat. For Serb women, whose babies 
were more "valuable", at least to Serb nationalists, abortion was restricted. The 
criteria for detennining when abortion was appropriate were not universal, and in this 
case were subject to change depending upon the particular needs of the nationalist 
project. 
The connection between the movements of nations into cnSIS and the 
pronatalist moves of restricting abortion is illustrated by Nikolic-Ristanovic, outlining 
the cases in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The pressure of anti.-abortionist groups 
coincided with the pronatalist goals of the nationalist leadership. According to 
Nikolic-Ristanovic, nuns witnessed any examinations of women seeking abortions, 
and insisted there be no abortion.453 A further example of this was a " ... 1995 
Christmas message from the Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church, which called on 
women to stop 'killing' their unborn children, to bear more children despite economic 
451 Mertus, 1996, p 266 
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hardship and to learn from mothers who lost their only sons in the war and who now 
regret not bearing more sons who could bring them consolation.,,454 Again from the 
Serbian Orthodox Church: "abortion is the unspeakable slaughter of little Serbs", and 
"Serbian people are dying and bleeding at the same time, both on the battlefield and 
on the medical table.,,455 Nationalist rhetoric is employed to draw the attention of 
people to the impact of their individual actions on the nation as a whole: the slaughter 
of the Serbian nation at their own hands. 
This pronatalist nationalist mobilisation was not peculiar to Serb nationalists. 
Slovenia was another region in which the threat of increasing non-Slovenian 
populations within the state caused concern among nationalist leadership. Indeed, the 
right to abortion that was ensured under socialism became "seen as a great hazard to 
the future of the Slovene nation, which, according to most of the parties in the 
governing coalition, is on the brink of dying out.,,456 The Slovenian Constitution is 
worded such that it can be interpreted as anti-abortion, and, after women were 
guaranteed access to reproductive control under socialism, the new constitution was 
used to restrict that access in order to populate the nation.457 
Rape 
One of the most prevalent and disturbing aspects of the conflict over power in 
the former Yugoslavia was the widespread use of rape as a tactic of war. As a 
symbolic and physical way of asserting dominance, rape in the context of this case 
study demonstrates how strong the power of gender constructs can be, particularly in 
a nationalist conflict. 
It is important to address here the symbolic nature of rape, particularly as it 
relates to the legitimacy of the nationalist leadership. On the individual level, when a 
woman is raped, it demonstrates that the men responsible for her (father, husband, 
brother, etc) are incapable of protecting her and are therefore not true men. To relate 
this back to the symbolic political utility of rape, a man must be able to protect 
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women from rape, and if he cannot, he is not fit to hold power, whether on a local or 
national level. The rape of a woman can be seen as the symbolic rape of the nation, 
and can be seen as emasculating for the male leadership, effectively removing its 
legitimacy to govern. The rape of the nation, therefore, is often used as a means of 
portraying the nation as defiled by the enemy - the "other" - and is a means of 
creating both fear and outrage at that other. Rape in the fonner Yugoslavia was often 
perfonned in front of the woman's husband and/or other family, which suggests that 
part of the purpose of the rape was to show that those who bore responsibility for the 
woman were incapable of protecting her. This symbolic attack on the capability of 
men to protect those dependent on them can be seen as showing a nation's weakness 
and inability to protect itself. 
One of the signs of organised rape as a tool of war was the allegations of rape 
camps organised by various sides in the conflict. 458 Benton, in her discussion of the 
Serbian rape camps, states that these " ... are but the most notorious examples of rape 
as an actual assault on women, on a nation's honour and on men's capacity to protect 
their women ... ,,459 This returns the discussion to a point raised earlier. A neglected 
aspect of the individual gender roles that are promoted in nationalist ideology is 
construction of conceptions of masculinity. While a great deal of literature deals with 
the impact on women, men's roles and relationship to the nation needs to be analysed 
as welL The above quote points to one area where the impact of rape also affects men: 
they have failed in their role as protector of their wife or mother or daughter. It is an 
attack on the masculinity of the man and his responsibility to the nation. For the 
rapist, it is a sign of his dominant masculinity, as he has proven that he is more 
powerful than the enemy men, and that he has the capacity to dominate and control 
the woman and the man who is meant to be protecting her. As discussed in the 
framework, when women's purity is a symbol of the demarcation of the nation's 
purity, the rapist renders the national boundaries unclean. 
The ramifications of biological inclusion in the nation as discussed in the 
pronatalism section also playa role in the use of rape to achieve wartime goals. When 
a woman is raped and impregnated by the enemy of the nation, and the nation is 
457 Ibid., P 152-3 
458 0 1ujic, 1995 
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defined at least partially biologically, the woman and the child are both considered to 
be impure and to have at least partially lost membership in the nation.46o The 
mandatory element for inclusion in the nation is the patrilineal gene, regardless of the 
child's mother. This is in accord with Denich's argument that, "It is significant that 
the newly resurrected nationalism ofthe contending Bosnian factions should include a 
patriarchal claim that equated biological paternity with social fatherhood, and 
presumed that children of mixed parentage would belong to the father's ethnicity.,,461 
The continuation of this patriarchal conception of the right to membership in the 
nation means rape will continue to be used in this type of nationalist warfare. 
Serb soldiers and paramilitary troops who raped women told them that they 
would give birth to 'little Chetniks' or Serbian soldiers, who would grow up 
to kill them. Other Croat or Muslim women were told that if a woman 
carries a Serbian baby, then she too is Serb (State Commission for 
Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
October 1992)462 
These tactics are not limited to one group. When nations identifies themselves 
along lines that place such importance on biological indicators, there is a relatively 
consistent use ofthe methods outlined above. Denich found that many Serbian victims 
of rape described the same methods of rape as Croatian and Muslim women, and that 
the "patterns" of rape were the same, indicating that they were used for the same 
purpose.463 The similarities arose from "male perpetrators [who] appropriated women 
simultaneously as objects of sexual violence and as symbols in a contest with rival 
males that replicated the traditional forms of Balkan patriarchy".464 
Because the patriarchal system dictates that national membership is dependent 
on the father's nationality, rape is often used to both devastate the enemy nation and 
populate one's own national group. The rape of women in this war, as Nikolic-
Ristanovic described it, is multi-functional. 
"Wartime inter-ethnic rapes forced women to bear children who belonged to 
their enemy's ethnic group. In this war [in the former Yugoslavia], rape has 
459 Benton, 1998, p 38 
460 Brown, 1994, p 87; Denich, 1995, p 68; Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 39 
461 Denich, Bette, 1995, p 68 
462 Hughes et aI, 1995 
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been used as a method of "production" of children for the rapist's 
nationality ... ,,465 
The result was the rej ection of the women by their husbands, who, subscribing 
to nationalist definitions, saw the women as defiled by the enemy. To many men, rape 
rendered women unclean. The children of the rape could not be accepted.466 
The distressing number of allegations concerning rape camps supports this 
argument. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, Allen discussed some of the 
reasons for the camps.467 The women were raped both as part of a system of torture, in 
which they were either killed or impregnated. The women would often be raped 
continuously and held until they were in an advanced state of pregnancy, and would 
then be released. 
In the first case, the death of the victim contributes to the genocidal goal; in 
the second, the birth of a child does, for the perpetrator or the policy 
according to which he is acting - considers this child to be only Serb and to 
have none of the identity of the mother.468 
Seifert has provided a disturbing example of how Serbs used rape as part of a 
plan to destroy and pollute significant aspects of a culture. 
It is reported that once an area or town had been invaded, a phased course of 
action was followed. The first step obviously consisted in destroying objects 
of cultural heritage. In a second step, the intellectuals were taken captive 
and frequently killed because they are people who play a particularly 
important role in the preservation and tradition of a nation's culture ... The 
third step was the establishment of rape camps for women.469 
The rape of women in front of their families can only be considered a 
conscious act to degrade the woman and her family and community. Meznaric's 
detailing of this shows how widespread this was, and that the purpose of the rape was 
at least partially to inflict this degradation.470 This is apparent in the testimony of the 
women Meznaric interviewed, as many describe the public nature of their rapes and 
465 NikoHc-Ristanovic, 1996, p 361 
466 Ibid., P 361 
467 Allen, 1996 
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the effect it had: "Salih's son ... hung himself after his wife Rarnza had been violated 
by several Chetniks who raped her before his eyes.,,471 
Rape is often used in propaganda to provoke emotional responses, as 
demonstrated in the example of Albanian men allegedly raping Serbian women. As 
discussed above in the pronatalism section, in the 1980s the power struggle in Kosovo 
between Serbs and Albanians was intensifying. As the struggle for control over the 
Kosovo police force increased, accounts of rape by Albanian men of Serbian women 
were widely reported in Serbian media. Included in this was an allegation of the rape 
of a Serbian nun by an Albanian policeman, an accusation guaranteed to heighten 
emotions. It was never verified. Mertus has contended that this "served to create a 
truth about the gender behaviour of Albanian males - painting them as primitive, 
oversexed, out-of-control animals who threaten the purity and very survival of the 
Serbian nation.,,472 
The irony of rape as a tool of propaganda is that the stigma it induces is a 
double edged sword. Its usefulness as propaganda capable of stirring great emotion is 
weighed against its effectiveness as a method of destroying the "purity" of a woman. 
One anecdote from Mertus demonstrates the agony of deciding whether to report the 
rape of a 19 year old Albanian woman raped by a Serbian policeman (1995). "While 
the incident can be touted as an example of Serbian oppression and this benefits the 
Albanian cause, it can also be seen as a shame. 'Her life is ruined in her village now', 
one woman explained. 'No one will touch a girl that [sic] has been raped. ",473 One 
Serbian newspaper, referring to a woman raped by the enemy, concluded, "She would 
be better off dead than alive to shame her husband, her family, and her community by 
giving birth to a child from the seed ofthe enemy.,,474 
However, there is often a limit on how much of a threat an enemy male is 
allowed to present. If he presents too much danger to the women within the national 
community, then he may be perceived as too strong for the men of the nation: i.e. they 
will not be men enough to protect their women. "What is important here is that the 
471 Ibid., P 97 (n 43) 
472 Mertus, 1996, p 264 
473 Ibid., P 271 
474 Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 39 
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rape is always an attempted one. A picture of the enemy thus takes shape of an 
Albanian who tries to rape Serbian girls but is unable to do so ... The enemy tries to 
attack, to rape, but is confounded, is impotent, in contrast to the macho Serb.,,475 
One of the indicators that rape is specifically used as a nationalist tool is the 
way rape is handled in the political sphere. In Serbia, " 'political rape' is distinguished 
from 'ordinary rape.' The violence of 'ordinary rape' is less severely punished 
because victims and perpetrators are presumably not of different nationalities ... ,,476 
Morokvasic claims that while women who have been raped are "directly exploited as 
a symbolic image of the threat that mixing represents for a nation", rape is disregarded 
and the women shamed when the rapes are perpetrated by men of their own nation. 
" .. .In nationalist discourse rapes are condemned only in so far as they are committed 
by men of the other group. ,,477 It is interesting to note that this interpretation of rape 
allows the nationalist identity to remain noble: there is a lesser charge for "inter-Serb" 
rape, because the image of a Serb man as a rapist contradicts the image of the male 
Serb as a hero. To equate him with the Albanian or Croatian rapist would be to equate 
him with the enemy, and weaken the Serb nation. 
One of the most marked aspects of the wars in the former Yugoslavia has been 
the international attention paid to the gendered nature of much of the warfare. This is 
usually in reference to the atrocities that are specifically wrought on women and girls: 
rape, the intentional impregnation of women by rape, and rape camps.478 However, 
what is often ignored is that men are singled out and killed because of their gender. 
They are killed because ofthe perception of men as warriors. Just as the horror stories 
are told of young, attractive women being chosen by enemy soldiers, so are the men 
of fighting age selected and killed so they cannot continue to fulfil their gender role: 
that of warrior for the nation. The failure of men in the role of protector and defender 
of vulnerable members of the nation results in a perception of "men's inability to 
protect 'their' women and to control their sexuality and procreative powers is 
perceived as a critical symptom of weakness.,,479 This, as Jones describes in his 
475 Salecl, 1992, p 54-5 
476 Meznaric, 1994, p 79 
477 Morokvasic, 1998, p 75. This, claims Morokvasic, is an attitude that holds true for both participants 
and observers (i.e. journalists and scholars). 
478 Benderly, 1997, P 64-5 
479 Denich, 1995, p 68 
126 
examination of the neglect of men in the discussion of gender in wartime, results in a 
particular method of attack in wartime. 480 
Raising three main ways in which men are persecuted and killed because of 
their gender, Jones examines a perspective rarely covered in gender studies. First is 
the "forcible conscription" of men. This contradicts a perception of a universal 
"eagerness" on men's parts to fight in nationalist wars. When 4,000 men attempted to 
escape conscription in Bosnia by fleeing to Croatia, President Franjo Tudjman sent 
them back. His reasoning was that, "Croatia, which already has accepted 400,000 
refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, cannot undertake to care for those who in 
conditions of war should stay on the battlefield and defend their homes against the 
aggressor.,,481 The point Jones makes is that it is considered acceptable for men to be 
turned away as refugees because they are the ones who do the fighting. It is regardless 
of whether they want to fight, and is not considered a gendered part of conflict. 482 
His second category is of "retributory or 'pre-emptive' execution". In this 
scenario men are killed in order to prevent them from fighting. The horrifyingly 
common stories of men being rounded up and killed are not usually put in a 
nationalist conflict framework: these men are being killed because they are of fighting 
age, and they are killed because their duty, as Tudjman and many others have said, is 
to fight for their nation.483 
Finally Jones discusses "incarceration", which has much the same motivation 
as the executions. While much rarer than the raping of women, men were sexually 
abused in these prison camps as welL Jones discusses the sexual abuse of men at he 
hands of some women prison guards, either with the men being forced to have sex 
with each other, or being abused by the guards themselves.484 The incarceration 
prevented fighting-age men from being able to participate in the warfare, but the 
sexual abuse proved the men's loss of power and their subjugation to their captors.485 
The gender-based selection is never more apparent than in the multitude of stories 
480 Jones, 1994 
481 Ibid., P 123 
482 Ibid., P 122-24 
483 Ibid., P 124-26 
484 Ibid., P 121 and note 12 
485 Hague, 1997, p 53 
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about separation of men and women.486 Jones referred to documentation of, 'the 
gender- and age- based separation process carried out by occupying forces [which] led 
to men being detained while women and children were allowed to flee the area as 
refugees. ,,487 
These atrocities have a familiar theme: they were perpetrated with a sense of 
purpose, which draws on the themes and concepts outlined in the previous chapter. 
The purpose of the selection and killing off of men of fighting age is fairly obvious: it 
not only cuts the number of men who can fight for their nation, it also reduces the 
numbcr of men available to father the future fighters for the nation and acts to 
intimidate to anyone who remains to fight. 
Deviations from Nationalist Norms 
Socialist Yugoslavia was not as restrictive as socialist Romania in many ways, 
and this included more general tolcrance of deviations from gender constructions. 
While Yugoslavia was not open and accepting of a great deal of diversity, there was 
room in the Yugoslav society, for example, for women's groups. However, as conflict 
began to spread through the regions and national identities became more strictly 
defined, this room for tolerance was restricted. 
Feminist Movements 
Feminism in socialist Yugoslavia was a flourishing movement, especially in 
the early 1980s, due mostly to the relative openness of the socialist leadership in that 
country.48B There was considerable support for women's groups. But, as the 
nationalist rhetoric turned into nationalist conflict, feminist movements were either 
co-opted by the nationalist cause or were denigrated for their antiwar, pacifist 
messages.489 As the situation in Yugoslavia dissolved into armed conflict, the strain 
began to show on many women's groups that crossed nationalist boundaries. Groups 
486 Jones, p 126-28 
487 Ibid., P 126-27 
488 Benderly, 1997, p 60-61; Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 37; Munk, 1999, Litrichin and Mladjenovich, 1997 
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that had pacifist tendencies found that they were split either along internal, nationalist 
identity lines, or by external pressure to conform to societal norms. 
As has been illustrated above, when women are encouraged to raise children 
for the nation, this protective role conflicts with having to send these same children to 
be wounded or killed in battle. As has happened many times in the West, women in 
Yugoslavia organised against war. The Women in Black are the most well-known 
group, and maintained their silent protests throughout the conflict. Denich has also 
traced the reality of mothers during the conflict by looking at the protests of many 
mothers in Yugoslavia.490 These mothers, from all areas of Yugoslavia, insisted that 
their sons return home and not fight. 
However, as the fighting became more intense and the conflict dragged on, 
many women began to withdraw along traditional nationalistic lines, and protests 
dwindled.491 Not only was it difficult for the women to continue to protest as 
nationalist sentiment grew in response to the intensity of the fighting, but the women 
themselves began to feel threatened by the "other" - the enemy - and in need of 
protection. 492 As hostilities increased in Kosovo in the late 1980s, Serb women in 
Kosovo marched with placards reading, "We gave up our sons for Yugoslavia, now 
the Yugoslavian army should protect US!,,493 These women were calling for the armed 
intervention of the military, not for the cessation of hostilities: they felt the threat of 
the "other" in the form of the Kosovo Albanians. 
Woollacott has made the very valid point that women are participants in the 
machinations of the nation just as men are. In many cases, the nation exerts more 
"identity pressure" than does the gender. An increase in the intensity of the conflict 
leads to a correlating increase in the pressure for men and women to conform to 
stricter nationalist norms, to align themselves with their national identity, rather than 
their identity as a woman or mother.494 While the national identity incorporates such 
associations as woman with motherhood, the paramouncy of the nationalist identity 
490 Denich, 1995, p 69 
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means that aspects of being a mother must fall to the side. The desire to protect one's 
children must be sacrificed to the nation, as sons go off to war. 
Yugoslavia is definitely a case in point. Women's groups were pressured into 
supporting the war, both through "official" channels and from their neighbours and 
friends. As Stojslavjevic put it, "women who did oppose the conscription of their sons 
into their own national armies were vilified and accused of wanting the destruction of 
their own people, by not wanting the country to defend itself.,,495 In one well-reported 
instance, a Croatian women's group leader compared the Serbian aggression with the 
sexual assault on the body of Croatia.496 Unsurprisingly, the sexuality of the women 
protesters was questioned. Benderly describes the Women in Black being spat upon 
and called whores as the women stood in silence.497 
Women as Soldiers 
While this thesis has discussed a variety of roles women "should" play, the 
actual elasticity of these roles becomes apparent in times of crisis. Indeed, the roles 
that are appropriate could be seen to change according to what is useful to various 
parties at various times. For example, this is true of the need for women to become 
mothers when the population of a nation is under threat due to large numbers of 
casualties. One of the most interesting switches, however, contrasts sharply with the 
role of the nurturing mother: the role of women as fighters or soldiers. In this 
scenario, the perception of women changes depending upon the group with which she 
is associated. In the former Yugoslavia, in both Croatia and Serbia, a number of 
women fought as soldiers. Needing to legitimate this, "the media celebrate[ d] these 
women when they kill [ ed] the enemy; but when women fighters from the other side 
are captured, they are denounced as 'monstrous women",.498 This switch, contends 
Morakvasic, was portrayed in the media as showing " the superiority of the nation 
over other identifications and allegiances.,,499 How gender should manifest was 
dependent upon the utility for the nation in a particular scenario. Therefore, when 
495 Stojslavjevic, 1995, p 38 
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women acted outside of what would seem to be appropriate gender roles, if those 
action were nonetheless useful for the national project, they were acceptable. These 
same actions were condemned as unnatural when in opposition to the national project. 
It is worthwhile to briefly address the position of men as pacifists, which is 
more difficult to reconcile with the goals of the nation than a woman soldier, 
especially during armed conflict. The position of a woman soldier can be rationalised 
by her portrayal as a fierce mother fighting for her children. Functionally, that means 
she is another soldier on her nation's side. However, if a man does not fight, he is not 
only another soldier not fighting for the nation, he is a threat to the definition of a true 
member of the nation: men fight to protect the nation to achieve the glory and goals of 
the nation. This is such a pervasive theme that it was vocalised, as we saw above, by 
Franjo Tudjrnan in the case of male asylum seekers. Unsurprisingly, in Serbia male 
refugees were forced into battle, and those who tried to avoid were this branded as 
"unpatriotic, unmasculine, even cowardly and treasonous, negative examples that 
would shame the others into abiding by the heroic nationalist ideal of manly 
behaviour.,,50o 
Homosexuality 
Homosexuality follows on from the case discussed above, of men pacifists, as 
a threat to the nation. In Romania, we saw that there was hostility towards 
homosexuality because it threatened the homogeneity of the nation. In Yugoslavia, it 
would seem that the closer the country came to civil war, the more this hostility 
increased. Homosexual males were seen to present an actual threat to the nationalist 
community because they threatened both masculinity and the combat capacity of the 
group (i.e., homosexuals were not considered capable of fighting as true warriors). I 
would contend that, in line with Mosse's argument that homosexuals are as dangerous 
as foreigners, foreigners are never as dangerous as when a nation is at war. 
This point is demonstrated quite graphically by a report of a state news-
broadcaster's comments within hours of NATO's bombing of the Serbs in 1999. This 
newscaster's claim ''was that the leaders of the West are gay, only he used our word 
500 Lukic, 2000, p 414 
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for fag, peder. He talked about the gay government of [British prime minister] Tony 
Blair, about how the wife of Tony Blair is a lesbian, and that her best friend, the wife 
of Bill Clinton, is also a lesbian.,,50I It is difficult to imagine a more overt example of 
Mosse's argument: the dangerous foreigners are portrayed here as homosexual, 
making them even more alien and menacing.502 
Conclusion 
This second case study provides further insight into the gender/nationalism 
dynamic. One of the most significant issues demonstrated by the case of Yugoslavia 
(and its disintegration) is how gender roles are exploited in a time of outright conflict. 
The utilisation of the concepts outlined in this thesis go far in indicating just how 
strong the link between gender and power legitimation is. 
As in Romania, the use and abuse of history played a large part in the 
manipulation of the Serb identity, particularly after the death of Tito. As outlined 
above, the dispersion of power to the various republics paralleled the efforts to control 
the history of the various regions. In Serbia, the emphasis was placed on the 
victimisation of Serbs in previous struggles, on the valour of Serb men and on the 
self- sacrifice of Serb women. Additionally, the above review of the media and 
popular culture makes clear that demonisation of the enemy played a large role in the 
reassertion of the national Serb identity. A large part of this demonisation was based 
on various attacks on the enemy's sexuality, whether through symbolic attacks in the 
media (the Kosovo Albanian women as breeders), the labelling of foreign leaders as 
homosexual, or the very physical act of rape. 
As the politics of reproduction section shows, the subject of rape permeates 
the discussion of gender in the former Yugoslavia. The widespread use of rape as a 
tool of warfare is a chilling example of how gender constructs are used to assert 
dominance over another group of people. The different levels on which this is 
effective symbolic, cultural, individual- demonstrates how the utilisation of gender 
constructions manifests in power struggles. The efforts to control male and female 
501 Friess, 1999. For more anecdotal examples, see Aravosis, 1999 
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bodies are shown through the examples of rape in the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia, and in the pronatalist attitudes and policies that were present, although to 
a lesser extent than in Romania. The significance of rape presents perhaps the most 
compelling evidence from this region that the study of gender is important to the 
study of nationalism. 
The case study above shows, through both policy and rhetoric, that the 
manipulation and construction of gender identities are integral to the struggle for 
leadership legitimation: Milosevic's manoeuvres to gain control of Serbia and to 
maintain his popularity relied on a heavily gendered construct of nationalism. It is 
with this in mind, and with the examples discussed in the chapter on Romania, that I 
examine the main themes in the final chapter. 
502 To carry this analogy further, there were a series of articles and magazines that contended that Blair 
and Clinton were controlled by aliens. See Toncic's article entitled, "Tony Blair is an Alien!" 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This thesis has provided an examination of the gendered discourse in the 
legitimisation of nationalist movements. By exploring the incorporation of gender 
constructions in nationalist theoretical literature, and then examining two case studies 
through a gender framework, the importance of these constructions has been 
demonstrated. Conceptions of gender played an integral role in the seeking and 
maintenance of legitimacy by nationalist movements, particularly because gender is a 
basic unit in the construction and maintenance of national identities. In both case 
studies, this thesis has demonstrated how nationalist projects are legitimated by and 
are reliant upon particular constructions of gender. 
A review of the theories and framework of this thesis is useful before 
exploring the major findings. The nationalism theory utilised in this thesis is based in 
the modernist paradigm, in which nationalism is defined as a modem, constructed 
phenomenon that is reliant upon certain elements for its construction and continuing 
appeal. One of the key elements of this paradigm is the conception of nations as 
imagined, as argued by Anderson.503 The model of nationalism utilised in this thesis 
has argued that in these imagined communities, histories are manipulated and 
traditions invented.504 This discussion also revealed some of the gaps in the nationalist 
literature; most specifically, the neglect of gender in the analysis of nationalism. 
The critique of nationalist literature in this thesis focussed on the failure to 
recognise that gender is one ofthe key elements in a national identity. This critique is 
primarily justified by the importance of gender as a social identifier. This thesis has 
utilised theoretical arguments that constructions of gender are integral to the 
S03 Anderson, 1991 
S04 Hobsbawm, 1983a, Gellner, 1983 
134 
reproduction of both the symbolic body of the nation and the reproduction of the 
actual popUlation of the nation. 505 These were then translated into the lenses of the 
politics of tradition and reproduction. 
The lenses of reproduction and tradition served to integrate the. vanous 
theories of gender and nationalism into a framework for the analysis of the case 
studies. The framework posited that there were several main areas in which the 
gendered nature of nationalist discourse became apparent. The section on tradition 
focussed on the way in which nationalism is transmitted. The means of transmission 
ranged from the utilisation of historical events to define the nation, to the 
manipUlation and creation of traditions to strengthen and support the nation, to the use 
of symbols, embedded in these traditions, to identify the individual with the nation. 
The reproduction section posited the various ways in which gender 
constructions, such as those of mother and father, can manifest themselves in a 
nationalist project. Drawing on biological characteristics of men and women, the 
nationalist projects discussed in this thesis have presented these constructions as the 
only appropriate roles for men and women in the nation. The containing and 
controlling of gender in pronatalist policies and the exploiting of the emotive power of 
rape in warfare were discussed as the two most potent ways this reproductive lens 
demonstrates gender's central role. 
The final section of the framework dealt with the deviations from the 
perceived or prescribed gender nonns within the nationalist project. The basic 
responses were either incorporation or rej ection. People who deviated from the 
constructed roles had to be either incorporated into the nationalist project through 
ideological gymnastics, or rejected as enemies of the nation. This section 
demonstrated not only how flexible gender constructions can be, but how these 
constructions can be used to vilify and isolate those who are rejected from the national 
community. 
Both case studies demonstrated the very potent role of nationalist identities in 
socialist and post-socialist legitimacy struggles. As argued in the theory chapters, 
505 Particularly Yuval-Davis: 1991, 1993 
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nationalist identities were based in part on definitions of gender that prescribed both 
criteria for membership in the nation and appropriate behaviour within the nation. The 
manifestation of tradition and reproduction in the gendered nature of the nationalist 
discourse in both countries was demonstrated. 
As in much of Eastern Europe, Romanian society was patriarchal, with 
"traditional" conceptualisations of male leadership and female passivity. Although 
socialist policy called for gender equality, women bore the double burdens of 
employment and domestic responsibility. As demonstrated, the major manifestation of 
the gendered nationalist project under socialism was through the pronatalist 
campaigns ofNicolae Ceausescu. In the post-socialist years, the emphasis was on the 
retraditionalisation of the roles of men and women. These professedly natural gender 
roles were manipUlated to legitimate the goals of various nationalist groups in their 
post-socialist attempts to gain power. 
The Yugoslavia chapter canvassed the particular aspects of gender as 
incorporated into the Serbian nationalist project, as led by Slobodan Milosevic, in the 
1980s and 1990s. Again, the community was a patriarchal one, the effects of socialist 
equality policies generally did not penetrate beyond the surface of society, and 
Yugoslav women bore the double burden of domestic responsibility and work. Post-
socialist conceptions of gender were dominated by armed conflict. The use of rape as 
a tool of war, for instance, was widespread. 
There are a number of differences and similarities between Yugoslavia and 
Romania that shed light on the nature of gender in nationalism. In Romania, 
nationalism was an almost monolithic force under socialist leadership. Nationalist 
ideology was inculcated by the state socialist leadership and nationalist policies were 
enacted. In the post-socialist years there have been different groups vying for 
legitimacy through a nationalist ideology. The situation in Yugoslavia is almost the 
reverse. The struggle to legitimate a particular leadership came in the latter years of 
state socialism, and it has been the nationalistic hegemony of Milosevic that has 
dominated the post-socialist years in the former Yugoslavia. 
As the manifestations of nationalist projects took place in different periods, i.e. 
socialist and post-socialist, it would be reasonable to expect that these radical changes 
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in both politics and social structures would lead to different social constructions of 
identity, such as gender. What is remarkable in both ofthese countries is the similarity 
of the gender constructions the nationalist leaderships have drawn on, both internally 
from period to period, and between the two countries. There are several facets of this 
similarity that need to be explored. 
As to the similarity of gender constructions between the socialist and post-
socialist years. As discussed in chapter four, the dynamics of state socialism and 
nationalism were mutually compatible in certain ways. These included the similarity 
between state intrusion into the private sphere, the efforts of both nationalist 
movements and socialist regimes to inculcate certain norms in society, and the use of 
an enemy "other" to support the legitimacy of the leadership. The association between 
identity construction and ideological legitimacy in both nationalism and socialism 
stemmed from the need to inculcate norms in the community and from the need to 
construct these identities in a way that situated a benevolent nation against a 
malevolent enemy. Socialist leaderships, for example, placed themselves in 
opposition to capitalist ideologies, while nationalist groups posited themselves against 
other nations. 
In socialist Romania, socialism and nationalism were combined, as the 
perceived threat to Romanians was not only from capitalist ideologies, but from other 
socialist countries, like Hungary. Therefore, there was official pressure to be wary of 
internal enemies under socialism that was rooted in both nationalist ideology and 
socialist ideology. The construction of the internal enemy had one of the most potent 
impacts on gender in socialist Romania. The Romanian woman who would not bear 
children for her nation was a threat to her nation, as she was not fulfilling her natural 
role and was endangering Romania by not reproducing the body of the nation. In 
socialist Romania, nationalist gender constructions were combined with socialist 
gender constructions: women bore the triple burden of work, domestic responsibility, 
and childbearing. 
Socialist Yugoslavia did not have this same combination of nationalist and 
socialist goals. Until Tito's death in 1980, the socialist leadership purposely avoided 
regional nationalism, only condoning a Yugoslav identity. It was after his death, as 
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socialism began to lose its legitimacy in Yugoslavia, that nationalist groups 
throughout Yugoslavia began to strengthen and grow, asserting their power from the 
periphery and weakening the central federal structures. There was not the same 
construction of an internal enemy, partly because there was not the same conflation of 
the socialist and nationalist goals. Indeed, if there was an internal threat under Tito, it 
was regional nationalism itself. Therefore, in socialist Yugoslavia, a more open 
society than socialist Romania, the formation of women's groups was not perceived to 
posit the same sort of internal threat as it did in Romania. The lack of a concerted 
pronatalist policy was also a factor in a the more extensive realignment of gender 
roles in Yugoslavia, albeit for a brief period. The feminist movement, which was 
really only nascent in the early 1980s, was reversed by the increasingly violent 
nationalist struggles that were occurring in Yugoslavia. 
The Serb leadership needed to emphasise the difference between the Serbs and 
the enemy others, although these groups had lived in relative harmony and had 
intermarried for decades. The need to delineate between Serbs and other enemy 
nationalist groups forced Serbs had to define themselves as different from these other 
groups. As we have seen in the chapter on Yugoslavia, this was accomplished through 
highly gendered issues and images. The constructions of gender as explored in this 
section were used to create difference between two groups. This concept of gender as 
an "ethno-marker'\ as Meznaric has called it, is often utilised not only to create 
difference between groups, but also to portray threat. 506 When two groups have very 
little else to distinguish them, demomsation and degradation of the other is often used 
to demarcate boundaries between groups. The degrading of women in particular is 
important, for as Yuval-Davis has argued, the purity of women is often representative 
of the integrity of national borders.507 Gender is a particularly potent device for this 
purpose, as the portrayal of an enemy woman as a whore dehumanises her, and helps 
to justify her being raped in war. The portrayal of enemy men as savages and rapists, 
on the other hand, provides justification to kill them, as they present a threat to the 
pure women of one's own nation. In newspapers, Albanian men were rapists; Serb 
men were not. In popular music representations, Serb women were pure and chaste; 
Croatian women were whores. Gender representations became the way that 
506 Meznaric, 1994, p 82; see also Rejali, 1996 
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differentiations were made between the Serbs and the Croats, for example, who spoke 
the same language. By portraying Croatian women as wanton, the distinction was 
made in a way that allowed Serbs to be disgusted by their enemy, and to see them as 
fundamentally different from themselves. This dehumanisation allowed enemy 
women and men to raped and killed. 
Post-socialist Yugoslavia was characterised by a retraditionalisation of gender 
roles, in that men and women were encouraged to "return" to their traditional roles of 
women in the home and men in the workplace. This was often framed in nationalist 
rhetoric, as Serb women were "naturally" meant to care for their husbands and 
children and Serb men were "naturally" meant to protect and provide for their 
families. This coincided with the increasing tensions of civil war, which was by then 
ravaging the country. The post-socialist period is also marked by the consolidation of 
Milosevic's power, which was based on a nationalist ideology of Serb superiority and 
victimisation. The disintegration of all but a few women's groups organised along 
nationalist lines indicates the collapse of state-condoned diversity, as conformity to 
nationalist goals became paramount, and deviation was either absorbed or quashed. In 
many ways, the situation in post-socialist Yugoslavia resembled that in socialist 
Romania. The perception of threat to the Serbs meant that gender roles became more 
restricti ve as defining the nation became more important. 
While post-socialist Serb nationalism became ever more militant and 
embroiled in violent conflict, and was increasingly controlled by one man and his 
wife, post-socialist Romania moved incrementally in the other direction. The 
execution of the Ceausescus brought with it a break from tyranny but no significant 
change from the ideology that had helped Nicolae Ceausescu to maintain his hold on 
power. As those vying for power utilised variations of Romanian nationalist rhetoric, 
the general trend was to encourage women back into the home and men into the 
workplace. This retraditionalisation was evident in the reduction in the number of 
women in the public sphere, and in calls in the media for women to bear children, as 
in the article entitled, "A Family Without Children is Like a Tree Without Fruit".508 
507 Yuval-Davis, 1993 
508 Ibid., P 238 
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Some basic elements of both the Romanian and Yugoslav nationalist identities 
is often seen as "typically" East European. They are traditional, delving deep into the 
past to co-opt events and to invent legends both for historical legitimacy and for 
rituals and traditions that emphasise community. They draw on and create folk 
traditions such as oral poetry and music to re-emphasise that community and to create 
ties with the past. The national identity is also seen as one that relies on "natural" 
conceptions: the national identity is one attained through birth, and through adhering 
to natural roles. As has been discussed at length, an emphasis on these natural roles 
has resulted in the retraditionalisation of men and women's roles in these countries. 
These basic elements in constructions of gender in both the Romanian and 
Serb cases were essentially the same. Throughout, the primary means of defining 
these nationalist identities and presenting the threats to them were in a gendered 
rhetoric. These concepts of gender were then used to further the goals of particular 
nationalist agendas by utilising emotive rhetoric and historic ties to separate people 
into particular groups. For example, in the pronatalist policies in both Yugoslavia and 
Romania women were exhorted to bear children for the nation, as it was their national 
and natural duty to do so. Abortion was referred to as killing the nation in both 
countries with similar imagery. In post-socialist Romania, to have an abortion was "to 
consent to your people's extinction".509 In Yugoslavia, "abortion [was] the 
unspeakable slaughter of little Serbs".510 It was through this gendered rhetoric that 
national groups were demarcated as unique and under threat from some foreign 
influence, whether that was a foreign ideology or the threat of rape. 
There are specific distinctions between the two countries, however, which 
raise some interesting questions and points for discussion. 
In Romania, the need for women to bear children for the labour force of the 
nation shaped the construction of gender roles. The need to present an internal threat 
from another ethnic group was not as great as in Yugoslavia, and the portrayal of 
imminent threat from an enemy within was not seen as integral to the national project. 
As discussed earlier, this is in part because the ethnic minorities had little chance of 
actually assuming power. Rather, for socialist Romania the external threat was posed 
509 Baban, 2000, p 238 
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either by other socialist countries (the USSR or by Hungary) or by capitalism, while 
the internal threat stemmed from the inappropriate behaviour of members of the 
Romanian nation. The internal threat in socialist Romania was from women and men 
who did not bear enough children. This was portrayed as a betrayal of the Romanian 
nation, not as a personal choice. The internal threat was a shrinking birth-rate, and 
those who did not help to combat this were traitors. The constant representation of 
women as fulfilling their natural, national role by bearing children is congruent with 
the assertions of the politics of tradition framework, that gender roles are posited as 
natural in order to achieve national goals. The integration of the roles of mother and 
father with the role of member of the nation is in accord with the argument in the 
framework that these constructions are interdependent. 
In Yugoslavia, on the other had, part of the purpose of gender roles was to 
present the spectre of an external threat. This external threat was a key element in the 
definition of Serb nationalist identity. Warfare in the 1990s meant that there were both 
internal and external threats in Yugoslavia, and the violent use of extreme gender 
constructions (i.e. rape) reflects this. The external threat is the more obvious, as 
anyone outside of the nation was presented as dangerous. For example, Albanians in 
Kosovo were people who would rape, while Serbs would never do this. The internal 
threat was the traitor within, a much more paranoid construction, that the Serb nation 
was in danger from its own members. These threats were often presented in gendered 
form, as examined in the deviations section of the case studies. For example, women's 
groups that reached across national boundaries were seen as threatening on a basic 
level because they demonstrated that those national boundaries were imagined. 
Because the capacity for this trans-national bond needed to be discredited, the women 
were presented as abnormal and deviant. 
In the increasingly violent nationalist discourse in the Serbian case, rape 
became the most prominent manifestation of the way gender constructions were 
utilised within this discourse. Symbolically and physically, rape became a means of 
cultural domination and physical control. As a means of propaganda it was used to 
create a threat by an enemy (but not too much of a threat, or it would become an 
assault on the masculinity of Serb men). Rape was utilised in rape camps both as a 
510 Mertus, 1996, p 267 
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cultural means of rendering large numbers of women "unclean", and to force the 
women to bear the children of the enemy. As has been argued throughout this thesis, 
the gendered warfare of rape also affected men, as their status as protectors was 
challenged when women were raped, as they themselves became the perpetrators of 
the rapes, and occasionally the victims of sexual abuse as well. 
The premise of women as mothers and men as both fathers and rapists creates 
a complex situation for the society in which these conceptions are utilised. Both are 
used to demonise the "other" (non-members of the nation) and to goad those who do 
belong into action for the nation. For example, Mertus traced a progression of 
"gender-based campaigns" in Kosovo, in which Albanian men were presented as 
rapists, Albanian women were portrayed as "baby factories" and therefore a threat to 
the Serb population, and finally, Serbian women were exhorted to increase the natality 
rate in the region.511 These are indicative of the way one concept (in this case, 
"woman as mother") can be used to demonise an enemy, to frighten people into 
believing a negative stereotype about an enemy, and to help push a nationalist group 
into action. 
In the case study sections, there has been a difference of emphasis on the 
various sections, depending upon what importance was placed on particular areas by 
the nationalist leadership. The most significant issue with a difference in coverage 
was rape as a nationalist tool. In Yugoslavia, this was one of the main mechanisms of 
gender constructions, whereas in Romania there was no evidence that this means was 
used either in presenting the perception of threat or as a tool of conflict. As argued in 
the Romania chapter, rape was probably not utilised because of the power imbalance 
in Romania. The minority groups in Romania were small enough to not present a 
serious threat to the leadership, despite the occasional representations by Ceausescu of 
them as a danger. It was easier for the groups to be "bought" by their "home" 
countries, such as Gennany, or to be assimilated or moved than to create the spectre 
of rape as a tool of differentiation and threat. Although rape as a nationalist implement 
was not utilised in Romania, the general conceptions of motherhood and purity were 
utilised, as were symbolic representations of the rape of Romanian lands, as in the 
511 Mertus, p 264-67 
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case of Bessarabia. Therefore, we see that all of the conceptualisations discussed in 
the framework were manifested in the two case studies. 
This discussion of rape and the differences between the two countries raises an 
important finding of this thesis. One of the major differences between the Romanian 
and Yugoslavian cases were the manifestations of the perceptions of threat to the 
national movement. In Romania, Hungarians were seen as a threat, but, as argued 
previously, were not enough of a threat to be demonised through rape. This is in 
contrast to the Albanian population in Kosovo, with the high incidences of alleged 
rape of Serb women by Albanian men. Hungarians, who could have been considered 
the largest internal threat to the Romanian nation, were not presented as such, possibly 
because their birthrate was lower than the Romanian one. Gypsies were often 
portrayed as the population threat because of their higher birthrate, but in terms of 
actual population numbers were realistically not threatening.512 The biggest threat in 
the Romanian case was the internal threat. 
The difference between internal and external threat in Yugoslavia and 
Romania brings up a variety of issues. The external threat in Romania, particularly 
under socialism, can be seen as a peripheral one, that was raised to show the spectre 
of threat from the inside to Romanians. This was then heightened by the internal 
threat of the enemy within. This enemy was portrayed as lurking everywhere, and was 
combated by the Ubiquitous Securitate. For Yugoslavians, the threat was basically 
external, in that there were foreigners living in the land that rightfully belonged to 
Serbs. In this way, the conflicts were different. Serbs were seeking to demonise and 
drive out the enemy. Romanians were fighting themselves and the enemy within. The 
gender constructions illustrate this. Romanian women bore the brunt of the fight 
against the internal enemy, as their bodies were utilised to achieve pronatalist goals. 
In Yugoslavia, the terror of rape was used to dominate and drive out the enemy. This 
entrenched the conflict, as the use of this powerful tool of war set people against their 
enemies. Gender constructions helped people perceive their enemies as innately 
different from themselves. 
512 The Roma birthrate was (in 1992) 2.7 per capita, as opposed to 1.8 for Romanians and 1.7 for 
Hungarians. Kligman, 1998, p 300, footnote # 42. 
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Besides the internal and external distinction, another aspect of the differences 
between Romania and Yugoslavia was the degree of threat. The degree of threat in 
both cases was portrayed by the nationalist leadership as vital to the survival of the 
nation. In actuality, the degree of threat in Yugoslavia was greater, as the conflict 
spiralled into civil war. The threat in Yugoslavia was generally portrayed and 
subsequently perceived as one that threatened the integrity of the nation from the 
outside. The threat to the nation was more extreme in this way, and the use of violent 
gender constructions served to portray and to heighten the threat to every Serb. This 
distinction shows how the gendering of the national conflict in Yugoslavia entrenched 
the conflict. The perception of threat from an enemy is very difficult to erase once it 
has been constructed, and the gendering of the threat serves to entrench that 
perception further. 
There are two processes at work here. As discussed above, the degree of threat 
to Serbs was portrayed in part through violent gender constructions, in which 
Albanians and Croatians were dehumanised by being portrayed as rapists and whores. 
Secondly, the intensity ofthe conflict was increasing, as more people were killed and 
more rapes were committed. The increasing degree of threat led to the entrenchment 
of the gender constructions. This dual process led to a spiral effect, as gender 
constructions were reinforced and the conflict intensified. Therefore, the threat in 
Yugoslavia was portrayed through gender constructions, and the degree of that threat 
was both intensified and entrenched by these gender constructions. 
The sections on deviations from a proscribed gender norm provide some ofthe 
most overt examples of the constructed nature of gender. One of the purposes of this 
thesis was to examine the malleability of gender constructions in nationalist 
movements. There are no absolutes of what gender is or of what it should look like, 
even within the strictures of a nationalist movement. Indeed, despite the efforts of 
many nationalist movements to control the physical bodies of its members, there are 
still deviations from these norms. However, the perceived naturalness of particular 
constructions is utilised within many nationalist movements to establish uniqueness 
and, therefore, legitimacy of a particular nationalist group. As discussed in chapter 
three, this is often through natural social structures such as the family. However, as 
with many other nationalist constructions, the image of gender is one that has been 
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culled from an often invented and manipulated past, and in reality is subject to change 
depending upon the need of the nationalist project. Therefore, there were examples of 
feminist groups in the former Yugoslavia who were condoned by the nationalist 
leaders for their support, while other feminist groups who did not support the 
leadership were condemned. Although one of the primary responsibilities of a mother 
in "nature" is to protect her young, women who strived to save their sons from battle 
were pilloried in the public arena. The image of a natural mother is useful to the 
national project in regards to the bearing of children. This then conflicts with the 
obligation to her national identity, which calls on her to send her sons offto battle. 
The discussion of deviations from the national norms is also illustrative of one 
of the paradoxes of nationalist identity: what is professedly a consistent, natural and 
immutable identity is actually fluid, and tends to change with the needs of a particular 
leadership. In the sections on "deviations", we found the demonisation of women and 
men in particular roles often depends on the usefulness those roles. The presumed 
rigidity that would come from a narrow definition of gender roles was actually quite 
flexible if the new definition had utility. Women soldiers in Yugoslavia, for example, 
were often considered useful by the Serb leadership if they were pro-Serb. If they 
were not, they were demonised as unnatural and as "monstrous".513 The same was true 
of women's groups in Yugoslavia. If the group was co-opted by the Serb nationalist 
project, it was acceptable an even laudable. If it reached across nationalist lines, it was 
condemned. 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there were certain restrictions 
on the scope of this work., which included the barriers of language and culture. The 
restriction of geography meant that this thesis had to draw on secondary case studies 
in most instances. This did not prove to be a problem, as the literature from the 
various disciplines utilised here was congruent with the primary information that was 
available. Where primary information was sourced, it was noted in the text of the 
thesis and was not evaluated at face value. In other words, I did not take for granted 
that information from the case study countries was not without an agenda: in most 
cases, the information obtained was useful because it did have an agenda. This was 
the case in the poem, "Spiteful Verses", from the Yugoslavian government website. 
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This piece was sanctioned by the Serb government and could be seen as representing 
their viewpoint. Thus, the subjectivity was useful in examining the gender 
representations approved by the Serb nationalist leadership. 
I would like to draw attention here to some further areas in which the 
gendering of nationalism is relevant and deserves further study. One is the issue ofthe 
uncertainty of nationalist leadership itself, in that there is a particular overarching 
legitimacy to which even the seemingly most permanent leaders are held. In Romania, 
Ceausescu was seen as having betrayed the nationalist project in his ravaging of the 
country and its people. His ultimate punishment was to be killed by the very people to 
whom he was meant to be a father. In Yugoslavia at present, Milosevic increasingly 
uses thug tactics to keep control of the country, such as quashing opposition protests. 
No longer certain of control over the people, he is turning more to coercion.514 His 
recent move to extend his presidential term is more reliant upon his ability to split the 
opposition vote than on his certainty in gaining support from the majority of Serbs. 
One question that arises from these two cases is, who has the right to be the 
"father" (it is not usually a political mother) of the nation? The difficulty with 
nationalist credentials is that if someone can be perceived as more "genuine" than the 
leader, they can then co-opt the nationalist movement. In Romania, the post-socialist 
contention for leadership has often focussed on which leader or political party can 
claim the most genuine nationalism, and to be representing the "real" Romanian. The 
legitimacy of a particular leader is dependent upon nationalist "credentials". In the 
former Yugoslavia, one of the most respected Serb nationalists has joined the youth 
opposition group, Otpor.515 Milosevic's continuing hold on power has relied on 
nationalist concepts, and on maintaining the right to determine what those nationalist 
concepts consist of. The threats to his hegemony come in part from the perception that 
he does not have those nationalist credentials. 
It is possible to construe from this that the constructed images of father, 
mother, son and daughter carry with them a certain degree of responsibility to the 
national project. To carry the metaphor of the family to its logical conclusion, the 
513 Zajovic, 1997, p 171 
514 Judah, 1997, p 43 
515 Sandford, 2000, "Father of the Nation" 
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self. This serves to entrench the conflict, as the differences between the two groups 
become so deeply rooted in past wrongs that a lasting peace becomes very difficult to 
achieve. 
The effect of this gendering of conflict can then be extended to a rccognition 
of the way these social constructions can effect the way countries in Eastern Europe 
deal with the issues of ethnicity and state borders. A national identity that is reliant 
upon these negative constructions of the enemy on such an emotive level will have 
great difficulty in reaching an equitable situation with members of that enemy nation 
in the same state. Therefore, in a scenario where there are the populations of two 
national groups living in the borders of one state, it is likely that these groups will 
have difficulty co-existing peacefully. This was certainly the case in the former 
Yugoslavia. What is important to understand is the deep impact that the often 
unrecognised influence of gender has upon these conflicts. 
Whether under a hegemonic nationalist leadership or during a struggle 
between competing nationalisms, gender constructions played an integral part in the 
claim to and maintenance of nationalist power in the two countries examined in this 
thesis. The utility of including gender in the study of nationalism is not only evident 
in the examination of past events in Romania and Yugoslavia, it is necessary in the 
analysis of the present situation of both countries, as gender constructions will impact 
on the way those countries deal with issues of nationalism in the future. In Romania, 
the conception of women and men as breeders of the nation led to devastating 
psychological effects and the abandonment of thousands of children who could not be 
cared for. In the former Yugoslavia, the utilisation ofrape as a tool of war has served 
to/ entrench the perceptions of difference between several national groups. 
Understanding the ubiquitous nature of these gender constructions in nationalist 
projects is vital to understanding how these nationalist groups view each other and 
themselves. Ignoring the vital role that gender plays in nationalism is to 
misunderstand the power that can be wielded through nationalist discourse. 
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